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EDITOR'S NOTE: THE SYMPOSIUM-WHAT VALUE?
This is the last in a series of editorial notes, modelled after editorials pub-
lished by the Review during the 1966-67 academic year. These editorials
are published as one of several special features during the Centennial
Year.
Twenty-five years ago, Lowell Noteboom and Timothy Walker
noted in the Denver University Law Review that "[i]n Ancient Greece, a
symposium was the discussion following a banquet or social gathering,
at which there was a free interchange of ideas." Long after Plato dis-
cussed the topic of ideal love, editors of journals and magazines have
often concentrated entire issues on specific themes for different pur-
poses-to address or meet the changing needs of society or to pose un-
answered questions for discussion and debate. In 1967, Noteboom and
Walker wrote that "the symposium has developed into a literary vehi-
cle-a collection of opinions on a selected topic, having as its purpose a
composite analysis of the significant aspects of that topic. Its value must
be measured in terms of its ability to achieve that goal."
For decades, the Denver University Law Review has annually at-
tempted to achieve that goal by publishing a Symposium Issue. Despite
the problems posed in presenting a Symposium Issue, each year the edi-
tors of the Review take on that challenge. For their efforts, the Review has
profited from increased interest by attorneys who find these single topic
issues a valuable resource in their chosen areas of practice. Over the
past one hundred years, the Review has published symposiums on vari-
ous areas of law (e.g. Intellectual Property, Natural Resources, Securi-
ties, Constitutional Law), special interests topics (Children, Employment
Discrimination) and even current events (the Watts Riots). Because
each Symposium Issue brings its own rewards, the Review continues its
tradition of publishing an annual symposium despite the difficulty of in-
tegrating each article into a common scheme.
This year's Symposium Issue takes a fresh look at environmental
litigation and regulation from the perspective of law and economics.
Colorado Attorney General, Gale Norton introduces this Issue with a
discussion of the "market incentives approach" to pollution prevention
and the economic impact of environmental regulation on private prop-
erty. Two other articles discuss a recent United Supreme Court case,
each from a different perspective. One article analyzes the impact of the
Lucas decision on shoreline protection programs, while the other re-
views the concept of "regulatory takings" after Lucas. In another article,
Professor Imwinkelreid, noted evidence scholar and author, writes of
the role of the expert witness in proving medical causation in toxic tort
cases. Another article addresses the effects of superfund site designa-
tion on property values, using Smuggler Mountain in Aspen as a case
study. This year's Symposium Issue also features two student pieces.
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One provides an economic analysis of environmental policy as enforced
by whistleblowers in contaminated facilities. The other discusses the
Supreme Court's reversal of a much-lauded Tenth Circuit opinion in
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, a landmark water law case involving competing
state interests and the classic "downstream versus upstream" battle.
By adding to the store of annual Symposium Issues during this
Centennial Year, we hope to continue a tradition of value measured only
by its "contribution to legal education."
Diana A. Cachey
FOREWORD
It is customary in forewords for editors to set forth the reasons for
their selection of certain topics and articles. What follows is an assem-
blage of articles that address basic concerns in the field of environmen-
tal law. Foremost among these concerns is the issue of what happens
when private interests clash with public interests and the extent to which
our society will go to find an equitable balance between them. Overall,
however, this Symposium deals with various environmental questions,
and though it may not provide definitive answers, I do believe that the
future of our planet and its inhabitants will depend on how human be-
ings choose to address these questions through what is perhaps their
most amazing tool-the law. Of course, it would be nothing short of
hubris for me to presume that this Symposium Issue will be pivotal in
shaping the law, but the articles I have chosen do raise some interesting
and worthwhile questions and they serve to encourage debate and
thought from both an economic and legal perspective.
I would like to thank all of the editors and staff who helped with this
Issue, especially Ms. Diana Cachey, whose assistance and advice always
made my task less formidable. Finally, thank you to Professors David
"Jake" Barnes, Jan Laitos, and J. Robert Brown, each of whom enriched





We live in a society that places great demands on its natural re-
sources. We insist upon a lifestyle that requires massive utilization of
raw resources, be it water for domestic uses, recreation and irrigation,
timber for fuel, paper and building materials, or oil, for heat and trans-
portation. Yet at the same time we are becoming even more insistent
that the environment be restored to, and preserved in, its natural state,
free from human interference. Clearly a complete "hands-off" ap-
proach to our natural resources is unworkable, yet we continue to adopt
new requirements for the use of our natural resources in an attempt to
reverse the impacts caused by years of unrestricted use, and to control
current and future uses to prevent waste and mismanagement.
Historically such requirements were based upon the concept of
"command and control," a method of regulation that imposes strict re-
quirements on polluting facilities. High civil penalties for violations of
those requirements provide the incentive to comply. This method of
regulation has advanced the restoration and preservation of the environ-
ment considerably, but its many shortcomings are likely to reduce its
effectiveness as we continue to pursue the reduction and elimination of
environmental pollution. Further success in our efforts to curb environ-
mental degradation must come from new incentives to eliminate pollu-
tion, and a recognition that the costs of clean-up and preservation of the
environment must be borne by all members of society.
MARKET INCENTIVES APPROACH
Until very recently the "environment" was viewed as a free com-
modity, belonging to no one, but subject to use by everyone. Because
they were free for the taking, the natural resources that make up our
environment - air, water, soil, flora and fauna - were often exploited
to the point that the resource was either depleted, or left in such a con-
dition that future use was impracticable. In the middle of the twentieth
century we began to recognize the importance of the environment, and
the need to control the use of our natural resources to prevent their
misuse, and to secure their availability into the future. We enacted many
environmental laws designed to regulate the use of our natural re-
sources and to mandate that past environmental degradation be cleaned
up. These environmental laws have relied upon the "command and
control" method of regulation. Technology-based controls or maxi-
mum pollutant levels have been imposed on those who release pollu-
tants into the environment. Those who violate these generally inflexible
* Colorado Attorney General
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controls are subject to enforcement. Known as "end-of-the-pipe" re-
quirements, these controls have traditionally been implemented across
the board, with little or no consideration of the difficulties encountered
by a particular facility in attempting to comply with the regulatory re-
quirements. Compliance costs can vary markedly between facilities, de-
pending on the age and location of the facility and the type of
manufacturing process it utilizes. Frequently, these kinds of regulations
have the greatest economic impact on smaller or older facilities, because
of the high costs of compliance or the difficulties in integrating new
technology into older processes.
Compliance with "end-of-the-pipe" requirements has significantly
reduced the release of pollution, but it has not eliminated pollution en-
tirely. Tighter end-of-the-pipe controls may further reduce the release
of pollution into the environment, but the costs associated with such
tighter controls may force many facilities out of business. One alterna-
tive is to require the establishment of pollution prevention and waste
minimization programs to reduce the generation of pollutants. This
kind of strategy, however, does not adapt well to the traditional ap-
proach of command and control. Instead of monitoring and limiting
what comes out of the pipe, pollution prevention under command and
control concepts would require monitoring and regulating the front end
of the facility, the raw products that go in, the processes that are used,
and how the waste is generated. Because of the huge variability in facili-
ties and their internal processes, adopting meaningful regulations to
prevent pollution or to minimize waste will be nearly impossible. More-
over, such regulation moves dangerously close to regulating the busi-
ness activities internal to the facility.
The market incentives approach to pollution prevention and con-
trol may provide a partial solution to the problem of further reducing or
controlling pollution. The advantage of this approach is that it controls
pollution in an especially effective and efficient manner by better distrib-
uting the costs of compliance among facilities, and by allowing facilities
to determine, within their own structures, how best to comply with envi-
ronmental requirements.
The market approach to pollution control utilizes the market to en-
courage the voluntary adoption of environmentally beneficial measures.
Private property rights in land, recreation uses and environmental
amenities, for example, can provide substantial incentive for the owner
to take appropriate actions to preserve and enhance that privately-held
right. There are many current examples of private groups using the
market to protect the environment. The Nature Conservancy, a private
non-profit organization, buys and protects valuable habitat. In this way,
private dollars from people with the desire to protect habitat pay for the
conservation effort, rather than protection being paid for by the public
as a whole. Defenders of Wildlife, a national nonprofit wildlife conser-
vation group, has initiated a program under which it will pay ranchers
for livestock killed by wolves. The group has undertaken this program
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in an effort to gain acceptance of wolf reintroduction programs. And in
England, a program of allowing private rights in fishing has been very
successful in improving stream quality. When rights are private, private
individuals utilize private causes of action, such as common law tort or
nuisance suits, to protect environmental resources.
A market incentives approach can likewise be used to encourage
private industry to voluntarily prevent and control pollution. This ap-
proach was adopted in the Clean Air Act of 1990 through provisions
that authorize sulfur dioxide emissions trading. Utilities can now sell
sulfur dioxide allowances credited to them for reducing their own sulfur
dioxide emissions below the legally imposed limit. The utilities that
purchase such allowances can thereby avoid the potentially more expen-
sive option of installing control equipment. Overall, total emissions of
sulfur dioxide are reduced to the Clean Air Act standard, at substantially
less cost than under traditional command and control concepts.
Market incentives can also be applied to encourage individuals to
reduce waste. Solid waste can be reduced through deposit refund sys-
tems or variable garbage collection fee programs. Applicants for envi-
ronmental permits can be encouraged to adopt source reduction or
waste minimization projects if in return their permit receives an expe-
dited review.
Market incentives will not replace command and control methods of
regulating the use of our natural resources, but they are a valuable tool
to explore and utilize to promote environmental protection.
ECONOMIC IMPACTS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
The negative impact of environmental regulation on private prop-
erty values has also steadily increased, creating a demand for the re-
examination of the costs of environmental protection. As we recognize
the finite nature of our natural resources, we have attempted to halt the
development and use of real property to preserve its natural condition
or to remediate its environmental ills. Real property has always been
subject to reasonable regulation to promote public health, safety and
welfare. This police power has continuously been expanded by federal,
state and local governments to restrict available uses of land, because of
environmental concerns or the desire to preserve natural resources.
Property values can be greatly diminished if the property is located on
the shoreline or if it contains a wetlands or an endangered species. Real
property transactions are greatly hampered because of fears of finding
environmental contamination.
In the recent Lucas decision, however, the United States Supreme
Court may have limited government ability to regulate land use based
upon environmental or natural resources issues.' Now public entities
wishing to preserve or protect the natural characteristics of real property
may be required to pay private landowners for taking their property
1. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
1993]
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rights. Governments may be precluded from imposing environmentally
based restrictions on the use of private property without compensating
the property owner for the diminution in property values resulting from
such restrictions. This outcome would represent a shift in whom we
burden with the cost of paying for protecting our environment. Society
as a whole would be required to bear the burden instead of the individ-
ual property owner. Shifting the burden of environmental protection
from the private to public sectors would compel us to determine priori-
ties for our environmental goals. To do this, we would have to place
more consciously a value on particular environmental attributes. This
would be an immensely difficult task because of the difficulty in as-
signing a value to resources which sometimes have little popular or eco-
nomic value, but may have great scientific value. Government officials
could find themselves subject to public pressure to save a scenic coast-
line instead of a little known, but endangered, Black-spored quillwort.
2
In short, having the public pay the true cost of environmental protection
under caselaw such as Lucas would force governments to prioritize and
perhaps abandon some environmental goals. Nevertheless, the Lucas de-
cision represents a recognition that the costs of environmental protec-
tion can be enormous, and that we as a society need to rethink who must
bear that burden. These new demands underscore even more the im-
portance of seeking and utilizing alternative methods of environmental
controls, including pollution prevention, waste minimization and market
incentives.
CONCLUSION
The recognition of the true value of our natural resources, and the
need to restore and protect them has given rise to numerous controls on
their use. The traditional command and control strategies of the last 25
years have succeeded in the elimination of many of our worst environ-
mental problems, but the effectiveness of using command and control
strategies to further reduce and eliminate adverse affects on our envi-
ronment will likely decrease. Other methods must be explored and uti-
lized if we are to succeed in restoring and protecting our environment.
Utilizing market incentives appears to be a valuable tool for govern-
ments, private industry and individuals to provide the incentive to re-
duce waste and pollution and to promote restoration of our natural
resources. Shifting the responsibility for the costs of protecting the en-
vironment also must be explored as we place more controls on the use
of our natural resources. Just as individual facilities can no longer bur-
den society with unregulated releases of pollution, society must limit the
burden on individuals caused by unreasonable restrictions on land use.
Individual facilities and society must both learn to internalize these
externalities.
One need only look at Eastern Europe to appreciate how far we
2. 50 C.F.R. § 17.12 (1992).
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have come in restoring and preserving our environment and natural re-
sources. The greater challenge remaining is to address the outstanding
environmental issues. Further progress in environmental restoration
and protection will continue to demand our attention and our creativity
in finding equitable and effective strategies to pursue.

WILD DUNES AND SERBONIAN BOGS: THE IMPACT




In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,I the United Supreme Court
was forced once again to delve into the law of regulatory takings.2 This
experience is seldom a pleasant one. Echoing the poet John Milton, an
exasperated state court judge once described takings law as a "Serbo-
nian Bog."3 Unfortunately, the takings doctrine is only slightly more
comprehensible after the Lucas decision than it was before. Neverthe-
less, progress in this area, however modest, deserves praise, and the
Court is to be commended for clarifying one aspect of takings jurispru-
dence. As a result of Lucas a "categorical rule" has been announced that
provides for compensation when a state regulation deprives a landowner
of all economically valuable property use.
4
The claimant in Lucas owned two unimproved beachfront lots in the
Wild Dunes Resort on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island located near
Charleston, South Carolina. In 1988, the state legislature enacted a law
that authorized the South Carolina Coastal Council to establish con-
struction setback lines.5 The purpose of these setback lines was to miti-
gate the effects of erosion in coastal areas. 6 The Coastal Council
established a setback line landward of Lucas' back property line, effec-
tively preventing him from building on either of his lots. 7 Lucas
brought suit, arguing that the regulation constituted a taking of his
* Richard C. Ausness (B.A. University of Florida 1966, J.D. University of Florida
1968, L.L.M. Yale 1973) is a professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. The takings or just compensation clause of the fifth amendment provides that pri-
vate property may not be taken for public use without payment ofjust compensation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Governmental actions that do not physically appropriate private prop-
erty, but instead unduly restrict its use, are known as regulatory takings. See Nathaniel S.
Lawrence, Regulatory Takings: Beyond the Balancing Test, 20 URB. LAw. 389, 390 (1988).
3. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978) ("arguing that regula-
tory taking law is a sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog") (quoting Brazos River Auth. v.
City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Tex. 1962)). The reference is to a description of
Hell from Milton's Paradise Lost:
A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog
Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old,
Where armies whole have sunk: the parching air
Burns frore, and cold performs the effects of fire.
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Bk. II, I1. 592-95.
4. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
5. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 48-39-270, 280 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
6. Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court s Changing Tak-
ings Doctrine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REV. 205, 220-21 (1991).
7. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90.
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property without just compensation. The state trial court, in ruling for
the claimant, concluded that the regulation left the property with virtu-
ally no market value. 8 The South Carolina Supreme Court overturned
the trial court decision by concluding that the state may pass regulations
to prevent harm to the public without having to pay compensation. 9
Having granted certiorari, ' 0 the Court held that compensation must
be paid if a police power regulation deprives a landowner of all econom-
ically valuable use of his or her property."I This decision produced a
bitter division within the Court. This Article argues that the categorical
takings rule set forth by the majority in Lucas is analytically sound and
fully consistent with the true meaning of the Takings Clause. Further-
more, the Article concludes that Lucas reflects a long overdue reorienta-
tion of the Court's takings jurisprudence in favor of private property
rights. At the same time, however, the categorical takings rule of Lucas
is fairly narrow and should not threaten most state shoreline protection
programs.
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I reviews the property
regime of coastal areas as well as some representative shoreline manage-
ment schemes. Part II explores the "Serbonian Bog"-the law of regu-
latory takings. Part III examines South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act and analyzes the Lucas decision in some detail. Finally,
Part IV evaluates the significance of Lucas and discusses its potential im-
pact on various aspects of shoreline management and environmental
protection.
I. THE LEGAL REGIME OF COASTAL AREAS.
A. Private and Public Rights Along the Shoreline.
In most states, the mean high water line marks the boundary be-
tween public and private ownership in the shoreline. 12 Although land
above the mean high water line is subject to private ownership, public
rights are paramount in the area below (or seaward of) this line. 13
8. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 907 (S.C. 1991) (Har-
well, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 900-02.
10. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
11. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893-94.
12. Frank E. Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean
High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 200-201 (1974). The
mean high water line represents the intersection of a vertical tidal datum with the shore-
line. Id. at 195. Tidal datums are elevations based on the average rise and fall of the tide.
See Peter K. Nunez, Comment, Fluctuating Shoreline and Tidal Boundaries: An Unresolved Prob-
lem, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 447, 451-52 (1969). These datums are generally calculated on
the basis of a nineteen year period of observations. This period is used to determine tidal
datums because all of the cycles related to the phases, declinations, and distance of the
moon occur within this time frame. Maloney & Ausness, supra, at 198.
13. Richard C. Ausness, Land Use Controls in Coastal Areas, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 391, 396
(1973). In some states, the mean low water line constitutes the usual boundary between
public and private shoreline property. State ex rel. Buckson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228
A.2d 587, 601 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, Inc.,
173 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Mass. 1961); In re Hadlock, 48 A.2d 628, 630 (Me. 1946); Whealton
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Both Roman law 14 and English common law,' 5 acknowledged that
members of the public could use the foreshore and adjacent tidal waters
for purposes of navigation, fishing and commerce. 16 This right was
known as thejus publicum. 17 In the United States, thejus publicum, which
includes recreation as well as more traditional public uses, '8 is protected
by a concept known as the public trust doctrine. According to this doc-
trine, the state holds title to the foreshore and the land beneath naviga-
ble waters in trust for the benefit of the public. 19 Even when the state
transfers such property into private ownership, public rights are not en-
tirely lost as long as the property remains physically capable of being
used for trust purposes.
20
Most of the shoreline above the mean high water line is now pri-
vately owned and those who own such property typically possess certain
littoral rights. The most important of these littoral rights is access to the
water.2 1 Littoral owners also possess the right to navigate, fish, swim
and bathe in the sea and its surrounding tidal waters.22 Finally, these
owners get the benefit of any increase in littoral property caused by the
deposit of soil on the land by currents or other natural forces. 23 Con-
versely, they risk losing any land that erodes away when the shoreline
recedes.
24
& Wisherd v. Doughty, 82 S.E. 94, 96 (Va. 1914); Commonwealth ex rel. Hensel v.
Y.M.C.A., 32 A. 121, 127 (Pa. 1895); Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524, 526 (1845).
14. Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA
GRANT L.J. 13, 21-36 (1976); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sover-
eignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-43
(1986); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79
YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970).
15. Richard C. Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of in-
stream Flows, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407, 409-411 (1986); GlennJ. MacGrady, The Navigability
Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doc-
trines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 511, 549-68 (1975).
16. Stephen A. DeLeo, Note, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi and the Public Trust Doc-
trine: Strengthening Sovereign Interest in Tidal Property, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 571, 585 (1989);
Melissa A. Heath, Note, A Tidelands Trust for Georgia, 17 GA. L. REv. 851, 866 (1983).
17. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 472 (1988); Matthews
v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 362 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821
(1984); State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,
380 (Cal. 1971).
19. ThomasJ. Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C. L. REV.
1, 16-17 (1972); Bertram C. Frey, Note, The Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7 URB. L. ANN.
219, 226 (1974).
20. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380-81 (Cal. 1971) (owner who acquired tide-
lands from state not automatically entitled to dredge and fill property).
21. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Madeira
Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Hollan v. State, 308
S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
22. See, e.g., Butler v. Attorney Gen., 80 N.E. 688, 689 (Mass. 1907).
23. This is known as the doctrine of accretion. A related concept, the doctrine of
reliction, increases the property of the littoral owner when the water permanently uncov-
ers a portion of the seabed, leaving it dry. Carol E. Dinkins, Texas Seashore Boundary Law:
The Effect of Natural and Artificial Modifications, 10 Hous. L. REV. 43, 46 (1972).
24. See id. at 50. However, the doctrines of accretion, reliction and erosion only apply
when the shoreline changes are "gradual and imperceptible." See County of St. Clair v.
Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68 (1874). Thus, the original boundary remains as it was when the
19931
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In recent years, certain activist courts attempted to redefine prop-
erty interests to enhance the rights of the public at the expense of pri-
vate landowners.2 5 One aspect of this trend is the expansion of such
concepts as prescription, implied dedication, customary rights and the
public trust doctrine for the purpose of increasing public access to pri-
vately-owned portions of shoreline.2 6
A number of courts use prescription to extend public access to dry-
sand beaches. A prescriptive right requires the claimant to exercise ac-
tual, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse use over the property under a
claim of right for fixed period of time.2 7 In Moody v. White,2 8 for exam-
ple, the court found that the public acquired a prescriptive right since
members of the public appropriated the dry-sand beach as their own by
using it for hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, sunning, and other rec-
reational purposes.
29
Other courts rely on the doctrine of implied dedication to provide
public access to privately-owned beaches.3 0 A dedication is express
when it is made by oral declaration or written instrument.3 ' A dedica-
tion is implied when the intention to dedicate is inferred from the acts
shoreline is shifted suddenly by severe storms or hurricanes. Maloney & Ausness, supra
note 12, at 226. Furthermore, in many states, legal boundaries do not change if the physi-
cal shoreline is altered by artificial structures. Mary C. Whitney, Comment, The Federal
Rule of Accretion and California Coastal Protection, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1462-63 (1975).
25. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 342 (Fla.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (public trust doctrine invoked to invalidate sover-
eignty lands mistakenly conveyed into private ownership during nineteenth century as
swamp and overflowed lands); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 721
(Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (existing appropriative water rights in nonnavigable
tributaries can be restricted under public trust doctrine to prevent harm to navigable
freshwater lake); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659, 664-65 (Ark.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843
(1980) (owners of freshwater streams subject to public rights under newly promulgated
"recreational test" of navigability); County of Haw. v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973)
(extending public ownership of beaches from high water line to farthest reach of the
waves); McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1973) (changing state riparian rights doctrine); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d
761, 769 (Wis. 1972) (lands adjacent to navigable waters are subject to special regulation
under the public trust doctrine).
26. In theory, public rights extend only to the wet-sand beach below the mean high
water line. See Frank E. Maloney, et al., Public Beach Access: A Guaranteed Place to Spread Your
Towel, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 853, 855 (1977). However, if members of the public are com-
pletely excluded from dry-sand areas, they may be prevented from using the wet-sand
areas as well because of the existence of natural or manmade barriers. See Steve A. Mc-
Keon, Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564, 566 (1970).
27. Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theories and the
Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627, 631 (1989). Because members of the public often share a
beach with the littoral owner, the adversity requirement, if strictly enforced, may defeat a
claim of prescriptive right. See Maloney, supra note 26, at 859. See also City of Daytona
Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 76-77 (Fla. 1974) (public's use was permissive
because littoral owner allowed members of the public onto beach to induce them to use its
commercial pier facilities).
28. 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
29. Id. at 374.
30. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 59 (Cal. 1970); Seaway Co. v. Attorney
General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
31. Note, Public Access to Beaches: Common Law Doctrines and Constitutional Challenges, 48
N.Y.U. L. REV. 369, 370 (1973).
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and conduct of the landowner.32 Thus, continuous, uninterrupted use
of a parcel of land by the members of the public may give rise to an
inference that the owner intended to dedicate the land to public use.33
Seaway Company v. Attorney General3 4 illustrates the application of this
principle to shoreline areas. In that case, the court found the general
public used the beach for more than a hundred years without permission
or interference from littoral owners.3 5 This was sufficient for the court
to conclude that Seaway impliedly dedicated its property to the public
for recreational purposes.
3 6
Some courts uphold public claims to the dry sand beach based on
the ancient doctrine3 7 of customary rights. s8 To qualify as a customary
use, a public use must be ancient, uninterrupted, peaceful, reasonable,
certain of description, obligatory with respect to affected landowners,
and not repugnant to or inconsistent with other customs or law.3 9 Until
recently, state courts overwhelmingly refused to recognize the doctrine
of customary rights as a part of American law.40 However, in State ex rel.
32. Margit Livingston, Public Access to Virginia's Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of Im-
plied Dedications and Public Prescriptive Rights, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 669, 684 (1983).
33. See Alice G. Carmichael, Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public Access to
North Carolina Beaches, 64 N.C. L. REV. 159, 168-9 (1985). Once an implied offer to dedi-
cate is made and accepted, the owner cannot revoke the offer. McKeon, supra note 26, at
573. Furthermore, the public cannot lose its rights through nonuse or adverse possession.
Luise Welby, Note, Public Access to Private Beaches: A Tidal Necessity, 6 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'y 69, 78 (1986).
34. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
35. Id. at 933-34.
36. Id. at 940. California has also applied the doctrine of implied dedication to
beaches. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970). In Gion, the court declared
that an intent to dedicate could be implied from adverse use as well as by acquiescence on
the part of the littoral owner. Id. at 55. According to the Gion court, evidence that the
beach has been used as if it were a "public recreation area" for the five-year prescriptive
period was sufficient to support a finding of adverse use. Id. at 56. Furthermore, the court
disagreed that public use of the beach was presumptively permissive. Instead the court
required the landowner to prove that the use was pursuant to a license or that the land-
owner had made a bona fide effort to prevent the public from using the property. Id. at 57.
37. The doctrine of customary rights originated in England, where by immemorial
custom, residents of towns and manors exercised certain use rights over private land. See
Lew E. Delo, Note, The English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Property Law: State ex rel. Thorn-
ton v. Hay, 4 ENVTL. L. 383, 389 (1974); David R. Miller, Comment, Easements: Judicial and
Legislative Protection of the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 586, 591
(1973).
38. United States v. St. Thomas Beach Resorts, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 769 (D.V.I. 1974),
aff'd, 529 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1975); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987); City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271
So. 2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd in part, 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974); State ex rel.
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969); In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968). How-
ever, a number of states have refused to apply the doctrine of customary rights to beaches.
E.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 1989); Leabo v. Leninski, 438 A.2d
1153, 1156-57 (Conn. 1981); Smith v. Bruce, 244 S.E.2d 559, 569 (Ga. 1978); Department
and Council of Natural Resources v. Mayor of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 1975);
Gilies v. Orienta Beach Club, 289 N.Y.S. 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 288 N.Y.S. 136
(N.Y. App. Div. 1936).
39. See Hay, 462 P.2d at 677; Alfred Clayton, Jr., Note, Oregon's "New" Doctrine of Cus-
tom: McDonald v. Halvorson, 26 WILLAME-rrE L. REV. 787, 792 (1990); Susan P. Stephens,
Access to the Shore: A Coast to Coast Problem, 3J. LAND USE & ENv-rL. L. 95, 112-13 (1987).
40. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 717 (1986).
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Thornton v. Hay,4 1 the Oregon Supreme Court approved the doctrine of
customary rights and upheld a ban on fences and other barriers across
the dry-sand portion of the beach. 42
Finally, a few courts invoke the public trust doctrine to protect pub-
lic access to the dry sand beach. Most of these decisions involve nonres-
ident access to municipally-owned beaches.43 New Jersey, however,
extends this principle of nondiscrimination to private beaches as well.
44
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, both the forces of nature
and activist courts threaten the use and enjoyment of private property in
coastal areas. Landowners learned to live with the dramatic conse-
quences of floods and hurricanes, as well as the more subtle losses of
beach erosion. But now, in addition to the physical alteration of beach-
front areas by natural forces, shorefront landowners are increasingly
threatened by judicial attacks on property rights. Additionally, as shown
in the next section, property owners are also threatened in some states
by legislation that greatly restricts the right to build in shoreline areas.
B. Regulation of Shoreline Development.
Due to aesthetic and recreational values, the nation's coastal areas
are prime targets for residential and commercial development. 4 5 How-
41. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
42. The court observed the public had peacefully used the dry-sand beaches and fore-
shore since the beginning of the state's political history and that this use had never been
interrupted by littoral landowners. Moreover, the public had always made use of the land
in a manner appropriate to the land and to the usages of the community. The scope of this
public right was visibly delimited by the physical boundaries of the dry-sand beach and by
the character of the land. The evidence also showed that the dry-sand beach in question
had been used, as of right, uniformly with similarly situated lands elsewhere. Therefore,
allowance of public use of the dry-sand beach was not left to the option of individual
landowners. Finally, the court concluded that public use of the dry-sand beaches of the
state violated no law and was not inconsistent with any other customs. Accordingly, the
court held that the public had acquired a customary right to use the dry-sand beach for
recreational purposes. Id. at 676-678. But see McDonald v. Halvorson, 780 P.2d 714 (Or.
1989) (holding that customary rights do not necessarily extend to all beaches in the state).
43. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978); Borough of Nep-
tune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972); Gewirtz v. City of Long
Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
44. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 821 (1984). In Matthews, a group of individuals sought to compel the Bay Head Im-
provement Association, a private nonprofit organization, to open its beachfront property
to the general public. The trial court held in favor of the Association and this decision was
affirmed by an intermediate appellate court. Id. at 358. The Association maintained its
beachfront property for the benefit of its members during the summer months. Member-
ship was generally restricted to Bay Head. Id. at 359.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the public trust doctrine pro-
tected recreational uses as well as fishing and navigation. Id. at 363. The court declared
that the public had to have some rights in the dry-sand beach in order to exercise its rights
to the foreshore. Id. at 364. According to the court, this rationale applied to private, as
well as municipally-owned beaches. Id. at 365. Furthermore, not only must the public be
allowed to travel across privately-owned beaches in order to reach the foreshore, but it
must be allowed to use these beaches for recreational purposes as well. Id. In this case,
the court ruled that the general public should be allowed to join the Association, regard-
less of whether they were residents of Bay Head or not. Id. at 368-69.
45. See David Owens, Land Acquisition and Coastal Resource Management: A Pragmatic Per-
spective, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 625, 625 n.3 (1983).
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ever, uncontrolled development can cause a great deal of harm to the
coastal environment. Erosion now occurs in almost every coastal area.
4 6
Although some of the erosion is natural, 4 7 much of it is caused by im-
proper placement of artificial structures. 48 Furthermore, development
near estuarine areas often threatens delicate marine habitats. 49 Finally,
development on barrier islands often destroys sand dunes and thereby
increases the risk of storm damage.
50
Encouraged by grants from the federal government, 5 1 virtually
every coastal state enacted legislation to protect the shoreline environ-
ment.5 2 A number of states established construction setback lines in
46. Id. at 626. Over the past 100 years, the Atlantic coast has receded an average of
two to three feet per year, while the Gulf shoreline has receded an average of four to five
feet per year. Erosion also occurs on a smaller scale on the West Coast. See Dennis J.
Hwang, Shoreline Setback Regulations and the Takings Analysis, 13 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991).
47. The movement of sand and sediment can profoundly affect the shoreline. Under
natural conditions, sand and gravel eroding from rocks and soils inland are carried down-
stream by rivers and streams. These particles ultimately reach the shoreline where they
are deposited as beach sand. Michael A. Corfield, Comment, Sand Rights: Using California's
Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Against Coastal Erosion, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 727, 731 (1987).
Littoral currents remove this sand from where it has been originally deposited and trans-
port it to another beach or out to sea. Frank E. Maloney & Anthony J. O'Donnell, Jr.,
Drawing the Line at the Oceanfront: The Role of Coastal Construction Setback Lines in Regulating
Development of the Coastal Zone, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 383, 390 (1978).
48. Artificial structures can interfere with the movement of sand and sediment and
cause erosion. For example, structures, such as groins and jetties, that extend out perpen-
dicularly into the water, contribute to beach erosion by interrupting the flow of sand along
the shoreline. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 214. In addition, seawalls and other vertical struc-
tures change the shoreline's natural slope and absorb the full force of the waves. This
causes a turbulent, scouring action at the base of the structure that accelerates the removal
of sand from the surrounding area. Maloney & O'Donnell, supra note 47, at 390. Finally,
improved inlets increase erosion by causing sand to pile up on the updrift side of the shore
and blocking it from the downdrift side. FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., WATER LAW AND AD-
MINISTRATION-THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE § 93.1 (1968).
49. Ausness, supra note 13, at 392; David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property:
A Call forJudicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 339-40 (1988); Kenneth W. Parsons, Note, Environmental Law-Preser-
vation of the Estuarine Zone, 49 N.C. L. REV. 964, 970 (1971).
50. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 213-14.
51. The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1988), is the
primary source of federal funding for state shoreline regulation activities. This statute
authorizes grants to states that develop and implement a coastal management program
that satisfies certain statutory requirements. Id. § 1454(a) (development grants); id.
§ 1455(a) (administrative grants). For a further discussion of the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act, see generally Sarah Chasis, The Coastal Zone Management Act: A Protective Mandate, 25
NAT. RES. J. 21 (1985); Daniel R. Mandelker & Thea A. Sherry, The National Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 7 URB. L. ANN. 119 (1974); RonaldJ. Rychlak, Coastal Zone Manage-
ment and the Search for Integration, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 984-90 (1991).
52. See ALA. CODE §§ 9-7-10 to 9-7-20 (1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.10 to 46.40.210
(1992) (The Alaska Coastal Management Program); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000 to
30900 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (The California Coastal Act of 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 22a-90 to 22a-1 13j (West 1958 & Supp. 1992) (The Coastal Management Act);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001-7013 (1991) (The Coastal Zone Act); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.052-161.200 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (The Beach and Shore Preservation Act);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-210 to 12-5-312 (Michie 1988) (The Shore Protection Act); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 205A-1 to 205A-49 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (Hawaii Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:213.1-49:214.41 (West Supp. 1992) (Louisiana
Coastal Wetlands Conservation, Restoration, and Management Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, §§ 480A to 490 (1964 & Supp. 1991); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 9-603
(1990 & Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21A, § 4A (West Supp. 1988); Miss.
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coastal areas in order to control development and protect against
coastal erosion.5 3 Most of these states require new structures to be
placed a certain distance from a fixed line, such as a vegetation line,
dune line, or mean high water line.54 Other states, however, employ a
floating setback line.5 5 Unlike a fixed setback line that is uniform along
the entire coastline, a floating setback line will vary according to the his-
torical rate of erosion in a particular area. 56 The purpose of this regula-
tory technique is to ensure that buildings are located far enough inland
to have a reasonable lifespan before being threatened by erosion.5 7 Un-
fortunately, as Lucas illustrates, floating setback lines often impose ex-
cessive burdens on the owners of shorefront property.
II. THE LAW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS.
Perhaps because of its complexity, the takings issue has intrigued
generations of legal scholars, inspiring them to write numerous articles
on the subject.5 8 This Article does not try to improve upon these ef-
forts, but instead merely provides a brief overview, with special empha-
sis on those aspects of takings law involved in the Lucas case.
A. The Police Power.
States, through the exercise of their police power, may regulate the
CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-1 to 49-27-69 (1990) (The Coastal Wetlands Protection Act); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to 13:19-21 (West 1991) (The Coastal Area Facility Review Act);
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 34-0101 to 34-0113 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1992)
(Coastal Erosion Hazard Areas); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ I13A-100 to 113A-134.3 (1990 &
Supp. 1991) (North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 196.405 to 196.515 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-23-1 to 46-23-21 (1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op 1986 & Supp. 1991) (The Beachfront Man-
agement Act of 1988); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001 to 33.176 (West 1992) (The
Coastal Public Lands Management Act of 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.1-101.4 (Supp.
1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.51.650 to 43.51.765 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992).
53. Hwang, supra note 46, at 5.
54. ALA. CODE § 9-7-10 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7004 (1991); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 205A-43(a) (Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 438A(l) (1989 & Supp.
1991).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.053 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (100-year storm surge set-
back line); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-5 (West 1991); N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAW § 34-
0103(3)(a) (McKinney 1984) (setback line calculated at 40 times annual erosion rate); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § lI3A-118 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(B)(4) (Law. Co-op Supp.
1991) (setback line calculated at 40 times annual erosion rate).
56. The floating setback line is determined by calculating the annual rate of erosion,
based on historical data. This figure is then multiplied by a factor of 30 to 100 as deter-
mined by the statute. Hwang, supra note 46, at 9.
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977);
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS-PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985); Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752
(1988); Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165
(1974); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of 'just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings
Clause.- In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1299 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a




use of private property in order to promote the health, safety, morals or
general welfare of their citizens. 59 These governmental regulations
must, however, meet the requirements of substantive due process.
60
The "rational basis" test is the prevailing approach for reviewing due
process challenges. 6 ' This test considers whether the regulation ad-
vances any valid governmental interest 6 2 and whether the means chosen
provides a rational method for accomplishing this purpose.63 Tradi-
tionally, the Court accords a great deal of deference to legislative judg-
ments regarding regulatory means and ends.64 However, even if a
regulation satisfies the requirements of the due process clause, it may
still violate the takings clause6 5 if it takes property without just compen-
sation.6 6 If the regulation is deemed to be a taking, the government
must either abandon the regulation or compensate the injured party.
6 7
B. Traditional Takings Tests.
1. The Physical Invasion Test.
The physical invasion test requires the government to pay compen-
sation when it permanently occupies private property. 6 8 This rule uses
objective criteria and, therefore, is relatively predictable and consis-
tent.6 9 However, the physical invasion test only has limited applicability
and, therefore, it rarely serves as a deciding test in regulatory taking
59. Robert I. McMurry, Comment,Just Compensation orJust Invalidation: The Availability
of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1982).
60. The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. Denis Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional
Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1972).
62. See Chicago B. & 0. Ry. v. Ill. ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592
(1906); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
63. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313,
320 (1890); Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888).
64. E. George Rudolph, Let's Hear It for Due Process-An Up to Date Primer on Regulatory
Takings, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355, 374 (1988).
65. The takings or just compensation clause of the fifth amendment provides that pri-
vate property may not be taken for public use without payment ofjust compensation. U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The takings clause is binding on the states through the application of
fourteenth amendment. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County, 482 U.S. 304, 310 n.4 (1987), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Webb's Famous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104, 110 (1911); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
66. In theory, the due process clause and the takings clause are concerned with en-
tirely different issues. However, some commentators suggest that these provisions cannot
be entirely separated. John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for
the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 485-86 (1983);James L. Oakes, "property Rights" in
Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 592 (1981).
67. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 321.
68. See United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750 (1947) (dam raised water level,
causing flooding of plaintiff's land); United States v. Lynah,. 188 U.S. 445, 469 (1903)
(overflow from navigation project turned plaintiff's rice plantation into a bog); Pumpelly v.
Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1872) (state authorized dam on river
caused upstream lake to overflow its banks and flood plaintiff's land).
69. Neal S. Manne, Note, Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58
TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1465 (1980).
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cases. 70 Furthermore, the test is arguably unfair because it compensates
trivial losses, 7 1 while denying compensation for substantial loses when
no physical invasion occurs, even when the landowner's loss is more
severe.
7 2
2. The "Noxious Use" Test.
The "noxious use" test allows states to regulate, without paying
compensation, activities that create a risk of significant harm to the pub-
lic regardless of the economic effect on the regulated parties. 73 In ef-
fect, this rule vindicates the right of the government to protect the
public against harmful spillover effects from private activity. 74 Thejusti-
fication usually given for the denial of compensation is that no one can
obtain a vested right to injure or endanger the public; therefore, the
abatement of a noxious use is not a taking of property. 75 The noxious
rule is generally applied to nuisances or "nuisance like" activities. 76 It
works tolerably well in these circumstances, but provides little help in
resolving conflicts among socially desirable, but incompatible,
activities.
7 7
3. The Harm/Benefit Test.
The harm/benefit rule was derived from the noxious use rule.
78
Under this approach, no taking occurs if the government regulates to
prevent a landowner from causing harm to others. However, a taking
occurs if the purpose of the regulation is to force the landowner to con-
70. Binder, supra note 61, at 3.
71. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
For a brief description of the Loretto decision, see infra nn. 101-103 and accompanying text.
72. See John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for theJust-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regu-
lation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 252 (1982).
73. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding law that required
destruction of cedar trees infected with cedar rust parasites); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267
U.S. 188,195-96 (1925) (upholding law prohibiting possession in plaintiff's home of alco-
holic beverages purchased before passage of state prohibition law); Pierce Oil Corp. v.
City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 499 (1919) (upholding ban on oil and gasoline storage tanks
near residential dwellings); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (upholding
prohibition of brickyard in residential area); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171,
177 (1915) (upholding ban on livery stables in residential area); Murphy v. California, 225
U.S. 623, 629 (1912) (upholding ordinance against pool halls); L'Hote v. New Orleans,
177 U.S. 587, 598 (1900) (upholding ban on houses of prostitution in certain areas);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (upholding closure of plaintiff's brewery).
74. See Ross B. Lipsker & Rebecca L. Heldt, Regulatory Takings: A Contract Approach, 16
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195, 211 (1988).
75. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330 (1905); New Orleans Gas Light Co. v.
Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905).
76. See Andrea L. Peterson, The Taking Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part II-
Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without MoralJustification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 55, 86
(1990) (suggesting that the noxious use rule allows confiscatory regulation without com-
pensation only if the public would regard the regulated activity as "wrongful").
77. Sax, supra note 58, at 48-50. In addition, the noxious use rule is arguably unfair in
cases where the landowner could not reasonably foresee that a particular use might subse-
quently become harmful to the public. Berger, supra note 58, at 174-75.
78. Hunter, supra note 49, at 323-24. The harm/benefit test was first devised by Pro-
fessor Ernst Freund. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS § 511 at 546 (1904).
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fer a benefit on the public. 79 The Supreme Court does not treat the
harm/benefit approach as a distinct test. 80 However, state courts fre-
quently rely on this test to uphold land-use controls in environmentally
sensitive areas.81
In theory, there is a significant difference between preventing a
harm and securing a benefit.8 2 However, in practice, it is often difficult
to maintain this distinction on a principled basis. 83 In addition, critics of
the rule charge that the concept of harm can be expanded to cover just
about anything.
84
4. The Diminution-in-Value Test.
Under the diminution-in-value test, a regulation that reduces the
value of property beyond a certain point is treated as a taking. 8 5 Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon8 6 is commonly thought to be the original
source of this doctrine.8 7 In that case, a coal company challenged the
validity of a statute prohibiting the mining of anthracite coal if the min-
ing caused subsidence of overlying residential property. Writing for the
Court, Justice Holmes declared that while some diminution in value is
permissible, "[w]hen it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act."
8
79. Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
650, 665-66 (1958); Lipsker & Heldt, supra note 74, at 211. According to Professor
Michelman, the rationale of the harm/benefit rule "is that compensation is required when
the public helps itself to good at private expense, but not when the public simply requires
one of its members to stop making a nuisance of himself." Michelman, supra note 58, at
1196.
80. But see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 138-39 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981) (uphold-
ing a ban on destruction of mangrove forest); Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd.,
485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984) (upholding denial of permission to fill wetlands); Carter v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984) (upholding a prohibition
on filling in tidal wetlands); Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 (Wash. 1987) (up-
holding a prohibition on filling privately-owned tideland areas); Just v. Marinette County,
201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972) (upholding prohibition on filling along the shore of a
navigable lake).
82. Dunham, supra note 79, at 664-65.
83. Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to the just Compen-
sation Clause, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 139, 184 (1990). In the majority opinion of Lucas, justice
Scalia also recognizes that the difference between benefit and harm may be only a matter
of perception. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897-98 (1992).
84. Sondra E. Berchin, Comment, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Carta to a just
Formulation, 23 UCLA L. REv. 904, 911 (1976).
85. Donald W. Large, This Land Is Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property,
1973 Wis. L. REv. 1039, 1056 (1973).
86. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
87. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1325. It appears that Justice Holmes mentioned dimi-
nution-in-value on several occasions prior to the decision in Pennsylvania Coal. See, e.g.,
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (if an exercise of police
power renders property "wholly useless, the rights of property would prevail over the
other public interest, and the police power would fail"); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907) ("the question narrows itself to the magnitude of
the burden imposed").
88. 260 U.S. at 413. Applying this principle, Holmes concluded that the statute made
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In applying the diminution-in-value test to determine whether com-
pensation must be paid, the Court looks to the extent of economic loss
suffered by the property owner.8 9 This involves determination of a nu-
merator and a denominator - that is, the value to the property before
and the value after the regulation is applied. 90 The Court must then
calculate the percentage of the decline in value and decide whether the
decline is sufficient to constitute a taking.9 '
There are a number of difficulties with the diminution-in-value test.
In the first place, it is not clear whether excessive diminution in value
alone constitutes a taking or whether it is merely one factor for the
Court to consider in deciding takings controversies. 9 2 Moreover, the
diminution-in-value test provides no standard by which to determine
how much of a diminution is a taking. 93 Finally, the rule does not iden-
tify which property interests must be taken into account when calculat-
ing a regulation's economic effect.
94
C. Modern Takings Tests.
Each of the traditional takings tests focuses on a single factor, such
as the physical consequences of the government's action, the motivation
behind the challenged regulation, or its economic impact on the claim-
ant's property. In the last decade or so, the Court has tended to employ
takings tests that require more than one factor to be considered. The
two most popular approaches are the Penn Central balancing test and the
Agins two-factor test.
1. The Penn Central Balancing Test.
This test made its debut in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.9 5
The Penn Central case arose out of the refusal of the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission to allow Penn Central to construct
a multi-story office building over Grand Central Station Terminal (the
Terminal). 96 Penn Central claimed that the New York Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law deprived it of all gainful use of the airspace above the Ter-
minal. The Court considered the following factors to determine
it unprofitable to remove coal from the land in question, and thus destroyed the value of
the company's mineral estate. This, in his view, constituted a taking. Id. at 414.
89. Susan J. Krueger, Comment, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis:
Toward Redefining Takings Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 877, 879 (1989).
90. Donald W. Large, The Supreme Court and the Takings Clause. The Search for a Better
Rule, 18 ENVrTL. L. 3, 19 (1987); Michelman, supra note 58, at 1229-34.
91. Id. at 19-20.
92. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1327.
93. Craig A. Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court
Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339 (1988); Rose, supra note 58, at 566.
94. Michelman, supra note 58, at 1192-93; David A. Myers, Some Observations on the
Analysis of Regulatory Takings in the Rehnquist Court, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 527, 541 (1989).
95. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
96. Under this law, any change in the exterior structure of a building designated as a
historic landmark required a permit from the Landmarks Preservation Commission. In
1967, the Commission classified Grand Central Station Terminal, which was owned by
Penn Central, as a historic landmark. Id. at 115-17.
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whether a taking occurred: (1) the character of the governmental action
involved; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations; and (3) the economic impact of
the regulation upon the property owner.9 7 Applying these factors to the
facts of the case, the Court upheld the New York law.9 8
a. Character of Governmental Action.
This factor involves both the "type of taking" alleged and the "na-
ture of the state action." The "type of taking" inquiry looks to whether
the government action is a physical invasion or whether it is an accepted
form of economic regulation. 99 The "nature of state action" analysis
focuses on the justification for the government's action, and in particu-
lar, on whether it is attempting to prevent harm to the public. 0 0
i. The "Type of Taking."
The Court focused almost entirely on the "type of taking" in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 101 The Court struck down a New
York statute that required landlords to permit cable television compa-
nies to install cable facilities on their property upon payment of a nomi-
nal fee.' 0 2 The Court characterized this relatively trivial intrusion as a
property restriction of unusually serious character.
10 3
The "type of taking" also influenced the Court's decision in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 10 4 a case which involved public access to a nonnavi-
gable pond. The landowner, with the permission of the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps of Engineers), connected one end
of the pond with the ocean and constructed a marina at the other end.
Later, the Corps of Engineers sought to compel the landowner to allow
members of the public to use the pond and marina. 10 5 Although the
Court acknowledged that the pond had become navigable for purposes
of federal regulation, it refused to rule that the federal navigation servi-
tude requires public access to private property without payment of
compensation. '
0 6
97. Id. at 124.
98. Id. at 138.
99. Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court Regulatory
Taking Doctrine: The Principles of "Noxious Use, " "Average Reciprocity of Advantage, "and "Bundle
of Rights"from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 653, 713
(1987).
100. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1318-19.
101. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
102. Id. at 441.
103. Id. at 426.
104. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
105. Id. at 168.
106. Id. at 179-80. The navigation servitude doctrine provides that the federal govern-
ment does not have to compensate landowners who are injured when it exercises its power
over navigable waters under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Grand River
Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960) (federal government not required to pay owner of
condemned property for water power rights); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350
U.S. 222, 228 (1956) (same); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510
(1945) (federal government not required to pay owner of hydroelectric dam for reduction
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ii. The "Nature of State Action."
In Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictis 107 the Court looked at
"the nature of state action" to determine if a taking occurred.' 0 8 Key-
stone involved a state statute that prohibited mining which might cause
subsidence to certain buildings. Regulations adopted pursuant to this
statute required fifty percent of the coal beneath these structures to be
kept in place to provide surface support.' 0 9 The plaintiffs sought to en-
join state officials from enforcing the statute or its regulations."l 0 On
appeal, the Court declared that the government had a substantial inter-
est in preventing harm from nuisance-like activities and, therefore, the
Court did not require compensation."' The Court upheld the statute
in part by suggesting that mining operations that harmed the property
of third parties were similar to noxious uses.1 12 This case effectively
incorporated the noxious use rule into the Penn Central balancing test. '
13
b. Investment-Backed Expectations.
Deprivation of "investment-backed expectations" may also consti-
tute a regulatory taking.' "4 The rationale behind the protection of in-
vestment-backed expectations is similar to the reliance rationale that
underlies the doctrines of estoppel and vested rights in zoning law.
51 5
However, to claim interference with investment-backed expectations,
the property owner must be able to point to specific facts and circum-
stances that make such expectations reasonable.
16
The burden of proving the existence of investment-backed expecta-
tions is often a difficult one for property owners to meet. For example,
the Court rejected the landowner's investment-backed expectations
in water flow caused by construction of flood control project); United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 65-66 (1913) (federal government not required to
pay owner of condemned dam for water power rights).
107. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The Court seems to have also used the Agins two-factor test
in Keystone. See Peterson, supra note 58, at 1329.
108. 480 U.S. at 488-90.
109. Id. at 476-77.
110. The trial court refused to grant the requested injunction. Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511, 520 (W.D. Pa. 1984). This decision was
affirmed by the court of appeals. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d
707, 719-20 (3d Cir. 1985).
111. 480U.S. at492.
112. Id.
113. SeeJames S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Critters-
Is It Against Nature to Pay for a Taking?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309, 343 (1992) (nuisance
exception could be viewed as an element of the "character" of government action).
114. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Professor
Frank Michelman appears to have coined this expression. See Michelman, supra note 58, at
1233 (a taking occurs when a claimant is deprived of "distinctly perceived, sharply crystal-
lized, investment-backed" expectations).
115. Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U.
J. URB. & CoNTEMp. L. 3, 42 (1987). For a discussion of these concepts see John Martinez,
Reconstructing the Takings Doctrine by Redefining Property and Sovereignty, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
157, 181-82 (1988).
116. Richard G. Wilkins, The Takings Clause. A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional Tale,
64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 41 (1989).
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claim in the Penn Central. case, concluding that its expectations largely
focused around the Terminal's traditional use as a railroad station.
Since the law only restricted a use of the airspace, the Court felt that it
did not frustrate Penn Central's expectations with respect to use of the
Terminal. 17 Conversely, the landowner in Kaiser Aetna persuaded the
Court that by allowing the landowner to improve the pond, the Corps 3f
Engineers created certain expectancies, including the expectancy that
the landowner could continue to exclude the public from the pond and
the marina." 18
c. Economic Impact.
Obviously, the size of the burden imposed on a property owner by a
regulation is relevant to the taking issue.' 19 At the same time, even a
severe economic impact does not necessarily constitute a taking.' 2 0
Moreover, the Court developed several techniques that undercut claims
of adverse economic impact in taking issue cases. One concept is the
doctrine of average reciprocity of advantage. The other is that the en-
tire "bundle of rights" in a piece of property should be considered when
measuring the economic impact in a takings analysis.
i. Average Reciprocity of Advantage.
"Average reciprocity of advantage" originally meant that the state
was not required to pay just compensation when a party giving up prop-
erty received a new benefit not shared by the general public. 12 1 This
rule implicitly assumed the regulation standing alone might be a taking,
but the new benefit was payment in kind, rather than in cash, which sat-
isfied the compensation requirement.' 2 2 This appears to be what hap-
pened in Penn Central, where the plaintiff claimed the Landmark
Preservation Law only benefitted the general public. The Court ac-
knowledged that the burden fell disproportionately on Penn Central,
but nevertheless concluded that the fact that some benefit accrued to
Penn Central was sufficient to compensate the landowner.' 23 The cur-
rent approach is to regard any general benefits that arise from the regu-
117. 438 U.S. at 136. See also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
227 (1986) (employers withdrawing funds from multi-employer pension plans required to
provide adequate funding for vested pension benefits); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986, 1006-07 (1984) (health and safety data required to be submitted to EPA not
protected against disclosure).
118. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
119. Michelman, supra note 58, at 1191; Wilkins, supra note 116, at 30.
120. Krueger, supra note 89, at 892.
121. Connors, supra note 83, at 173. The reciprocal advantage principle was tradition-
ally invoked to justify special assessments.
122. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 21
(1988).
123. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978). Justice
Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the landowners did not receive any benefit
from the law. Id. at 139-40. See also Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private
Property, 58 WASH. L. REV. 481, 485 (1983) (contending that there was no plausible reci-
procity of advantage to the landowner in Penn Central).
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lation as mitigating the economic harm it imposes on a particular
property owner. 1
2 4
ii. Effect of the Regulation on the Entire Property
Interest.
The Court generally insists that economic impact be assessed in
terms of the entire property interest of the regulated party.' 25 Never-
theless, property owners occasionally utilize a tactic known as "concep-
tual severance" to defeat this policy. This involves "severing" from the
whole bundle of rights just those aspects of property use that are im-
paired by the regulation and then treating them as a separate property
interest. 1 2
6
In Penn Central, for example, the landowner claimed that the
Landmark Preservation Law deprived it of all gainful use of the airspace
above the Terminal. Rejecting this attempt at conceptual separation,
the Court declared that it must consider the economic impact of the law
on Penn Central's entire "bundle of rights" in the Terminal and not
restrict its inquiry to one particular aspect of these rights.
12 7
The plaintiffs in Keystone also employed a conceptual separation
strategy. They contended that the coal that would have to be left in the
ground was a separate property interest being taken by the state.
128
However, the Court rejected this argument by concluding that this coal
did not constitute a separate property interest distinct from the plain-
tiffs' coal reserves as a whole.
129
2. The Agins Two Factor Test.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 130 the plaintiffs challenged the validity of
124. Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New
Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 351 (1990) (reciprocal advantages
contribute to an economic mix effectively diluting the level of a regulation's impact).
125. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("where an owner possesses a
full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a tak-
ing, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety").
126. Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence
of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988).
127. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. Furthermore, the Court observed, the
Landmarks Preservation Law did not completely destroy the value of the airspace above
the Terminal because it allowed Penn Central to transfer its "development rights" in the
airspace to other nearby property that it owned. In the Court's view, this mitigated any
loss that Penn Central might suffer if were denied all use of the airspace above the Termi-
nal. Id. at 137.
128. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 496-97.
129. Id. at 498. Although, the plaintiffs would be required to leave 27 million tons of
coal in place, this only amounted to about two percent of the their total coal reserves of
1.46 billion tons. Furthermore, the plaintiffs conceded that no individual mine would be
rendered unprofitable by the regulation. Id. at 496. The plaintiffs also argued that the
statute destroyed a separate legal interest known as the "support estate." Id. at 496-97.
However, the Court denied that the support estate was really a distinct property interest.
According to the Court, the support estate had value only when it was used in connection
with either the mineral estate or the surface estate. Therefore, the Court refused to con-
clude that the statute completely destroyed the support estate. Id. at 500-01.
130. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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two local ordinances that limited the number of residential dwellings
that could be constructed on their five-acre tract of land. The plaintiffs
maintained that the city's density restrictions would make it economi-
cally impossible for them to develop their property.'13 On appeal, the
Court applied a two-part test to facial challenges to the land use control
regulations. Under this approach, a taking would occur if either: (1) the
regulation failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest; or
(2) if it deprived the landowner of all economically viable use of his or
her property. 
13 2
a. Substantially Advance Legitimate Governmental Goals.
The requirement that a regulation "substantially advance legitimate
governmental goals" is traditionally associated with substantive due pro-
cess. In Agins, however, the Court incorporated this principle into its
takings analysis.' 3 3 The Court concluded that Tiburon's ordinance sub-
stantially advanced legitimate governmental goals by protecting the
public against the adverse effects of uncontrolled urbanization. 134 In
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 13 5 however, the Court ruled that to
"substantially advance" a legitimate state interest, a "reasonable nexus"
must be established between the regulation and the public need it seeks
to address.136 Furthermore, satisfying this test requires close scrutiny of
both the ends served by governmental action, as well as the means used
to achieve them.'
3 7
Some commentators suggest that "substantially advance" aspect of
Agins is not only a "means-ends" test, but that it is also concerned with
the nature of the state's interest.13s Thus, the central consideration of
this test is whether the state is attempting to prevent a substantial harm
to the public. For example, in Keystone, the Court first asked if the stat-
ute served a legitimate public purpose, 13 9 and then considered whether
the government was seeking to prevent a noxious use of the plaintiffs'
131. The California Supreme Court upheld the validity of the ordinance. Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
132. 447 U.S. at 260.
133. See Norman Williams,Jr. et al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193,
213-14 (1984) (criticizing the Court for injecting substantive due process concepts into
takings analysis).
134. 447 U.S. at 261.
135. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
136. The plaintiffs in Nollan sought permission from the California Coastal Commis-
sion to build a house on a parcel of beachfront property. However, the Commission re-
fused to issue the necessary permit unless the plaintiffs agreed to grant an public easement
along the beach. The Commission claimed that an easement was necessary to protect the
public's ability to see the beach, to overcome the "psychological barrier" created by a
developed shorefront, and to prevent congestion on public beaches. The Court failed to
see how the permit condition would achieve any of these objectives. Id. at 836.
137. Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 231, 242-43 (1988); Wilkins, supra note
116, at 8.
138. See, e.g., Burling, supra note 113, at 343; Peterson, supra note 58, at 1328.
139. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-88.
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property. 140 It is not clear, however, whether compensation would be
required under this approach if the Court concluded the state was seek-
ing to prevent a nuisance.
b. Deprivation of All Economically Viable Use.
Under the Agins formula, a regulation that substantially advances a
legitimate state interest can still result in a taking if it deprives the claim-
ant of all economically viable use of his property. 14  It is not clear
whether this language is to be taken literally or whether it is merely a
restatement of the diminution-in-value principle. The Court never an-
swered this question in Agins because it could not determine whether the
plaintiffs had suffered any loss as a result of the ordinances. ' 42 In subse-
quent cases where the issue has arisen, the Court never found that a
regulation deprived a claimant of all economically viable use of his or
her property. 14
3
D. A Critique of Current Takings Jurisprudence.
As many legal commentators observe, the Supreme Court's current
takings jurisprudence leaves much to be desired. 14 4 First, the Court
uses inconsistent approaches in takings cases. The Penn Central test bal-
ances various factors without (except perhaps in the case of a physical
invasion) according preeminence to any one factor. 14 5 The Agins test,
on the other hand, is an "all or nothing" approach where a taking exists
if either element of the test is satisfied. 14 6 It has been suggested that the
Agins approach is applicable to facial challenges, while the Penn Central
140. Id. at 488-90.
141. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The expression "no economically viable use" originated in
a footnote in the Penn Central case. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36.
142. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985)
(denial of permit to dredge and fill in wetlands area does not deny landowner all economi-
cally beneficial use of land).
144. See, e.g., Arvo Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1971) ("With some exceptions, the decisional
law [on the takings issue] is largely characterized by confusing and incompatible results,
often explained in conclusionary terminology, circular reasoning, and empty rhetoric.");
Epstein, supra note 122, at 4 ("the cases continue to mount up, and the pressures to distin-
guish and to reconcile them increase, until this array of ad hoc decisions becomes wholly
incomprehensible to legal and lay observer alike"); Humbach, supra note 72, at 244 ("the
law of police-power takings is a widely acknowledged hodgepodge, its doctrines a farrago
of fumblings which have suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories."); Peterson,
supra note 58, at 1303-04 ("the Court's takings doctrine is in far worse shape than has
generally been recognized-indeed .... it is difficult to imagine a body of case law in
greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray"); Rose, supra note 58, at 562 ("commentators
propose test after test to define 'takings,' while courts continue to reach ad hoc determina-
tions rather than principled resolutions"); William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and
Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1059 n.l I (1980) ("in truth, the collected deci-
sions of the Supreme Court, and all other courts [on the takings issue], leave the subject as
disheveled as a ragpicker's coat").
145. Peterson, supra note 58, at 1317.
146. Id. at 1329 n.152.
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test is used where "as applied" challenges are involved. 14 7 However,
the Court does not apply this distinction with any great degree of consis-
tency. Consequently, it is difficult to predict what test the Court will
apply in any given situation.
148
The Penn Central and Agins tests have also been criticized on indeter-
minacy grounds. Thus, it is claimed that the three factors in Penn Central
provide little structure to the Court's taking analysis. 149 First, the Court
defines each factor in a variety of ways without acknowledging shifts in
definition. 150 Second, the weight assigned to each factor varies from
case to case. 15 ' The Agins test is subject to similar criticism. Both the
"substantially advance" requirement' 5 2 and the "no economically viable
use" concept have been criticized for lack of clarity.153
To its credit, the Court appears to be gradually reducing the areas
of ambiguity in its takings issue jurisprudence. Thus, for example,
Loretto established a clear position with respect to permanent physical
invasions of real property154 and Nollan apparently tightened up the
"means-ends" test.' 5 5 In Lucas, the Court turned its attention to an-
other area of ambiguity, the "no economically viable use" concept of the
Agins test. What has emerged is a bright-line rule against government
regulation that totally deprives landowners of any productive use of
their property.
III. THE LucAs DECISION.
A. The South Carolina Beachfront Management Act.
South Carolina's original shoreline regulation statute, enacted in
1977, required landowners to obtain permits from the Coastal Council
before building homes or other structures in "critical areas."' 15 6 This
included beaches and primary sand dunes. 157 However, the 1977 Act
gave the Coastal Council no control over residential development land-
ward of existing beaches.' 5 8 In 1987, a Blue Ribbon Committee estab-
147. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96
(1981).
148. Peterson, supra note 76, at 57.
149. Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 372, 375-76 (1986) (Penn Central balancing approach criticized as "stochastic" be-
cause of indeterminacy).
150. Petersen, supra note 58, at 1317.
151. Id.
152. Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REV. 448, 455-58 (1988).
153. Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872, 877 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("the precise meaning of'economically viable use' of land is elusive and has not
been clarified by the Supreme Court").
154. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
155. See Krueger, supra note 89, at 905 ("The [Nottan] Court's description of the degree
of fit required between the ends and means of land-use regulations seems to signal a much
stronger examination of legislative purpose.").
156. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130(A) (1987).
157. Id. § 48-39-10(J).
158. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 79.
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lished by the Coastal Council to study erosion control, recommended a
setback program that would move development sufficiently inland so
that residential structures would not be threatened by the natural ero-
sion cycle. 159 This suggestion led to the enactment of the 1988 Beach-
front Management Act (the Act).' 60
The Act provided for the establishment of "baselines" and con-
struction setback lines in coastal regions.161 The Act also distinguished
between standard erosion zones and inlet erosion zones. A standard
erosion zone was defined as a segment of shoreline that was subject to
the same set of coastal processes, had a fairly constant range of profiles
and sediment characteristics, and was not influenced directly by tidal in-
lets or associated inlet shoals.16 2 The Act defined an inlet erosion zone
as a segment of shoreline along or adjacent to a tidal inlet that was di-
rectly influenced by the inlet and the inlet's associated shoals.
16 s
Ordinarily, the baseline in the standard erosion zone would be lo-
cated along the crest of the primary oceanfront sand dunes in that
area. 164 However, if the shoreline was altered, either naturally or be-
cause of artificial structures, the baseline was to be placed where the
crest of the primary oceanfront sand dunes would have been if the
shoreline had not been altered.16 5 Where inlets had not been stabilized
by jetties, groins, or other structures, the baseline was to be located at
the most landward point of any erosion in the last forty years unless the
best available scientific and historical data indicated that the shoreline
was unlikely to return to its former location.
16 6
Once a baseline was established in a coastal area, the Act directed
the Coastal Council to establish a setback line landward of the baseline.
This setback line would be either forty times the annual erosion rate or
twenty feet, which ever was greater. 16 7 The Act generally prohibited the
construction of habitable structures seaward of the setback line.168 Nor-
mal repairs were allowed, 169 but a structure that had been completely
destroyed could only be replaced if certain conditions were met. 170 Fur-
159. NewmanJ. Smith, Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South Carolina,
42 S.C.L. REv. 717, 720 (1991).
160. 1988 S.C. Acts 634, codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10, 48-39-130, and 48-
39-270 to 48-39-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp 1991).
161. The Act required the Coastal Council to establish "interim" baseline and setback
lines by the Act's effective date. Id. § 48-39-280(C). The 1990 amendments required the
Council to establish final baselines and setback lines prior to July 3, 1991. Id.
162. Id. § 48-39-270(A)(6).
163. Id. § 48-39-270(A)(7). The property in Lucas was located in an inlet erosion zone.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.1.
164. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(1).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(2). Baselines within inlet erosion zones were to be calculated
in the same manner as baselines in standard erosion zones. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(3).
167. Id. § 48-39-280(B).
168. Id. § 48-39-290.
169. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(1)(b)(i).
170. The new structure must not be larger, longer along the coastline, or closer to the
sea than the original structure. Furthermore, the new structure must be moved as far
landward as possible. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(1)(b)(iv).
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thermore, no damaged structure could be reconstructed seaward of the
baseline. 17 1 Finally, new erosion control structures were banned out-
right by the Act 17 2 and replacement of damaged structures was severely
restricted. 173
Some of the restrictions in the Act were later relaxed by the Legisla-
ture in 1990 to alleviate some of the hardships caused by Hurricane
Hugo. 174 For example, limited construction was allowed between the
baseline and the setback line. 175 In addition, the 1990 amendments au-
thorized the Coastal Council to permit construction seaward of the base-
line in certain situations.17 6 Finally, the amendments repealed a
provision that required landowners to replace, on an annual basis, all
sand in front of their property lost through erosion if they replaced hab-
itable structures or erosion control devices. 
177
B. The State Court Opinion.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 178 was one of several chal-
lenges to the validity of South Carolina's 1988 Beachfront Management
Act. 179 In 1986, the plaintiff in Lucas purchased two unimproved beach-
171. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(i)(b)(iv)(d).
172. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(2)(a).
173. The Act provides that an existing erosion control structure may not be replaced if
more than 80% of the "above grade" portion is destroyed. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(2)(b)(i).
That percentage drops to 67% in 1995 and 50% in the year 2005. Id. §§ 48-39-
290(B)(2)(b)(ii), 48-39-290(B)(2)(b)(iii).
174. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 221.
175. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(l)(a). Houses of less than 5000 square feet were allowed
within this area if no portion was constructed on a primary oceanfront sand dune and if the
structure was moved as far landward as possible.
176. Id. § 48-39-290(D)(1).
177. Id. § 48-39-350(A)(6).
178. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
179. See Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991);
Chavous v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 745 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.C. 1990), rev'd sub
non. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991). Esposito
and Chavous involved property in Hilton Head, South Carolina. The parties in Esposito
owned improved property located partially seaward of a baseline established by the
Coastal Council pursuant to the 1988 Act. The act prohibited repair or additions to struc-
tures located in this "dead zone." 939 F.2d at 167. The landowners brought a facial chal-
lenge to the Act, claiming that it constituted a taking of their property. The trial court,
however, ruled in favor of the Coastal Council. On appeal, the Circuit Court applied the
Agins test. First, it held that the state had an important interest in protecting its beaches
and that the Act was substantially related to the achievement of this goal. Id. at 169. Then
the court found that the Act did not deprive the landowners of all viable use of their prop-
erty because it permitted them to use it in the same manner as they did before the statute's
enactment. Id. at 170. Therefore, the court upheld the validity of the 1988 Act.
In Chavous, two landowners were denied permission to construct a house on a vacant
parcel of beachfront property. The landowners sued for money damages and injunctive
relief. The trial court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited a federal court from
awarding damages against the state. However, the court did find that the 1988 Act
amounted to a taking of the landowners' property and enjoined the Coastal Council from
enforcing the setback restriction against them. 745 F. Supp. at 1172. The case was consol-
idated with Esposito on appeal and the circuit court ruled that the 1990 amendments obvi-
ated the need for an injunction. See Esposito, 939 F.2d at 171. The court expressed no
opinion on whether the 1988 Act constituted a temporary taking of the landowners' prop-
erty between 1988 and 1990.
Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 403 S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 1991), decided by the
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front lots on the Isle of Palms near Charleston, South Carolina for
$975,000.180 The owners of all of the adjacent tracts constructed sin-
gle-family homes on their property and Lucas intended to do the same.
At the time Lucas purchased the property, neither lot was subject to
regulation under the existing Coastal Management Act' 8 1 and, there-
fore, the lots were not subject to regulation by the Coastal Council.
However, the Act mandated the baseline be fixed some distance land-
ward of the Lucas property 18 2 because the shoreline along this property
had fluctuated significantly over the past forty years.' 83 The construc-
tion setback line was located even further inland. Consequently, Lucas
was prohibited by the Act from building a structure on either lot except
for a small deck or walkway. 1
84
Lucas brought suit against the Coastal Council, alleging that the
building restriction constituted a taking of his property without just
compensation. The trial court found in his favor and awarded Lucas
more than $1.2 million.' 8 5 This decision, however, was reversed on ap-
peal by a divided South Carolina Supreme Court. 18 6
Lucas did not question either the objectives of the Act or the means
chosen by the legislature to achieve these objectives. Instead, he
claimed that the statute's provisions, as applied to him, deprived him of
"all economically viable use" of his property.'8 7 The majority opinion
acknowledged that economic impact was a relevant factor under the Key-
stone's multifactor analysis. 18 However, the opinion preferred to rely on
a line of United States Supreme Court cases that upheld regulations
without requiring just compensation when the state acted in order to
South Carolina Supreme Court shortly before its ruling in Lucas, involved a challenge to
the 1977 Coastal Management Act. In that case, several landowners brought suit to com-
pel the Coastal Council to allow them to construct a bulkhead across their beachfront
property. The lower court held that denial of the necessary permit amounted to a taking
of the plaintiffs' property. Id. at 621. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court con-
cluded that enforcement of the restriction would have little impact of the property. The
court also declared that the state did not have to compensate a landowner when the re-
striction was intended to prevent a serious harm to the public. Accordingly, the court
upheld Coastal Council's decision. Id. at 622.
180. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
181. Id. at 2889. At the time of purchase, the plaintiff's lots were located approxi-
mately 300 feet from the beach and dune line. Id. The 1977 Act only regulated "critical
areas." Critical areas did not extend beyond existing beaches and primary sand dunes. See
Smith, supra note 159, at 717-18.
182. The area in question was located in an inlet erosion zone that had not been stabi-
lized by jetties, terminal groins or other structures. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889 n.1. Conse-
quently, as required by the 1988 Act, the baseline was fixed at the most landward point of
the shoreline over the past 40 years.
183. Over the past 40 years, the shoreline had been subjected to both accretion and
erosion. For example, the plaintiff's property was under water between 1957 and 1963.
Since 1963, the shoreline had moved seaward. Id. at 2905.
184. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
185. Id. at 896.
186. Id. at 902.
187. Id. at 896.
188. Id. at 899. These factors are: (1) the economic impact of the regulation; (2) the
regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations; (3) the character of the
government action; and (4) the nature of the state's interest in the regulation. See Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
[Vol. 70:3
WILD DUNES
prevent a serious harm to the public.' 8 9 This was, of course, nothing
more than the old "noxious use" rule. The majority opinion treated this
as a per se rule: if the regulation is aimed at preventing a noxious use, the
state is never required to compensate, regardless of how much the land-
owner is harmed.190
The majority opinion then concluded that since the landowner had
not challenged the Act's legislative findings that new construction
causes serious public harm, 19 he had conceded that his proposed use
would be harmful and thus fall within the noxious use no compensation
rule. 19 2 Thus, the majority concluded, Lucas was not entitled to com-
pensation even though the regulation deprived him of all economically
viable use of his property.'
93
In a strong dissent, two members of the South Carolina court ex-
pressed disagreement with the reasoning of the majority opinion. The
dissenting opinion relied on the two-factor test of Agins.19 4 According
to this approach, a land use regulation would constitute a taking if it did
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or if it denied an
owner all economically viable use of his land.19 5 Thus, according to the
dissent, the court must first examine the purpose of the regulation.
19 6
This inquiry would lead to one of three possible conclusions: (1) the
regulation was unconstitutional because the public purpose for which it
was enacted was not considered to be sufficient or legitimate; (2) the
regulation was designed to prevent a nuisance and, therefore, no com-
pensation was required; or (3) the regulation was not designed to pre-
vent a nuisance, but did substantially advance other legitimate state
interests. In this latter situation, a taking would occur if the landowner
was deprived of all economically viable use of his land. 19 7
Unlike the majority, the dissenters did not regard the legislative
findings of fact as conclusive on the issue of whether the regulated activ-
ity caused serious harm to the public. The dissent contended that such
an approach would allow the state to regulate without paying compensa-
tion simply by calling that which it seeks to prevent a nuisance. 19 8 The
dissent then determined that the primary purpose of the Act was not
nuisance prevention since the activities and effects that the Act sought to
189. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899. The court did not specifically indicate how this no com-
pensation rule fit within the Keystone framework, but presumably it felt that it was an aspect
of the nature of the state's interest in regulation.
190. Id. at 900-01. The court cited Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d
327 (S.C. 1984), as an example of the application of the noxious use rule in South
Carolina.
191. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (development site
too close to beach/dune system jeopardizes the stability of this system, accelerates ero-
sion, and endangers adjacent property).
192. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 900.
193. Id. at 902.
194. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
195. Id. at 260.
196. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 906.
197. Id. at 906.
198. Id. at 905.
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prevent were not sufficiently injurious to be considered "noxious." 19 9
Turning to the second factor of the Agins test, the dissent concluded that
the restriction on construction effectively destroyed the market value of
the plaintiff's property.
20 0
C. The Supreme Court Opinion.
On the last day of the October 1991 Term, Justice Scalia, joined by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas, is-
sued an opinion reversing the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme
Court. 20 1 Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but preferred to de-
cide the case by using an investment-backed expectations test instead of
the categorical rule proposed by Justice Scalia.
20 2 Justice Blackmun 20 3
and Justice Stevens20 4 each wrote a dissenting opinion and Justice Sou-
ter issued a separate statement on the question of ripeness.
20 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia first determined that the case
was ripe for review by the Court.20 6 He then announced a categorical
rule under which compensation would be required whenever a regula-
tion deprived a property owner of "all economically viable use."' 20 7 Fur-
thermore, the landowner would be entitled to compensation under
these circumstances even though the stated purpose of the regulation
was to prevent harm to the public.20 8 However, Justice Scalia did con-
cede that the government would not be required to compensate a prop-
erty owner for prohibition of uses that were not permitted under
preexisting background principles of nuisance and property law.
2 0 9
1. Ripeness.
Lucas did not challenge the Act on its face; he merely objected to
the Act as applied to his property. 210 However, between the time Lucas
brought suit and the time his case was decided by the South Carolina
Supreme Court, the legislature amended the Act to create a special per-
mit procedure under which a landowner could request the Coastal
Council to allow construction seaward of the setback line. 21 ' The Coun-
cil, therefore, argued that the Court should not review the landowner's
permanent takings claim until after he had requested, and been denied,
a special permit to build.
212
199. Id. at 906.
200. Id. at 907.
201. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 (1992).
202. Id. at 2903.
203. Id. at 2904-17.
204. Id. at 2917-25.
205. Id. at 2925-26.
206. Id. at 2891-92.
207. Id. at 2895.
208. Id. at 2899.
209. Id. at 2900.
210. Id. at 2907 n.4.
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
212. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
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The Court had previously addressed the ripeness issue in MacDon-
ald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County.213 In MacDonald, a developer, whose
proposed plan was rejected, claimed that this action effectively restricted
his property to unsuitable uses. 2 14 However, the Court declared that it
could not decide whether a taking had occurred until the county had
made a "final and authoritative determination" of the type and intensity
of development that it would permit on the plaintiff's property.
2 1 5
Justice Scalia agreed that the landowner's permanent takings claim
was not ripe for review as long as he could apply for a special permit to
build houses on his lots. 2 16 However, Justice Scalia argued that the
Court could review a temporary takings claim, 2 17 notwithstanding the
establishment of a special permit procedure in 1990.218 According to
Justice Scalia, even if Lucas eventually obtained a special permit to build
on his beachfront lots, the state supreme court decision upholding the
validity of the statute effectively foreclosed any claim for loss of use of
the property between 1988 and 1990.219 On this basis, Justice Scalia
concluded that the Court could review the landowner's temporary tak-
ings claim.
220
Considering the availability of a special permit procedure, it is
rather surprising that a majority of the Court was willing to decide the
Lucas case. The Court could have vacated the judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court and remanded it back to the state courts for
further consideration in light of the 1990 amendments. At that point,
Lucas could have brought an action for a temporary taking in state
court. 2 2 1 However, as Justice Blackmun observed, "Clearly, the Court
was eager to decide this case."
'222
Although Justice Souter and the dissenters disagreed with the
Court's action, it can be defended on two grounds. First, it would have
been unfair to require the landowner, who brought his case before three
courts, to then go through a lengthy and uncertain administrative pro-
cess followed by additional litigation, to find out whether or not he
213. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
214. Id. at 344.
215. Id. at 348; see also Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985) (factors involved in taking issue could not be properly
evaluated until agency had made a final, definitive decision about how the regulation
would be applied to the claimant's property).
216. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
217. The Court acknowledged that compensation was required for a temporary regula-
tory taking in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987).
218. The special permit procedure became available after the Lucas case was argued
but before it was decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890-
91.
219. Id. at 2891-92.
220. Id. Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the landowner's claim
for a temporary regulatory taking claim was ripe. Id. at 2902.
221. Id. at 2909 n.7.
222. Id. at 2909.
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could build a house on his property.2 2 3 Second, the Lucas case
presented an excellent opportunity for the Court to shed some light on
the takings issue.
2. The Categorical Rule.
Justice Scalia observed that there were at least two types of regula-
tory action that required compensation "without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint. ' 22 4 The
first involved physical invasions or appropriations of private property;
the second included cases where government regulation denied all eco-
nomically beneficial or productive use of the land.2 25 Since the state
courts had conceded that the regulation completely destroyed the eco-
nomic value of the beachfront lots, Justice Scalia believed that the only
issue before the Court was whether compensation could be required in
this situation when the purpose of the regulation was to prevent a seri-
ous harm to the public.
Justice Scalia concluded compensation was necessary when a regu-
lation deprived a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his or
her property.22 6 He declared that a regulation that allowed no econom-
ically beneficial use did not merely adjust "the benefits and burdens of
economic life" in a manner that secured an "average reciprocity of ad-
vantage" to everyone concerned; rather, the effect of such a regulation
was similar to a physical appropriation. 22 7 Furthermore, because confis-
catory regulations were extremely rare, Justice Scalia did not feel that a
compensation requirement in such cases would impair vital governmen-
tal functions. 228 Finally, Justice Scalia claimed that a categorical rule
would discourage local governments from pressing private property into
public service under the guise of mitigating some public harm. 229
The case for a categorical rule in "total deprivation" cases is a com-
pelling one. If the essential meaning of the Takings Clause is that the
rights of individuals should not be sacrificed to promote some greater
public good,23 0 a rule that vindicates that principle is completely appro-
priate. The categorical rule promulgated in Lucas does not insulate
property owners against reasonable regulation; it merely requires the
state to exercise its power of eminent domain when it destroys the value
of an individual's property in order to achieve some otherwise desirable
governmental objective.
There may, however, be some problems with the application ofJus-
tice Scalia's categorical rule. For example, the concept of "deprivation
223. Cf. Burling, supra note 113, at 346 (arguing that the cost of multiple administrative
proceedings can exhaust a property owner's resources).
224. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2893.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2895.
227. Id. at 2894.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2894-95.
230. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 58.
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of all economically valuable use" may be indeterminate. 23 ' Because this
concept is central to operation of the categorical rule, it should have
been fleshed out more in Lucas.2 3 2 For example, does this mean that
uses should be considered "economically valuable" only if they are ap-
propriate to the physical character of the land, to its geographical loca-
tion, and to the land-use patterns of the surrounding area?
23 3
Hopefully, in future decisions, the Court will give the term "deprivation
of all economically valuable use" an interpretation that is consistent with
the rationale behind categorical rule. Another problem is that of deter-
mining which property interests should be taken into account in decid-
ing whether a landowner has suffered a total deprivation.2 3 4 However,
as discussed earlier, this difficulty arises whenever economic loss is cal-
culated in fractional terms, as it is in the diminution-in-value test and
Penn Central's economic impact test.23 5 Therefore, the "conceptual sep-
aration" problem is not unique to the categorical rule and should not be
cited a reason for rejecting Justice Scalia's categorical approach to total
deprivations.
3. The Noxious Use Rule.
As the dissenters pointed out, the categorical rule announced in Lu-
cas was inconsistent with Mugler and a long line of other noxious use
cases. Rather than overrule these cases directly, Justice Scalia attempted
to incorporate them into a takings formula based on the Agins two part
test. Thus, Justice Scalia characterized the noxious use rule as the pro-
genitor of the principle that "land-use regulation does not effect a taking
if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests.' ",236 In this fash-
ion, he transformed the noxious use rule from a doctrine that denied
compensation into a doctrine that invalidated police power regulations
because they failed to satisfy the first part of the Agins test. According to
this analysis, a regulation that was intended to control a noxious use met
the first requirement of Agins, but compensation would still be required
under the second part of the Agins test if the regulation deprived the
landowner of all economically beneficial use of his or her property.
2 3 7
Justice Scalia's attempt to link the noxious use rule with substantive
due process was probably ill-advised. To be sure, many of the early nox-
ious use cases were primarily concerned with the state's power to regu-
231. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2913.
232. In fairness to justice Scalia, it should be pointed out that the concept of depriva-
tion of all economically valuable use originated in the Agins case. In the 12 years since
Agins was decided, no one on the Court has ever attempted to explain what this concept
means.
233. For example, in Lucas, virtually the entire 3 1/2 mile beachfront side of the Wild
Dunes Resort was occupied by single family homes, condominiums or resort-owned recre-
ational facilities. To suggest, therefore, that the lots had economic value because the land-
owner could "picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a moveable trailer"
was inconsistent with this standard.
234. Id. at 2913, 2919-20.
235. See Radin, supra note 126, at 1676.
236. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
237. Id. at 2898-99.
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late, rather than with the effect of the regulation on the claimant; but the
rule, at least in the twentieth century,2 3 8 has been predominantly associ-
ated with takings analysis, not with substantive due process. 23 9 Nor, can
it be said, as Justice Scalia suggested, that the noxious use rule does not
allow deprivation of all economic value.2 40 Even though many of the
regulations in question merely prohibited noxious uses,24 1 their practi-
cal effect was to render the property useless and unproductive.2 42 The
inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that the noxious use rule autho-
rizes total deprivation of economic benefit and, as such, is completely
inconsistent with Justice Scalia's categorical rule.
The categorical rule announced in Lucas, however, not only rejects
the noxious use rule, but also abrogates the harm/benefit test. The
harm/benefit test provides that no taking occurs if a regulation merely
prevents property owners from causing harm to others, although com-
pensation will be required if the purpose of the regulation is to confer a
benefit on the public that it does not already enjoy. 24 3 It is clear that the
no taking/no compensation aspect of this rule applies even when the
regulation allows no profitable use of the property. 24 4 For this reason,
the harm/benefit test is often relied upon by state courts to uphold re-
strictive environmental regulations.2 4 5 Now, as a result of the Lucas de-
cision, state courts will no longer be able utilize the harm/benefit test to
uphold regulations that deprive landowners of all beneficial use of their
land.
This repudiation of the harm/benefit test is long overdue. The
harm/benefit approach is analytically unsound because the distinction
between preventing a harm and providing a benefit is largely illusory.2 46
Furthermore, the harm/benefit test is easily manipulated because the
concept of harm can be expanded to cover just about anything the gov-
238. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding a local
ordinance which prevented gravel pit from continuing in business); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (upholding law that called for the destruction of infected cedar
trees); Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188, 195-96 (1925) (upholding seizure of liquor in
private homes).
239. See, e.g., Patrick Wiseman, When the End justifies the Means: Understanding Takings Ju-
risprudence in a Legal System with Integrity, 63 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 433, 459 (1988) (approving
the no compensation aspect of the noxious use rule); but see Stoebuck, supra note 144, at
1062 (arguing that the noxious use rule is really a due process test, not a takings test).
240. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
241. See Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New
Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAw. 735, 771 (1988).
242. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2918-19.
243. Peterson, supra note 76, at 106.
244. Hunter, supra note 49, at 324.
245. See Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C. 1984)
(upholding a prohibition against filling in wetlands); Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc., 399 So.
2d 1374, 1380-83 (Fla. 1981) (upholding a ban on destruction of mangrove forest);Just v.
Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (Wis. 1972) (upholding ordinance that regu-
lated filling along banks of navigable lakes).
246. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897 ("the distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-
conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder"). See also Connors, supra note
83, at 184; Williams, Jr. et al., supra note 133, at 221.
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ernment wants to regulate or prohibit.2 4 7 This has allowed some courts
to uphold confiscatory regulations while giving little or no consideration
to their effect on property owners.
2 48
4. The "Nuisance Exception."
Justice Scalia declared that when the government deprived a land-
owner of all economically beneficial use, it could avoid the duty to com-
pensate only by showing that the use interest destroyed by the
regulation had never been part of the landowner's title.2 49 Further-
more, Justice Scalia warned, the notion that title to land was subject to
an implied limitation that the state could subsequently eliminate all eco-
nomically valuable use was "inconsistent with the historical compact re-
corded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional
culture."
2 50
According to Justice Scalia, limitations on land use that relieved the
government of the duty to compensate "must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership." '2 5 1 Any inquiry on
this issue would ordinarily entail an analysis of: (1) the degree of harm
to public lands or resources, or adjacent property, posed by the claim-
ant's proposed activities; (2) the social value of the claimant's activities
and their suitability to the locality in question; and (3) the relative ease
with which the alleged harm could be avoided through measures taken
by the claimant, the government, or adjacent landowners. 2 52 As Justice
Scalia himself admitted, courts examined these same factors to deter-
mine the existence of a private nuisance. 2 53 Justice Scalia also pointed
out that the fact that a particular use has been engaged in by similarly
situated owners ordinarily imported a lack of any common-law prohibi-
tion, as did the fact that other landowners, similarly situated, were per-
mitted to continue the use denied the claimant.
2 54
Finally, Justice Scalia declared that this issue was one of state law
that must be decided by the state courts on remand. However, he sug-
gested that common-law principles would rarely prevent all construction
or improvement on a landowner's property. 25 5 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia emphasized that, on remand, the state could not simply cite legis-
lative findings or make conclusive applications of common-law maxims
247. Berchin, supra note 84, at 911.
248. In Lucas, for example, the state court accepted at face value the Legislature's con-
clusion that beach erosion caused harm to beach/dune areas, that new construction con-
tributed to beach erosion, and that the state could, therefore, prohibit new construction
without payment of compensation, regardless of its effect on landowners. Lucas, 404
S.E.2d at 900-02.
249. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. Justice Stevens labeled this as a "nuisance exception."
Id. at 2920.
250. Id. at 2900.
251. Id.
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in order to sustain the regulation. 2 56 In effect, the state would have to
show that construction of a house on the beachfront property would
constitute a common-law nuisance.
25 7
In the abstract, no one could disagree with the proposition that no
taking can occur unless the claimant is deprived of a legally recognized
property interest.2 58 Nevertheless, the dissenters expressed great con-
cern about the operation of the nuisance exception in Justice Scalia's
takings framework. These concerns, however, seemed to relate more to
the categorical rule rather than the nuisance exception.
One argument, for example, was that the categorical rule and nui-
sance exception were unnecessary because legislatures could make de-
terminations about background principles of nuisance or property law as
effectively as courts.25 9 In effect, every new regulation represents a leg-
islative readjustment of nuisance or property principles; thus, the legis-
lative act that establishes the regulation would also place the regulated
activity within the nuisance exception by declaring it to be unlawful.
This is essentially how the harm/benefit test works. However, the nui-
sance exception in Lucas quite properly places the responsibility for de-
termining background principles on the courts. Courts have a clear
institutional advantage over legislatures when it comes to making deci-
sions about existing nuisance and property law. Legislatures are inher-
ently political institutions which often represent narrow special interest
groups rather than the general public. 260 Courts, on the other hand, are
experienced in dealing with legal concepts and are more likely to be
neutral decision-makers.
It was also suggested that the nuisance exception would have the
effect of protecting existing lawful uses of property against subsequent
prohibition. 26 1 It is true that under Justice Scalia's takings framework,
the state legislature could not unilaterally characterize some activity as a
nuisance and thereby prohibit it completely without payment of com-
pensation. That does not mean, however, that this new takings formula
"effectively freezes the State's common law, denying the legislature
much of its power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of
property. '2 62 Background principles of nuisance and property law are
still free to change over time as they always have in the past.
2 63
In sum, the nuisance exception is a logical corollary to Justice
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2901-02.
258. See, e.g. Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1905); New Orleans Gas Light
Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905).
259. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260. Some theorists have argued that legislative decisions are seldom made on grounds
of public policy. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of
Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
261. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. Id.
263. For a discussion of changes in the law of prescription, implied dedication, custom,
and the public trust doctrine and the effect of these changes on littoral rights. See supra nn.
12-44 and accompanying text.
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Scalia's categorical rule. The dissenters' attacks on the nuisance excep-
tion lack plausibility and reflect their dislike of the categorical rule,
rather than any genuine concern about the rule's exception.
IV. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE COURT'S NEW TAKINGS THEORY.
In recent years, the Supreme Court began to show more concern
for property owners. 2 64 Kaiser Aetna,2 65 Loretto,26 6 First English,26 7 and
Nollan,2 6 8 along with Lucas, are illustrative of this trend. This portion of
the Article examines some of the consequences of the Court's new treat-
ment of regulatory takings claims.
A. Effect on Property Owners.
In the past, property owners who sought to challenge burdensome
regulations faced a number of procedural and evidentiary barriers. For
example, the Court rigorously enforced its rules relating to ripeness and
exhaustion of administrative remedies, thereby delaying judicial review
of any takings claim until dilatory local officials reached a final adminis-
trative decision on a landowner's request to develop.2 69 In addition, in
its application of the "rational basis" test, the Court generally accepted
at face value legislative findings about the public purpose served by the
regulation and the effectiveness of the means employed. 2 70 Further-
more, the Court often rejected takings claims even when a regulation
imposed a severe burden on affected property owners. 2 7' All of this
gave government agencies a decided advantage when property owners
sought to challenge restrictive or oppressive regulations.
The Court's new takings jurisprudence improves the position of
claimants somewhat at the expense of the government. The Court's
willingness to accept the Lucas case for review suggests that it may be
264. Burling, supra note 113, at 313.
265. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
266. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
267. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
268. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
269. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53
(1986) (developer whose initial development plan was turned down required to submit
revised plan before bringing takings claim); Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193-94 (1985) (claimant required to seek a vari-
ance from local zoning board before bringing takings claim).
.270. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-88
(1987) (agreeing that mining companies could be required to leave coal in place to protect
surface owners from effects of subsidence); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261
(1980) (agreeing that density requirements were necessary to protect city against conse-
quences of urban growth); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134-
35 (1978) (agreeing that historic preservation law served a public purpose); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962) (agreeing that a ban on excavation promoted
safety).
271. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979) (prohibition on the sale of
privately-owned eagle feathers upheld); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)
(local ban on excavation below water table upheld even though it effectively destroyed
claimant's gravel excavation business).
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prepared to relax its ripeness and exhaustion rules, at least in cases
where it is apparent that no change in position is likely to occur on the
part of local legislators. This shift in the Court's approach is to be com-
mended. While ripeness and exhaustion doctrines are obviously essen-
tial to the efficient operation of the judicial system, they can sometimes
be unfair to landowners who are forced to expend time and money seek-
ing variances and pursuing administrative appeals when it is obvious
that permission to develop will ultimately be denied.
2 7 2
The "rational nexus" requirement of Nollan also exemplifies the
Court's newfound solicitude for property owners. 2 73 It indicates that
the Court is not going to automatically defer to implausible legislative
statements of purpose, but instead will make an independent evaluation
of the legislative purpose of a challenged regulation. 2 74 This does not
mean a return to the Lochner2 7 5 era when the Court felt free to make its
own decisions about the social or economic wisdom of state legislation.
Rather, it means that the Court will not be deterred by legislative asser-
tions of public purpose from invalidating regulations, like that involved
in Nollan, that are nothing more than blatant appropriations of priygte
property.
The Lucas Court's repudiation of the noxious use and harm/benefit
rules, insofar as they purport to authorize regulations that totally de-
stroy the value of private property without compensation, will provide
property owners with greater protection against overreaching by gov-
ernment officials and legislators who wish to please taxpayers by secur-
ing the benefits of public beaches and wildlife sanctuaries without
paying for them. 2 76 The holding in Lucas is also reassuring because it
contradicts the certain radical notions about private property that have
been espoused by a segment of the environmental movement.2 7 7 .
Finally, the First English decision, upholding a claim for a temporary
taking, will discourage the enactment of clearly invalid regulations, be-
cause it imposes an economic cost in the form of damages on communi-
ties that act in such a manner. The holding in First English- will
encourage expeditious resolution of regulatory takings claims because it
penalizes delay if the regulation is subsequently found to be invalid.. In
the past, regulatory agencies had no reason to move the decisional pro-
cess along. Now the threat of a damage claim provides an incentive'for
these agencies respond more quickly to development requests.
272. Burling, supra note 113, at 346.
273. Lawrence, supra note 137, at 253.
274. Krueger, supra note 89, at 905.
275. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
276. Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto:
A Reply to the "Gang of Five's " Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Propeity, 19
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 685, 697 (1986).
277. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 49, at 317-20 (endorsing Aldo Leopold's theories of
"land ethic" and "stewardship"); Large, supra note 85, at 1045 (because of spillover ef-
fects, "land cannot be neatly divided into mine and yours"). See also Devall, The Deep Ecol-
ogy Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299 (1980).
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B. Effect on Land Use and Environmental Regulation.
Even prior to the Lucas decision, some environmentalists criticized
the Court's takings jurisprudence because, in their view, it unduly lim-
ited the government's power to protect ecological resources from de-
struction by private property owners. 278 In Lucas itself, some members
of the Court expressed concern that the new takings formula might be
too restrictive.2 79 However, as the discussion below attempts to illus-
trate, the Court's new takings framework will not invalidate most ex-
isting forms of shoreline protection regulation.
1. Dune Protection Legislation.
Sand dunes stabilize beach areas, act as buffers against storms and
provide a habitat for wildlife. 280 At the same time, sand dunes and their
associated vegetation are vulnerable to the effects of development.
2 8 1
Consequently, it makes sense to preserve the dune environment when-
ever possible. A few states enacted legislation that specifically protects
sand dunes.2 82 Typically, these statutes prohibit the destruction of
dunes or construction near dune lines. In general, unless a lot is ex-
tremely shallow, compliance with dune protection regulations is not dif-
ficult. Therefore, the Court's new takings framework should have no
significant effect on dune protection laws.
2. Beach Access Legislation.
Several states enacted beach access provisions. 283 Obviously there
is no constitutional problem with statutes that predicate public rights on
existing property law concepts, such as prescription, implied dedication
or custom. Development exactions are another matter. The mandatory
dedication of an easement that runs from a public road to a beach might
satisfy Nollan's rational nexus test if it was required of developers as part
of the initial development approval process. This is because large-scale
residential or commercial construction along a previously undeveloped
shoreline might in fact interfere with existing public access. However,
278. See Hunter, supra note 49, at 320 ("Current takings doctrine does not adequately
permit the government sufficient latitude to enforce the obligations land owners have to-
ward the 'land community.' "); Developments in the Lao--Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427,
1620 (1978) (takings clause labeled as "the major obstacle to effective environmental land
use regulation").
279. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 2922 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
280. Jeter M. Watson & Richard H. Sedgley, Land Use Regulation by the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission: The Virginia Wetlands Act and Coastal Primary Sand Dune Protection Act, 7
VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 381, 387-88,(1988).
281. Zalkin, supra note 6, at 213-14.
282. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 215-A:3 (Supp.
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-113(b)(6)(a), 113A-120(a)(6) (West 1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 48-39-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 63.011 (West
1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1400 (Michie 1992).
283. E.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30214 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 113A-134.1 to 134.3 (1991); TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.011-61.025 (West 1978
& Supp. 1992).
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requiring individual lot owners to dedicate a portion of their land as a
condition to obtaining a building permit, as was done in Nollan, should
not be allowed. Once a shoreline area becomes developed, the govern-
ment should pay for an easement if it wishes to provide public access to
beach areas.
3. Construction Setback Lines.
Beach erosion is occurring in many areas of the country. 28 4 As
mentioned earlier, a number of states established fixed construction set-
back lines in coastal areas in order to control this problem.28 5 As long
as setback lines are not located too far from existing shorelines, land-
owners should be able to coexist with them. A few states established
floating construction setback lines.2 8 6 Floating setback lines are proba-
bly more effective erosion control devices than fixed ones. 2 8 7 When this
technique is employed, the setback line may be located a considerable
distance inland if the shoreline fluctuates widely over time. Obviously, a
deep setback line is more likely to cover an entire lot, as in Lucas, than a
shallow one. Furthermore, the chances of a total deprivation are much
greater when a setback is established along a fully developed shoreline.
In fact, the floating setbacks are probably impractical in areas, such as
Wild Dunes, where development occurs along an unstable shoreline.
4. Wetlands Protection Legislation.
The Lucas decision is likely to have its greatest impact on wetlands
protection regulations. Coastal wetlands are extremely productive and
valuable natural resources.2 8 8 The estuarine environment, however, is
also highly vulnerable to the effects of development. 28 9 For this reason,
many states regulate dredging and filling in wetland areas. 290 Unfortu-
nately, wetlands are essentially worthless from the landowner's point of
view if permission to dredge or fill is denied.
2 9 '
In the past, some courts upheld denials of dredge and fill permits
on the theory that no compensation was required when the purpose of
the regulation was to protect the estuarine environment from harm.
292
284. Owens, supra note 45, at 626.
285. ALA. CODE § 9-7-10 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7004 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 205A-43(a) (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 438A(1) (1989 & Supp. 1991).
286. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.053 (West 1988); N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 34-
0103(3)(a) (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-1 18 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-
39-290(B)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
287. Hwang, supra note 46, at 13.
288. Binder, supra note 61, at 18-30.
289. See Hunter, supra note 49, at 339-40.
290. CAL. Pua. RES. CODE § 30233 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.91 to 403.929
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-286 (Michie 1992); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 9-202 (Supp. 1992); MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-9 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 482-A:3 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-4 (West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-23-18
(1991).
291. Large, supra note 90, at 4-5.
292. See, e.g., Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327, 329 (S.C.
1984); Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981).
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However, that rationale is no longer valid after Lucas. State courts could
rule that the destruction of wetlands was nuisance-like in terms of its
effect on the public welfare, 29 3 but it would be hard for them to justify
such a conclusion in light of the fact that development activities in wet-
lands areas are not unusual even in this era of heightened environmental
consciousness. 29 4 Nor could a court avoid the effect of Lucas by arguing
that title to wetlands does not carry with it any right to alter their natural
state.2 95 The logic Lucas appears to support the existence of a land-
owner's right to improve or develop property that is not economically
productive in its natural state. 2 96 Therefore, Lucas would seem to dic-
tate that the states must either place generous variance provisions in
their wetlands protection statutes or create programs to purchase devel-
opment rights in wetland areas.
CONCLUSION.
The Lucas holding was a narrow one, covering only situations where
a regulation completely destroys the economic value of a landowner's
property. However, Lucas, when read together with other recent deci-
sions, indicates that the Court shifted its takings doctrine in favor of
landowners. The Court's implicit repudiation of the no compensation
aspect of the harm/benefit test is particularly significant. Undoubtedly,
the Court's new takings framework will impose some constraints on land
use and environmental regulation. However, this is a price that must be
paid if property rights are to be protected against unduly restrictive gov-
ernmental regulation.
293. Cf. Coletta, supra note 124, at 357 (arguing that much development is nuisance-
like in character and may thus fall within the an expanded nuisance exception principle).
294. It will be recalled that Justice Scalia cautioned in Lucas that "[t]he fact that a par-
ticular use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack
of any common-law prohibition though changed circumstances or new knowledge may
make what was previously permissible no longer so." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
295. This notion was first proposed in Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768
(Wis. 1972). One commentator referred to this as the "when you buy a swamp you just get
a swamp" theory of takings. See Burling, supra note 113, at 351.
296. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 ("It seems unlikely that common-law principles would
have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's
land; they rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land.").
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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
CHRISTOPHERSEN V. ALLIED-SIGNAL CORP.: THE




It is a commonplace observation that the use of expert testimony
has increased dramatically in the last decade. A recent research project
studied the use of expert testimony in 529 civil cases in California Supe-
rior Court. I Expert witnesses appeared in 86% of those trials. 2 The
overall average was 3.3 expert witnesses per trial.3 This same period of
time witnessed a virtual "explosion of toxic tort ... litigation"4 in which
expert witnesses play a particularly important role. In a toxic tort case,
the crucial issue is often medical causation 5 and the plaintiff ordinarily
needs expert testimony to establish medical causation.
6
In 1986, Professor Charles Nesson published a widely-cited article.
7
In that article, he argued that the courts should liberally admit expert
testimony on the issue of medical causation in toxic tort cases. Professor
Nesson emphasized the differences between the legal and scientific stan-
dards of certainty.8 As Professor Nesson wrote,
[A] . . . scientist exploring the hypothesis that a given toxic
agent causes cancer is . . .likely to suspend scientific judgment
on the ultimate question of causation until more testing.., can
be done to eliminate alternative hypotheses. A doctor or law-
yer or judge, on the other hand, often does not have the luxury
of postponing a decision .... [W]e ask juries to come to conclu-
sions without insisting on or waiting for scientific demonstra-
tion. The legal standard of proof ... require[s] only a rational
basis for the expert's opinion-a standard far short of scientific
demonstration.9
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Sec-
tion, American Association of Law Schools; B.A., 1967; J.D., 1969, University of San
Francisco.
1. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1991).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Roy A. Cohen & Jodi F. Mindnich, Expert Testimony and the Presentation of Scientific
Evidence in Toxic Tort and Environmental Hazardous Substance Litigation, 21 SETON HALL L. REV.
1009, 1009 (1991).
5. EDWARD GREER & WARREN FREEDMAN, Toxic TORT LITIGATiON § 5.1 (1989 &
Supp. 1991).
6. See id. at ch. 5.
7. Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowl-
edge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986).
8. Id. at 529.
9. Id. at 529-30.
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More specifically, Professor Nesson contended that the courts should
permit an expert to opine on medical causation so long as the opinion is
based on reasonable clinical judgment.' 0 In Professor Nesson's judg-
ment, an expert testifying about medical causation should not be re-
stricted to relying on formal scientific demonstrations such as
epidemiological studies."I For example, assume that the body of scien-
tific knowledge about a particular type of cancer is incomplete and that
there is inadequate experimentation to validate the hypothesis that the
toxic agent in question causes that type of cancer. Professor Nesson be-
lieves that a physician's opinion on causation should nevertheless be ad-
missible if as a diagnostician exercising "his best medical judgment,"
the physician would treat the patient on the assumption that the toxic
agent was the most likely cause of the cancer.' 2
Within the past five years, several commentators have criticized Pro-
fessor Nesson's position that the courts should apply liberal standards to
determine the admissibility of medical causation testimony in toxic tort
cases. The leading critic has been Peter Huber, the author of Galileo's
Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom.13 Mr. Huber argues that as a result
of the liberalization of evidentiary standards, the courts have permitted
the presentation of spurious causation theories--"junk science"-to ju-
ies. In turn, juries have returned inaccurate plaintiffs' verdicts and
wrongfully imposed additional costs on defendants.
It would be fair to say that more and more courts are responding to
these criticisms and rejecting Professor Nesson's position. To be sure,
there is a split of authority over the question.14 "The pendulum," how-
ever, has clearly swung away from Nesson's view.' 5 When the question
presented is whether a given toxic agent causes a particular illness, such
as a type of cancer, the trend has been to require formal scientific proof
of causation. The courts have dismissed clinical judgments as unreliable
and unscientific speculation.' 6 Some courts have ruled that as a general
proposition, the expert must base his or her causation opinion on a gen-
erally accepted scientific theory. 17 Other courts have restricted the ex-
pert to specific types of scientific proof such as epidemiological studies'
8
or research published in peer-reviewed journals.' 9
10. Id. at 526, 529-30.
11. Id. at 526.
12. Id. at 528.
13. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
14. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4; Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Rea-
sonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702
and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 372-73 (1992).
15. Recent Case, Evidence-Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-Fifth Circuit Limits Permissi-
ble Scientific Evidence to Generally Accepted Theories-Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,
939 F.2d 1106, (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam)., 105 HARV. L. REV. 791, 791 (1992).
16. Id. at 793; Harwell v. American Med. Sys., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1287, 1298 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992).
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
18. McCarthy, supra note 14 at 364, 368, 375, 392.
19. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130-31.
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In mid-1991, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered an
en banc, per curiam decision in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.20 The
Christophersen case became a cause celebre. 2 1 The consensus is that the
Christophersen decision is in step with the judicial trend to demand formal
scientific demonstration of causation and the decision is viewed as an
important "signal" that in the future, the courts will take a more restric-
tive approach to the admission of expert testimony on causation.
22
In mid-1992, the publicity for another scientific evidence case,
Daubert,2 3 eclipsed the notoriety of the Christophersen decision. 24 In
Daubert, the plaintiffs' experts relied on a reanalysis of epidemiological
data to prove their theory that the anti-nausea drug Bendectin can cause
birth defects. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
scientific testimony was admissible only if plaintiffs could prove that
their experts' theory was generally accepted. 2 5 The court further ruled
that proving the acceptance of an expert's theory required a showing
that the theory was supported by studies published in peer-reviewed
journals. 26 On October 13, 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Daubert.27 The Court's decision in Daubert promises to clarify the
standard for determining the admissibility of expert testimony when the
expert employs a distinctively scientific methodology such as epidemio-
logical analysis. Notwithstanding the importance of clarifying that test,
Daubert should not be permitted to obscure the broader question raised
by Christophersen.
In Christophersen, the plaintiffs were the survivors of a deceased for-
mer employee of Marathon Manufacturing Co. 28 The cause of the dece-
20. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
21. Richard 0. Faulk, The Unanswered Questions of Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corp., 4 VILL. ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 21 (1993);Bruce L. James, Fryed Expert Witnesses: The
5th Circuit Takes Charge of Scientific Testimony, 12 REV. LITIG. 171 (1992); Barry J. Nace &
Thomas H. Bleakley, How Much Evidence Is Enough?, TRIAL, Aug. 1990, at 38; Rebecca L.
Hunt, Note, The Need for an Appropriate Standard for Admission of Expert Witness Testimony in
Toxic Tort Cases, 16 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 573 (1992); Kimberly M. Skaggs, Case Comment,
Limiting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony: Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1185 (1992); Fifth Circuit Formulates Stiff Test For Admitting Toxic Tort Expert Opinion,
60 U.S.L.W. 1042 (1991); Gary Taylor, Expert Witness Opinion Eyes; Circuits Split on the Issue,
NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 3.
22. Recent Case, supra note 15 at 791-92.
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
24. David E. Bernstein,Junk Science in the Courtroom, WALL ST.J., Mar. 24, 1993, at AIS;
Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court to Examine Scientific Proof, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1; Paul M.
Barrett, Top Court Agrees to Clarify Use of Scientific Evidence in Trials, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
1992, at B9; Joan Biskupic, High Court to Review Expert-Witness Standards in Product Case,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1992, at A6; Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Decide Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence in U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1992, at Al; 'Junk Science" and justice:
Court Will Decide When Expert Opinions Are Admissible, MISSOULIAN, Oct. 14, 1992, at A3; Tony
Mauro, Bendectin Case to Test 'Junk Science", USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1992, at 9A.
25. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1129.
26. Id. at 1131.
27. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
28. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 363 (5th Cir. 1990) (Chris-
tophersen I), superseded by 939 F.2d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (Christophersen II), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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dent's death was a small-cell cancer that originated in his colon and
metastasized to his liver.2 9 While he worked for Marathon, the decedent
was exposed to nickel and cadmium fumes.3 0 The plaintiffs contended
that the exposure caused the decedent's cancer. To prove medical cau-
sation, the plaintiffs presented a clinician's affidavit. 3 ' On the one hand,
the clinician, Dr. Miller, conceded that there was no formal scientific
proof that exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes can cause small-cell
cancer of the colon; he acknowledged that there were no human epide-
miological, live animal, or in vitro studies validating the hypothesis of a
causal connection.3 2 Unlike the plaintiffs' experts in Daubert, Dr. Miller
did not purport to rely exclusively on distinctively scientific methodol-
ogy such as epidemiological analysis. On the other hand, Dr. Miller
noted that "[s]cience so far has established specific [causal] links of
nickel and cadmium to lung, prostate, and renal cancers." 3 3 Dr. Miller
then added that as a matter of histology, small-cell cancer of the colon
has the same appearance or morphology as small-cell lung, prostate, or
renal cancer.3 4 He also pointed out that "the biochemical reaction" be-
tween small-cell cancer and colon tissue is apparently the same as the
reaction between such cancer and tissue in the lung, prostate, or renal
area.
3 5
In a memorandum opinion, the trial judge struck Dr. Miller's opin-
ion as inadmissible and granted the defendant summary judgment.
3 6
The en banc Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
judge's decision.3 7 The per curiam lead opinion rejected Dr. Miller's
opinion as an untrustworthy "scientific hunch."
'3 8
The en banc Court of Appeals treated the Christophersen case as a
run-of-the-mill problem of medical causation testimony. The lead opin-
ion professed that in excluding Dr. Miller's opinion, the court did not
need to "introduce ... new concepts to .. .[its] jurisprudence."3 9 This
short article asserts that the court-and, for that matter, the litigants-
erred in assuming that the Christophersen fact situation was a typical case.
The thesis of this article is that quite to the contrary, the Christophersen
case raised a novel question, namely, whether an expert witness should
be permitted to rely on nonscientific reasoning, here analogical reason-
ing that falls short of formal scientific proof. The Supreme Court's
eventual decision in Daubert may prescribe the standard for assessing the
validity of a scientific methodology, but Christophersen poses the more
fundamental question of whether an expert such as Dr. Miller with a
29. Christophersen II at 1108.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1124.
32. Id. at 1115.
33. Id. at 1124, 1133.
34. Id. at 1115, 1133-34.
35. Id. at 1115 n.16.
36. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 363.
37. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1108.
38. Id. at 1115.
39. Id. at 1110.
[Vol. 70:3
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
scientific background must rest his or her opinion on uniquely scientific
techniques.
The first part of this article surveys the current state of the case law,
that is, the division of authority over the question whether expert scien-
tific witnesses must base their causation opinions on scientific methodol-
ogies such as human epidemiological and live animal studies. The
second part of the article describes the Christophersen case. This part of
the article details both the state of the evidentiary record and the judicial
opinions filed at the trial and appellate levels. The third part of the arti-
cle argues that even though there were no formal scientific studies to
support Dr. Miller's opinion, his opinion was admissible. The thrust of
this section of the article is that although analogical reasoning is not a
distinctively scientific methodology, it is a valid mode of reasoning
which an expert should be permitted to rely upon. The conclusion of
this article points to the broader significance of Christophersen. In the fi-
nal analysis, the per curiam opinion in Christophersen rests on the notion
that in order to give admissible testimony, scientific witnesses must rely
on exclusively scientific reasoning techniques. As we shall see, that no-
tion is neither self-evident nor true. The modes of valid reasoning are
too numerous and variegated to endorse the simplistic notion underly-
ing the per curiam opinion.
I. THE CURRENT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY ON MEDICAL CAUSATION
A. Courts Adopting a Liberal Attitude Toward Admissibility
As previously stated, in 1986 Professor Nesson published his fa-
mous article about scientific testimony on medical causation.40 In his
article, Professor Nesson emphasized the distinctions between the legal
and scientific cultures. Most importantly, he emphasized that the stan-
dards of proof differ. In Nesson's words, the law requires "neither abso-
lute certainty . . . nor the exacting level of certainty that scientists
employ for the demonstration of scientific propositions."-4 1 As he ex-
plained, it is feasible for scientists to "wait for a high degree of certainty
and reliability" to emerge.4 2 A research scientist may suspend judg-
ment until additional testing or experimentation can be conducted. 4 3 In
contrast, neither a clinician treating an ill patient nor a court adjudicat-
ing the patient's toxic tort claim has the luxury of postponing a deci-
sion.4 4 Professor Nesson concedes that the court should not permit a
finding based on rank speculation, 4 5 but he adds that "a rational ba-
40. Nesson, supra note 7.
41. Id. at 529. See also Bunting v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 931




45. Id. at 531. See also Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
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sis" 4 6-sufficient evidence to sustain a permissive inference-is
acceptable.
Professor Nesson is certainly correct in arguing that legal and scien-
tific standards of proof diverge. In the typical civil case, the burden of
proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. 4 7 That standard tends
to equate with anything exceeding a 50% probability.48 However, when
a scientist employs hypothesis testing, 49 the popular convention is to
accept the hypothesis only if the hypothesis is validated at the 0.05 level
of statistical significance. 50 A 0.05 significance level indicates that the
observed outcome should occur by chance only once out of twenty
times.
51
In light of these obvious differences between legal and scientific
standards of proof, a number of courts have opted to adhere to Profes-
sor Nesson's position. 5 2 Perhaps the most forceful decision embracing
that position is the opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 5 3 The court declared:
[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by
animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify
that, in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the
basic methodology employed to reach such conclusion is
sound, ... [the] law does not preclude recovery until a "statisti-
cally significant" number of people have been injured or until
science has had the time and resources to complete sophisti-
cated laboratory studies of the chemical. In a courtroom, the
test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is
not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors
could conclude from the expert testimony that [the toxin in
question] more likely than not caused [the plaintiff's] injury,
the fact that . . .science would require more evidence before
conclusively considering the causation question resolved is
irrelevant.
54
Courts subscribing to this school of thought have a strong prefer-
ence that the jury ultimately resolve any dispute between opposing ex-
46. Nesson, supra note 7 at 530.
47. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
48. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Judge Weinstein's sur-
vey of district judges in the Eastern District of New York), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
49. See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 15-5
(2d ed. 1993).
50. David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333,
1342-44 (1986).
51. Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1225 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 640
(1991); Sobel v. Yeshiva Univ., 566 F. Supp. 1166, 1173 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 797
F.2d 1478 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989).
52. E.g., Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990).
53. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
54. Id. at 1535-36. See also Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1031 n.77 (citing
Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Idaho 1990) as authority for
the distinction between legal sufficiency and scientific certainty).
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perts. 55 They assert that traditionally the Sixth and Seventh
amendments require that jurors serve as the arbiters of a "battle of the
experts." 56 These courts believe the testimony should be ruled admissi-
ble; the jury should be permitted to hear the testimony unless the ex-
pert's reasoning is so "illogical, outlandish, or totally speculative ...
that no reasonable jury could accept the opinion."
5 7
B. Criticism of the Liberal Attitude
Within recent years, Professor Nesson's position has been subjected
to sharp criticism. At one level, the criticism is evidentiary; at another
level, the criticism is economic. At the first level, the criticism is that the
liberal judicial attitude toward the admissibility of scientific evidence has
paved the way for the introduction of expert testimony that is both con-
jectural and unreliable. 58 Mr. Huber charges that the relaxed admissi-
bility standards have made it easier for quacks
5 9  to foist
"pseudoscientific" 60 testimony off on lay jurors. In Huber's opinion,
this testimony is highly speculative, 6 1 and in some cases the expert's un-
derlying theory is simply spurious.
62
The economic criticism is closely tied to the evidentiary criticism.
The critics argue that in many cases, the admission of spurious expert
testimony has prompted wrongful verdicts increasing the defendants'
transaction costs. 63 "In numerous recent instances, toxic tort defend-
ants have been driven into bankruptcy." 64 The President's Council on
Competitiveness joined in this criticism. 6 5 The Council contended that
the imposition of these additional transaction costs has placed American
businesses at a competitive disadvantage in world markets-a conten-
tion likely to strike a responsive chord with anyone concerned about the
current economic situation.
C. The Judicial Response to the Criticism of the Liberal Attitude
Subsection A describes one school ofjudicial thought on the admis-
sibility of scientific testimony on medical causation. Subsection B re-
viewed some of the criticisms of that school. Partially in response to
55. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1022; Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F.
Supp. 972, 985-86, 996-97 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
56. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1128.
57. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1033 (quoting Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp.,
576 A.2d 4, 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)).
58. Peter W. Huber, Quoth the Maven, 23 REASON 40 (Nov. 1991).
59. Id. at 42.
60. Id. at 43, 46.
61. Id. at 46. See also McCarthy, supra note 14 at 376 (quoting Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 874 F.2d 307, 309, modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1511 (1990)).
62. Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319, 320 (1990).
63. Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter
Huber, 44 ARK. L. REV. 629, 642 (1991).
64. Id. at 633.
65. Edward J. lmwinkelried, Abolish the "Frye" Test: Relevancy Is a Better Standard for
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 12 CAL. LAWYER 63 (Apr. 1992).
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those criticisms, a second school of thought has developed. 66 The
courts subscribing to this school believe that judges proffered such ex-
pert testimony must perform an active screening or gate-keeping func-
tion.6 7 The argument runs that expert testimony on this issue must be
subjected to rigorous examination 68 and that the judge should be allo-
cated the responsibility to subject the testimony to close scrutiny.6 9
The courts committed to this school of thought tend to exclude ex-
pert testimony based on anything short of formal scientific methodol-
ogy. 70 These courts demand admissible scientific proof of causation; 7 1
the expert's opinion must have a rigorous "scientific foundation."' 72 Mr.
Huber urges that the courts embrace the rule that the expert must rest
his or her opinion on a generally accepted or consensus scientific hy-
pothesis. 73 Some lower courts indicate that any traditional scientific
technique (human epidemiological studies, live animal testing, or in vitro
studies) is acceptable. 74 Other courts insist that the expert base the cau-
sation opinion on epidemiological studies 75 or even more narrow epide-
miological studies finding a causal nexus at a certain level of statistical
significance, such as 0.05.76
This strict approach 77 to the admissibility of expert testimony on
causation contrasts sharply with the attitude of the courts embracing
Professor Nesson's view. This split of authority serves as the backdrop
of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Christophersen.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE CHRISTOPHERSEN COURT'S POSITION ON
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY ON MEDICAL
CAUSATION
A. The Lower Court Evidentiary Record
In March 1986, Albert Christophersen died of small-cell cancer that
66. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1024.
67. Id.
68. McCarthy, supra note 14 at 360 (quoting In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988)).
69. Id.
70. E.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 791 F. Supp. 1042, 1056-57 (D. N.J. 1992)
(physician's clinical background was insufficient, since epidemiological proof was neces-
sary and the physician lacked expertise in that area).
71. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
72. Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
73. See generally HUBER, supra note 13.
74. Christophersen H, 939 F.2d at 1115.
75. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 311-15 (5th Cir.), modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Lynch v. Merrell-National
Lab., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (Ist Cir. 1987).
76. Michael Dore, A Proposed Standard for Evaluating the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in
Toxic Tort and Other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. L. J. 677, 693-95 (1985); Michael D.
Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of
Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643 (1992); Jan Feldman &John Del
Giorno, Toxic-Tort Case: Court Eases Standard of Proof, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18, 1991, at 19; Nace
& Bleakley, supra note 21 at 38.
77. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1024.
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began in his colon and spread to his liver. During the 20 years preced-
ing his death he had worked for Marathon Manufacturing Company. In
the final 14 years he was employed at Marathon's Waco, Texas plant.
That plant was a facility for manufacturing nickel/cadmium batteries.
Christophersen was never directly involved in the manufacturing pro-
cess, but his job duties necessitated that he visit the manufacturing area
frequently. In the course of those visits, he was allegedly exposed to
nickel and cadmium fumes.
After Albert's death, his surviving wife and child filed suit against
Marathon under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statute.7 8 The
Christophersens' complaint alleged that nickel and cadium fumes were
the producing cause of Albert's death. The complaint also averred that
Marathon was aware of the dangerous nature of these chemicals and vio-
lated its duty to provide the decedent with a safe place to work or to
warn him of the dangers.
The defendant Marathon moved for summary judgment. To defeat
the motion, the plaintiffs made a straightforward syllogistic argument.
79
The plaintiffs' major premise was that exposure to nickel and cadmium
particles can cause small-cell cancer of the colon. The minor premise
was that while he worked for the defendant, the decedent had substan-
tial exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes. The conclusion was that the
exposure ultimately caused Albert Christophersen's death.
To prove up their minor premise, the plaintiffs offered the affidavit
of Edgar Manoliu. Manoliu had been one of the decedent's co-workers
at the Waco plant. Manoliu's affidavit stated that during the 14 year
period preceding his death, Albert Christophersen had been exposed to
"many fumes and gases," including "airborne particles of cadmium and
nickel alloys." 8 0 Manoliu did not know the precise chemical composi-
tion of the fumes, and he could not quantify the level of the decedent's
exposure. Manoliu's affidavit, however, referred to "tremendous" re-
leases of fumes, monthly nickel and/or cadmium spills, and leaks in the
pipes transferring nickel nitrate and cadmium nitrate. 8'
To establish their major premise, the plaintiffs relied on the affidavit
of Dr. Lawrence Miller. Dr. Miller was a board-certified specialist in in-
ternal medicine with an "extensive ... clinical background .... ,,82 At a
deposition filed with the court, Dr. Miller acknowledged that the tradi-
tional scientific techniques of establishing medical causation are human
epidemiological studies, live animal tests, and in vitro research.8 3 While
the plaintiffs' experts in Daubert relied on epidemiological reanalysis, Dr.
Miller stated that he had not employed any formal scientific techniques
to establish a causal connection between exposure to cadmium and
78. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001-.031 (West 1986).
79. See Edward J. lmwinkelried, The "Bases " of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988).
80. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 365.
81. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1123 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1124 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1115 (per curiam).
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nickel fumes and small-cell cancer of the colon.8 4 He conceded that "he
had never seen an epidemiological or animal study demonstrating a
causal association between exposure to nickel and/or cadmium and co-
lon cancer."
8 5
Despite those concessions, Dr. Miller opined that such exposure
can cause small-cell cancer of the colon. He reasoned to that conclusion
in two steps. Initially, he noted that "[s]cience . . .has established spe-
cific links of nickel and cadmium to lung, prostate, and renal cancers."
8 6
That nexus had been proven by traditional scientific techniques. Next,
Dr. Miller identified a number of similarities between small-cell colon
cancer and small-cell lung, prostate, and renal cancers. Under the mi-
croscope, "small-cell carcinoma appears to be the same cell (identical
histology) regardless of its location in the body .... 87 Dr. Jacqueline
Torell, who performed the autopsy after the decedent's death, con-
firmed that the morphology of all such cancers is "quite similar." 8 8 Dr.
Miller also pointed out that the biochemical reaction resulting in the
development of small-cell carcinoma would be the same whether the re-
action occurred in the colon or one of the other sites such as the lung.
8 9
The defense countered with its own expert affidavits. Those affida-
vits asserted that human epidemiological research, live animal tests, and
in vitro studies are the accepted scientific methodologies for establishing
medical causation.9 0 The affiants declared that a scientifically valid
proof of causation would "require[] clearly positive results from one or
more of these types of testing."9' The affiants stated, as Dr. Miller had
conceded, that there were no such tests demonstrating a causal associa-
tion between small-cell colon cancer and exposure to cadmium and
nickel.9 2 The affiants asserted that without such tests, the hypothesis of
such an association could not be deemed "scientifically" validated or
"correct." 9 3
B. The Judicial Evaluations of the Evidentiary Record
The trial judge, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
the en banc Fifth Circuit evaluated this evidentiary record.
The Trial Court Decision. The trial judge filed a memorandum opin-
ion.9 4 Following the second school of thought described in Section I,
supra, the judge undertook an "in-depth review" of Dr. Miller's reason-
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1121 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1124, 1133 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1133-34 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1125 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
89. Chnstophersen I, 902 F.2d at 366.
90. Chrstophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1115.
91. Id.
92. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 366.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 364 n.20.
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ing.9 5 The trial judge concluded that Dr. Miller's opinion was "unrelia-
ble" 96 because Dr. Miller did not employ the traditional scientific
techniques of establishing medical causation.9 7 The judge, therefore,
struck Dr. Miller's opinion as inadmissible. 98 Since that opinion was the
linchpin of the plaintiffs' major premise on causation, the judge then
ruled that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs' proof was insufficient. 9 9 The
judge consequently granted Marathon's summary judgment motion.10 0
The Decision by the Fifth Circuit Panel. In 1990, the plaintiffs prose-
cuted an appeal to a panel of the Fifth Circuit.' 0 ' The panel, including
Judges Reavley, King, and Johnson, reversed the trial judge. The panel
emphasized the importance of the jury's role as the arbiter of disputes
between conflicting expert opinions.' 0 2 The panel stated that the jury
ordinarily assesses the credibility and weight of testimony, including sci-
entific evidence.10 3 The panel stated that the trial judge had improperly
"chose[n] sides in this battle of the experts and thereby usurped the role
of the jury .... "104
The panel acknowledged, as Dr. Miller had conceded, that Miller's
opinion was not based on any epidemiological, animal, or in vitro stud-
ies 10 5 directly establishing a link between small-cell colon cancer and
exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes. The panel pointed, however, to
scientific studies establishing a link between such exposure and cancer
discovered in the lung, kidney, and prostate.' 0 6 The panel underscored
Dr. Miller's testimony about the similarity of both morphology of small-
cell cancer and the biochemical reaction in those sites and the colon.1
0 7
Citing the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in Ferebee,'0 8
the panel rejected the defense's invitation to rule that a finding of medi-
cal causation requires proof through statistically significant epidemio-
logical studies. 10 9 The panel concluded that Dr. Miller's opinion had
sufficient factual support to be submitted to a jury."10
The Decision by the En Banc Fifth Circuit. After the panel decision, the
defense petitioned the Fifth Circuit for rehearing en banc. The court
granted the petition; and, upon rehearing, over vigorous dissents a ma-
jority of the en banc court voted to affirm the trial judge.' I The lead
95. Id. at 364. The later per curiam opinion uses the same expression to characterize
the trial judge's analysis of Dr. Miller's reasoning. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1109.
96. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 364 n.2.
97. Id. at 364-66.
98. Id. at 366.
99. Id. at 363.
100. Id.
101. Christophersen I., 902 F.2d at 362.
102. Id. at 364.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 366.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 367.
107. Id. at 365-66.
108. Id. at 367.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Christophersen H, 939 F.2d at 1106.
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opinion was per curiam, and Chief Judge Clark filed a separate opinion
concurring in the result affirming the trial judge.
The lead, concurring, and dissenting opinions touched upon the
sufficiency of Manoliu's affidavit to serve as Dr. Miller's minor premise.
However, our primary interest is the various judges' analysis of the ad-
missibility of testimony about Dr. Miller's major premise, that is, his hy-
pothesis that cadmium and nickel fumes can cause small-cell colon
cancer. The per curiam opinion faulted Dr. Miller's major premise on
the ground that he had not validated his hypothesis "in a scientifically
valid way." ' 1 2 The majority noted Dr. Miller's concession that he could
not point to any human epidemiological, live animal, or in vitro studies
to substantiate his hypothesis."l 3 The majority then cited the defense
experts' statements that a formal scientific demonstration of causation
would "require[] positive results from one or more of these types of
testing." ' 4 Given these statements, the majority found that Dr. Miller's
reasoning was "scientifically [in]correct" ' ' 5 because he had not em-
ployed traditional "scientific methodology.""l 6 The majority concluded
that the trial judge had properly ruled Miller's opinion inadmissible as
an unreliable "scientific hunch."" 17
Like the per curiam lead opinion, ChiefJudge Clark's concurrence
criticized Dr. Miller's reasoning.' 18 Judge Clark dismissed Dr. Miller's
"associative reasoning" as lacking a "foundation in medical science." 19
He noted the absence of any epidemiological, animal, or in vitro studies
demonstrating a causal nexus between colon cancer and nickel and cad-
mium exposure. 120 In Chief Judge Clark's judgment, Dr. Miller's rea-
soning was "seriously deficient."12'
The judges signing the per curiam and concurring opinions repre-
sented a majority of the en banc Fifth Circuit. There were, however, two
dissents. One dissent, a rather polemic opinion, was authored by Judge
King, one of the members of the original panel. 12 2 Judge King accused
the majority of attempting to skew toxic tort litigation against "penuri-
ous plaintiffls]."' 23 He noted that a plaintiff's victory in a massive toxic
tort suit can cause "severe ... economic disruptions," 124 but he added
that it is the legislature's province to modify substantive Tort law to pre-
vent such disruptions. 12 5 In his opinion, the majority had "placed a...
112. Id. at 1115.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1116.
116. Id. at 1115.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1116, 1121-22 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
119. Id. at 1121.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1136-38 (King, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 1136-37.
124. Id. at 1137.
125. Id.
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hurdle in the path of toxic tort plaintiffs"' 2 6 "in order to tilt toxic tort
litigation in favor of defendants."' 127 Judge King condemned the per
curiam opinion as "result-oriented decision-making."' 12 8
The other dissent was written by Judge Reavley, 129 who had au-
thored the panel opinion. In his dissent, as in his earlier panel opinion,
Judge Reavley carefully reviewed the evidentiary record below. At the
outset of his dissent, Judge Reavley commented on Dr. Miller's "exten-
sive . . . clinical background."' 3 0 He twice mentioned the scientific re-
search establishing that cadmium and nickel exposure can cause small-
cell lung, prostate, and renal cancer. 13 1 Judge Reavley then pointed to
the parallels which Dr. Miller had drawn between the small-cell cancers
in various sites. Judge Reavley noted Dr. Miller's testimony that regard-
less of its location, small-cell carcinoma has the same appearance-
"identical histology" or morphology.
132
As in his earlier panel opinion, Judge Reavley admitted that there
were no epidemiological, animal, or in vitro studies demonstrating a
causal link between small-cell colon cancer and cadmium and nickel ex-
posure. 133 He further admitted that those techniques are "[t]he ordi-
nary routes" to establishing "scientific certainty."' 134 Like Professor
Nesson before him, however, Judge Reavley forcefully asserted that the
standards of law and science differ in that "[c]ourts do not require scien-
tific certainty."i 3 5 In his view, the evidentiary record below presented a
classic battle of the experts; 13 6 and in resolving the battle as a matter of
law, the trial judge and majority judges had arrogated to themselves the
credibility determination which the jury was entitled to make.
13 7
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CHRISTOPHERSEN COURT'S
POSITION: THE MAJORITY'S FAILURE To RECOGNIZE THE
VALIDITY OF NONSCIENTIFIC REASONING By
SCIENTIFIC WITNESSES
None of the opinions filed in Christophersen explicitly recognized the
most unique facet of that case: the attempt by a scientist, Dr. Miller, to
rely on nonscientific analogical reasoning rather than traditional scien-
tific methodologies such as epidemiological research.
The range of expert testimony on such subjects as medical causa-
tion can be visualized as a spectrum. One end of the spectrum is formal
scientific demonstration of causation. At that end of the spectrum, the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1138.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1122-36 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1124.
131. Id. at 1124, 1133.
132. Id. at 1125, 1133-34.
133. Id. at 1135.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1128.
137. Id.
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ideal may be a human epidemiological study finding a causal relation-
ship with a high level of statistical significance.' 3 8 Other traditional sci-
entific methodologies such as animal and in vitro studies also would fall
near that end of the spectrum.' 3 9 Courts and commentators alike re-
gard these methodologies as highly reliable.
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the variation hypothesized
by Professor Nesson. If an opinion rests on nothing more than a diag-
nostician's hunch or educated guess, the opinion is necessarily conjec-
tural and its reliability is suspect. For example, relatively little is known
about AIDS and a court might exclude a diagnostician's opinion about
the cause of a patient's AIDS as unduly speculative. The reliability of an
opinion increases slightly if the expert can point to anecdotal data sup-
porting the opinion, 140 but, as in the case of a mere hunch, some courts
have held that anecdotal information is too flimsy a basis for an admissi-
ble expert opinion.
14 1
The Christophersen fact pattern was unique because the case falls
squarely in the middle of the spectrum. The majority correctly observed
that Dr. Miller had not employed traditional, formal scientific methodol-
ogies such as epidemiological studies. However, Dr. Miller presented
far more than a diagnostician's hunch or anecdotal data. In the final
analysis, his reasoning was reducible to a paradigmatic analogical argu-
ment. ' 4 2 The proposition he analogized to was the hypothesis that cad-
mium and nickel exposure can cause small-cell lung, prostate, and renal
cancer. As Judge Reavley pointed out in both his panel and dissenting
opinions, 143 that hypothesis had evidently been established by tradi-
tional scientific methodology. Dr. Miller in effect argued that there was
an apt analogy between small-cell colon cancer and small-cell carcinoma
in other sites on the bases of identical histology and biochemical reac-
tions. 144 Dr. Miller may never have used the term, "analogy;" but on
even cursory analysis, it becomes clear that his reasoning was analogical.
Moreover, there is no indication in either the panel or en banc decisions
that the defense experts could find any fault with the analogy. Their
only counterargument was that his reasoning did not fit the mold of clas-
sic scientific methodology. The thesis of this article is that Dr. Miller
ought to have been permitted to rely on nonscientific analogical reason-
ing. Neither logic nor legislation bars a scientific expert from using ana-
logical reasoning as the basis for an admissible opinion.
138. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
140. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1039.
141. Id. (collecting cases).
142. ROBERTJ. KREYCHE, LOGIC FOR UNDERGRADUATES 238-40 (1961).
143. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 367; Christophersen II, 939 F.2d at 1122 (Reavley, J.,
dissenting).
144. Christophersen 1, 902 F.2d at 366; Christophersen H, 939 F.2d at 1122, 1124-25, 1134
(Reavley, J., dissenting).
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A. In principle, analogical reasoning is a permissible basis for an expert
opinion by a scientific witness.
The rationale of the per curiam opinion in Christophersen can be re-
stated in these terms: The expert witness, Dr. Miller, was a scientist;
however, Dr. Miller's reasoning did not rest on any distinctive scientific
methodologies such as epidemiological studies; and therefore, his rea-
soning is invalid. However, once the rationale is restated in this fashion,
it becomes clear that the rationale is a non sequitur. The hidden assump-
tion is that when the witness has a scientific background, the reasoning
supporting the witness' testimony can be valid only if the reasoning
passes muster under scientific standards of certainty. Simply stated, that
assumption is fallacious; analogical reasoning is not a peculiarly scien-
tific mode of analysis, but in principle such reasoning is a valid mode of
analysis.
Logicians uniformly recognize the validity of analogical reason-
ing. 14 5 An analogy rests on a comparison."' 6 If the comparison is apt,
the reasoning is valid. 147 Analogical reasoning is used extensively in
philosophy.14 8 For that matter, the courts routinely employ analogical
reasoning. 14 9 A fortiori 150 is a common expression in the cases, and a
fortiori arguments rest on analogical reasoning. '51 The courts have even
invoked analogical reasoning in cases adjudicating the admissibility of
scientific evidence. 15
2
Even more significantly, although analogical reasoning is not a
uniquely scientific mode of analysis, on occasion scientists resort to anal-
ogy. The per curiam 153 and concurring 154 opinions both emphasized
the lack of animal studies establishing a connection between small-cell
colon cancer and exposure to cadmium and nickel. Both opinions
strongly suggest that Dr. Miller's testimony would have been admissible
145. KREYCHE, supra note 142 at 238-41.
146. Id. at 239.
147. Id.
148. 1 B.A.G. FULLER & STERLING M. MCMURRIN, A HISTORY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIE-
VAL PHILOSOPHY 29 (rev. 3d ed. 1955).
149. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS
97-99 (4th ed. 1988) (the role of analogy in the growth of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel in American Contract law); Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) (Britton is the
seminal American Contract case announcing that a plaintiff in default on an employment
contract may have a right to limited restitution from the defendant employer; in deciding
to recognize the right, the court relied in part on the "close analogy" between employ-
ment and construction contracts).
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 61 (6th ed. 1990).
151. KREYCHE, supra note 142 at 240. Indeed, it can be argued that the primary method
of reasoning in the Anglo-American case system is analogical. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). If the judge finds an apt analogy between the in-
stant case and an earlier precedent, the judge extends precedent to the current case.
However, when the judge finds that the analogy is inapt, the judge refuses to apply the
earlier precedent.
152. United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.) ("the existence of an analo-
gous relationship with other types of scientific techniques and results that are routinely
admitted into evidence .... "), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992).
153. Christophersen II, 939 F.2d at 1115.
154. Id. at 1121 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
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if there had been animal studies supporting his hypothesis as to the cau-
sation of small-cell colon cancer in human beings. What both the per
curiam and concurring opinions failed to recognize is that the use of
animal studies to validate hypothesis about human illness is undeniably
analogical reasoning. There are important differences between animals
and human beings. 155 Yet when an animal experiment is well designed
and the differences are carefully explored at trial, courts permit experts
opining about human illness to analogize to the results of animal stud-
ies. 15 6 Government agencies routinely rely on animal studies as a basis
for promulgating toxicity standards for human beings.15 71ndeed, the
per curiam and concurring judges arguably would have permitted a
longer analogical leap than they forbade Dr. Miller from making. Dr.
Miller's analogy compared carcinoma in one human organ to cancer in
other organs. Despite the evident differences between animals and
human beings, those judges seemingly would have permitted Dr. Miller
to have analogized between cancer in animals and cancer in human
beings.
The counterargument might be made that the argument in favor of
expert analogical reasoning proves too much. It might be contended,
for example, that a clever charlatan' 5 8 masquerading as an expert will
always be able to draw an analogy, however strained, to an adequately
validated hypothesis. If so, the counterargument runs, this argument
will enable such charlatans to testify about any theory however
speculative. 1
59
The counterargument assumes, though, that the lower courts are
incompetent to police the aptness of the claimed analogy. When the
proponent proffers expert testimony, the proponent has the burden of
establishing the existence of all the foundational or preliminary facts
conditioning the admissibility of the testimony. 160 If the proponent
claims that the expert is relying on an apt analogy, the aptness of the
analogy becomes a preliminary fact for the judge to determine. In nu-
merous reported cases, although experts have drawn analogies, courts
have rejected the analogy and screened out unreliable evidence.161 The
155. Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1038-39.
156. Id. at 1039. See also Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th
Cir. 1992) ("Animal studies often comprise the backbone of evidence indicating biological
hazards, and their legal value has been recognized by federal courts and agencies.").
157. In 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency issued Final Guidelines for Devel-
opmental Toxicity Risk Assessment. 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798 (1991). The Guidelines assert
that an assessment of the hazard posed by alleged toxic to human beings requires the
consideration of "animal ... data .... " Id. at 63,799. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae
American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics at 10-13, Daubert et al. v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., (U.S.) (No. 92-102). Footnote 7 of the brief sets out an extensive "list of
federal laws, regulations and standards in which animal studies are used to assess human
health risks .... Id. at 13-14.
158. Huber, supra note 58 at 42.
159. Id. at 46.
160. FED. R. EviD. 104(a)-104(b).
161. State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972) (rejecting an analogy between neutron
activation analysis of hair and NAA of blood); People v. Alston, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (rejecting a proposed analogy between fresh blood samples and dried
[Vol. 70:3
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
cases demonstrate that the courts will not uncritically accept the claimed
analogy at face value.
Concededly, standing alone an expert opinion based on analogical
reasoning may not be legally sufficient to sustain a plaintiff's burden of
production on the issue of medical causation. Suppose the worst possi-
ble state of the record for the plaintiffs: Based on an analogy, an expert
is willing to testify only that it is possible that exposure to cadmium and
nickel fumes cause small-cell colon cancer; the expert truthfully con-
cedes that she cannot vouch that causation is either certain or probable.
Since the ultimate burden of proof is a preponderance of the evi-
dence 16 2 and, at least in some minds, that standard equates with proof
of a probability exceeding 50%,16s the expert's testimony would not sat-
isfy the plaintiff's burden.
The question presented here, though, is the admissibility of the ex-
pert's testimony rather than the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port a plaintiff's verdict.164 At one time, there was extensive authority
for the proposition that to be admissible, an expert's opinion had to be
couched as either a probability or certainty. 165 However, the Federal
Rules of Evidence do not codify that requirement.' 6 6 Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, an expert opinion can be admitted if the opinion
would "assist the trier of fact."' 16 7 Many, if not most, jurisdictions have
abandoned any categorical rule that an expert opinion must be stated as
a probability or certainty to be admissible. 168 Even an opinion phrased
as a possibility can help or assist the trier of fact. The judge could con-
sistently admit the opinion about medical causation but ultimately rule
that cumulatively, plaintiff's evidence of causation is legally insuffi-
cient. 169 In short, the supposed legal insufficiency of the expert's ana-
blood stains); People v. Law, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (rejecting an analogy
between sound spectrography studies involving male Caucasians speaking naturally and a
fact situation in which an Afro-American woman was charged with making a threatening
call in a disguised voice); Cohen & Mindnich, supra note 4 at 1038 (discussing courts'
refusal to accept analogies to animal studies); Nesson, supra note 7 at 525-26 (mentioning
Judge Weinstein's refusal to rely on animal studies in the Agent Orange Litigation).
162. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 47 at § 339.
163. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Judge Weinstein's sur-
vey of judges sitting in the Eastern District of New York), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
164. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1122, 1130 (Reavley, J., dissenting) ("evidentiary suf-
ficiency rather than admissibility").
165. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried & Robert G. Scofield, The Recognition of an Accused's Consti-
tutional Right to Introduce Expert Testimony Attacking the Weight of Prosecution Science Evidence:
The Antidote for the Supreme Court's Mistaken Assumption in California v. Trombetta, 33 ARIz. L.
REV. 59, 69 (1991).
166. Id.
167. FED. R. EVID. 702.
168. Imwinkelried & Scofield, supra note 165 at 69.
169. It should be noted, though, that in Christophersen, Dr. Miller's affidavit did not
merely advance the analogical reasoning. Dr. Miller also attempted to exclude other pos-
sible causes of the decedent's carcinoma:
Dr. Miller considered the various possibilities of alternative causation. Chris-
tophersen was not a smoker. Mrs. Christophersen smoked, but Dr. Miller consid-
ered this source insufficient for Christophersen's small-cell colon cancer. Nor
was Christophersen a heavy drinker. Dr. Miller noted that associations of alcohol
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logical reasoning to sustain the plaintiff's burden would be no bar to the
admissibility of the expert's testimony.
B. A scientific witness' opinion, based on analogical reasoning, is admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Again, the rationale of the per curiam opinion in Christophersen is the
implicit assumption that a scientific expert must base his or her testi-
mony exclusively on distinctively scientific methodologies. As the pre-
ceding subsection noted, as a matter of logic, that assumption is
simplistic and flawed. The per curiam invokes several provisions of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to rationalize its decision; but on close scru-
tiny, it becomes clear that the Federal Rules do not impose any scientific
straitjacket on witnesses who happen to have a scientific background. 1
70
Vary the facts in Christophersen. Assume that Dr. Miller had been Mr.
Christophersen's treating physician. Further suppose that the plaintiffs
had joined a survival action for the decedent's pain and suffering with
their wrongful death action. At trial, they call Dr. Miller to testify to the
decedent's statement describing his then existing pain; the decedent
made the statement during a physical examination by Dr. Miller. The
decedent's declaration would fall within the hearsay exception for asser-
tions of then existing bodily condition.' 7 ' Any person who had first-
hand knowledge of the declaration-that is, anyone who had heard the
declaration-would therefore be competent to testify to the declaration
under Federal Rule of Evidence 602.172 If a layperson was in the room
when Mr. Christophersen made the statement, she would unquestiona-
bly be competent under Rule 602; she would have personal knowledge
of the fact that Christophersen made the statement. It would be non-
sense to exclude Dr. Miller's testimony about Christophersen's state-
ment simply because Dr. Miller happened to be a scientist. 173 In this
hypothetical, Dr. Miller heard the oral statement with his own ears; and
he should be permitted to testify to that statement-whether he has an
M.D., B.S., R.N., or nothing behind his name.
and gastrointestinal carcinoma generally occur with chronic alcoholics. Dr. Miller
found no evidence of exposure to asbestos, nor was there evidence of hereditary
or family associations of small-cell cancer.
Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1125 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
170. This Article assumes that the federal courts no longer have the power to promul-
gate general exclusionary rules of evidence by common law process. There is a powerful
argument that Federal Rule of Evidence 402 deprives the courts of that power. Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129 (1987).
Other commentators have recognized that the Supreme Court has adopted a textualist or
"plain meaning" approach to the construction of the Federal Rules. Randolph N.
Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV.
745 (1990) Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years - The Effect of "Plain Meaning "Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee on Rules
of Evidence and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 G.W.L. REV. 857 (1992); Glen
Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1307 (1992).
171. FED. R. EvIo. 803(3).
172. FED. R. EVID. 602.
173. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 519 (3d ed. 1991).
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Change the facts again. Now suppose that as further evidence of
the decedent's pain and suffering, the plaintiffs call Dr. Miller to testify
that during the physical evaluation, he carefully studied the decedent's
nonverbal demeanor and that based on that demeanor, he, Miller, is of
the opinion that the decedent appeared to be in pain. That testimony
would be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 governing the
admissibility of lay opinion testimony.174 The case law construing Rule
701 indicates that a person's suffering or pain is a proper subject for lay
opinion testimony.' 75Once again, if a layperson were in the room and
observed the same demeanor, she would be permitted to opine on that
basis. Dr. Miller was in the room, and his opinion rests on the identical
basis. It makes no difference that he happens to have a scientific back-
ground. Since his lay opinion satisfies Rule 701, the testimony is other-
wise admissible; and, it would be ludicrous to exclude the testimony on
the ground that scientific witnesses must confine their testimony to
opinions resting on scientific methodology.
Now revisit the original facts in Christophersen. Dr. Miller is not at-
tempting to testify to an observed fact under Rule 602 or to express a
lay opinion under Rule 701. Rather, he is endeavoring to voice an ex-
pert opinion under Rule 702. Rule 702 reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
176
The per curiam opinion would have the reader believe that if the witness
qualifies as an expert by virtue of scientific "knowledge ... training, or
education," the expert must base his opinion on "scientific" knowledge
or, more narrowly, on distinctive scientific methodology. The rub, of
course, is that the statute does not say that.
The critical language in Rule 702 is "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge."' 17 7 On its face, the statute does not restrict the
expert witness to opinions resting on "scientific knowledge." The stat-
ute lists three different types of knowledge, "scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge."' 78 The statutory language obviously
treats "specialized" knowledge as the genus and "scientific" knowledge
as the species; but the per curiam opinion in Christophersen would permit
the species to swallow up the genus. Moreover, the connective in Rule
702 is "or."' 179 "Or" is a disjunctive term. 180 It is well-settled that
174. FED. R. EvID. 701; Carter v. Steere Tank Lines, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 176, 182 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1992) ("While DPS troopers often possess the training and expertise to qualify as
expert witnesses in traffic collision cases, this qualification does not preclude them from
also giving lay opinions.").
175. 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FED-
ERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 50.3, at 75 (1991 Cum. Supp.).
176. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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when a legislature uses that connective, its use manifests a legislative
intent that alternatives are permissible.' 8 1 Since Congress selected the
connective "or,"1 8 2 Congress must have intended that scientific, techni-
cal, or more generally specialized knowledge would be a permissible ba-
sis for an expert opinion. In some cases such as Daubert, the expert will
avow relying on uniquely scientific reasoning; but Rule 702 does not
compel the expert to do so.
The case law construing Federal Rule 702 bears out that conclu-
sion. The cases are legion permitting local police and Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents to testify about code words and customary practices
of organized crime and drug rings.' 8 3 Needless to say, these witnesses
have not conducted systematic, scientific studies of the practices of
criminals.' 8 4 Rather, they have accumulated experience which gives
them a "specialized knowledge" helpful to lay jurors and judges. Un-
doubtedly, by happenstance some of these witnesses have had scientific
backgrounds or degrees; but no one would ever think to object to the
admission of their testimony on the ground that they did not employ
classic scientific methodology to develop the body of knowledge they are
drawing upon. The courts routinely admit this type of testimony, ' 8 5 and
that routine practice is eminently correct. Congress surely intended that
the expression, "technical, or specialized knowledge," in Rule 702
would have independent significance18 6 -- some meaning other than
"scientific knowledge."
The only remaining question is whether Dr. Miller's reasoning can
be characterized as valid "specialized knowledge" within the intendment
of that expression in Rule 702. The preceding subsection demonstrated
the validity of analogical reasoning. The issue then is the meaning of
"specialized" knowledge. When a legislature uses a term, the normal
presumption is that the legislature intended the common 18 7 or diction-
ary' 8 8 meaning of the term. The dictionary meaning of "specialized"
knowledge would be the knowledge of "a particular occupation or
180. BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 1095 (6th ed. 1990); 30 WORDS AND PHRASES 53, 54
(1972 & Supp. 1992).
181. Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Johnson, 791 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
182. Congress resorted to the connective "and" when Congress wanted to make it
clear that requirements were to be enforced conjunctively. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 701.
183. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried & Ephraim Margolin, The Case for the Admissibility of Defense
Testimony About Customary Political Practices in Official Corruption Prosecutions, 29 AMER. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 17-21 (1991) (collecting authorities).
184. Id. at 20; State v. Sanders, 832 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
185. Imwinkelried & Margolin, supra note 183 at 17-21.
186. United States v. Flores, 968 F.2d 1366 (1st Cir. 1992); Horn v. Commissioner,
968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992); R. E. Dietz Corp. v. United States, 939 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1991); Haynes v. United States, 891 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989); Darling v. Bowen, 878 F.2d
1069 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Roxford Foods Litig., 790 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Cal. 1991); Marc
Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 771 F. Supp. 1163 (D. Utah 1991); Fox-Knapp, Inc. v. Employers Mut.
Casualty Co., 725 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.), afftd, 893 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1989).
187. General Motors Corp. v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 641 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).
188. Id.; Lyons v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Bahnmiller v.
Derwinski, 724 F. Supp. 1208 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 923 F.2d 1085
(4th Cir. 1991).
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branch of knowledge."' 189 In contrast, "general" knowledge would be
information accessible to "every member" of society or at least "the ma-
jority of individuals in society."' 190
That is the meaning ascribed to "specialized knowledge" by the de-
cided cases construing Rule 702 as permitting expert testimony by law
enforcement officers familiar with criminals' code words and practices.
Those officers have knowledge which a lay judge or juror is unlikely to
possess; and for that very reason, the officer's description of that knowl-
edge would probably, in the words of Rule 702, "assist the trier of
fact."' 9 ' Dr. Miller's reasoning passes muster under this standard. The
judge and jurors are unlikely to know that a demonstrated connection
exists between small-cell lung, prostate, and renal cancer. Similarly, it is
unrealistic to assume that they know of the similar histology and bio-
chemical reactions between cancer in those sites and small-cell colon
cancer. Those propositions are "specialized knowledge." Further, as in
the case of expert testimony about criminals' customary practices, Dr.
Miller's testimony about those propositions would "assist [a] trier of fact
• .. to determine [the] fact in issue"' 192 of whether the decedent's expo-
sure to cadmium and nickel fumes at the defendant's plant caused his
small-cell carcinoma. In all probability, laypersons would be unfamiliar
with the scientific research demonstrating the causal connection to lung,
prostate, and renal cancer; and, without the benefit of Dr. Miller's testi-
mony, they would not appreciate the aptness of the bases for the anal-
ogy to colon cancer. Hence, the admission of Dr. Miller's testimony
would be perfectly consistent with the letter of Rule 702. Moreover,
since Dr. Miller's opinion rested on valid analogical reasoning, its ad-
mission would comport with the spirit of the Federal Rules as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
On the one hand, in legal analysis it is critical to avoid blurring fun-
damental distinctions. Overlooking elementary distinctions often leads
to faulty reasoning and inaccurate outcomes. In American Evidence law
in particular, it is vital to respect distinctions and draw the necessary
lines. In the United States, for example, Evidence law has drawn lines
based on the character and hearsay rules. We distinguish between im-
proper character uses of evidence and legitimate noncharacter uses; the
Federal Rules of Evidence permit a litigant to introduce evidence of the
opposing client's misconduct when the misconduct has the special,
noncharacter probative value but bar the evidence when the litigant's
only theory of relevance is "he did it once, therefor he did it again."' 193
Likewise, the Federal Rules announce a general rule excluding uncross-
examined hearsay but allow a litigant to introduce testimony about out-
189. WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 839 (1972).
190. Id. at 347.
191. FED. R. EVID. 702.
192. Id.
193. FED. R. EvID. 404-05; EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT Evi-
DENCE Ch. 2 (1984).
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of-court statements when the statement is relevant for a nonhearsay pur-
pose and there consequently is no need to cross-examine the out-of-
court declarant.' 94 In both cases, the enforcement of the distinction is
calculated to shield the litigants from supposedly prejudicial evidence
which the jurors might misuse. 195
On the other hand, it is equally important to avoid erecting artificial
barriers in the law. The life's work of the late ChiefJustice Roger Tray-
nor of the California Supreme Court is illustrative. When Traynor first
joined the court, there were rigid doctrinal barriers between Contract
and Tort doctrines in American law. Traynor's insight was that there
were general principles of fault and liability that transcended those bar-
riers. 19 6 That insight enabled him to import Tort concepts into Con-
tract law to refine the doctrine of promissory estoppel.19 7 In the same
vein, he introduced Contract notions into Tort law to help shape the
modern theory of strict product liability. 19 8 Traynor foresaw the pos-
sibilities for law reform that would arise once he repudiated the dichot-
omy between Contract and Tort.
In Christophersen, the judges signing the per curiam opinion endeav-
ored to impose a rigid dichotomy on expert opinion law. The judges
attempted to narrowly cabin testimony by scientific witnesses. Their un-
derlying assumption is that scientific witnesses differ from all other ex-
perts and that if they are to opine at all, scientific witnesses must derive
their conclusions exclusively through peculiarly scientific methodologies
such as epidemiological studies. Since Dr. Miller was a scientist,' 9 9 he
was obliged to use such methodologies to support his medical causation
opinion. He had not done so, and it therefore seemed patent to those
judges that his opinion was inadmissible.
As we have seen, though, that assumption is unsound. That as-
sumption certainly has not been codified in the text of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Rule 702 does not even purport to restrict scientific wit-
nesses to the use of distinctively scientific techniques such as animal
studies. Rather, Rule 702 explicitly authorizes the admission of evi-
dence of propositions of "specialized knowledge" when the witness is
qualified in the pertinent specialty and testimony about the proposition
would "assist" the trier of fact. "[Sipecialized knowledge" is expansive
enough to include the propositions which Dr. Miller relied on, his cre-
dentials qualified him as an expert on those propositions, and those pro-
positions would be helpful to a trier of fact grappling with the question
of medical causation of small-cell colon cancer. As a matter of statutory
194. FED. R. EvID. 801-802; CARLSON ET AL., supra note 173 at 575-80.
195. Miguel A. Mendez, California's New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section
352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1984); Peter Miene
et al., Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683
(1992).
196. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958).
197. Id.; Southern Cal. Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc., 456 P.2d 975 (Cal. 1969).
198. 1 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.02, at 1-32 to
1-36 (1993) (discussing the influence of Justice Traynor).
199. Christophersen 11, 939 F.2d at 1122, 1124 (Reavley, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 70:3
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
construction, the assumption underlying the per curiam opinion is
indefensible.
More fundamentally, that assumption is illogical. The starting point
of the per curiam opinion's rationale is that Dr. Miller was a scientist.
That point is not only obvious; Dr. Miller and the dissenters freely con-
ceded the point. However, it is fallacious to leap from that starting point
to the ultimate conclusion that Dr. Miller was required to base any ex-
pert opinion on peculiarly scientific methodologies such as epidemiolog-
ical studies. The per curiam opinion insists that Dr. Miller's reasoning
must qualify for the label "scientific," but the only meaningful question
is whether his reasoning deserves the appellation "valid." Analogical
reasoning is a valid mode of analysis even if it is not a distinctively scien-
tific methodology. The per curiam judges conceded as much when they
indicated that they would have allowed Dr. Miller to ground an expert
opinion on animal studies. A scientist extrapolating from animal studies
to human medical causation is analogizing, pure and simple. Like a sci-
entist relying on animal studies, Dr. Miller proposed to employ analogi-
cal reasoning. He explained the bases for his analogy; and, as best as we
can tell from the en banc Chnstophersen opinion, neither the defense ex-
perts nor the per curiam judges came to grips with his argument nor
found any fault with his analogical reasoning. They merely asserted that
as a scientist, Miller's only choice was to employ peculiarly scientific
techniques such as epidemiological research.
In the final analysis, the per curiam opinion in Christophersen is nar-
row-minded. As the British philosopher John Tyndall once remarked,
the human mind is an "instrument with a certain range of notes."
20 0
That remark holds true whether the human being in question is a layper-
son or a scientist. Tragically, the real failing of the per curiam opinion
is that the opinion was blind to the diversity of modes of valid reasoning
of which the human mind is capable.




A REVIEW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER LucAs
JAMES W. SANDERSON AND ANN MESMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent opinion on regulatory takings, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Comm 'n, I is the latest high court guidance address-
ing the tension between rights of property owners and what some see as
broader societal goals of either protecting or providing public access to
areas of environmental, and therefore, public value. Many believe that
the Lucas decision reflects the broader goals of the Reagan-Bush era.
2 It
shifts the analytical focus in environmental takings jurisprudence to a
more owner-oriented analysis, in line with the general perception that
the high court is weighted with "pro-property" justices.
3
With the election of President Clinton, one question is whether ef-
forts to advance the Clinton/Gore environmental agenda will receive a
hostile welcome among the judiciary. 4 A related question is whether
property owners will be compensated for losses suffered in the name of
"public interest." This article reviews developments in federal takings
jurisprudence. It first briefly reviews the historical development of regu-
latory takings jurisprudence and current practice, then discusses in de-
tail the Court's more recent Lucas analysis and issues that remain
unresolved.
* Mr. Sanderson is a Shareholder and Director, Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson,
P.C.; A.B., University of Nebraska, 1966; J.D., University of Denver, 1969. Ms. Mesmer
clerked for Chief Judge Sherman G. Finesilver, U.S. District Court, District of Colorado,
and she practiced law for just over two years with Saunders, Snyder, Ross & Dickson, P.C.;
B.A., Williams College; J.D., Boston University, 1989.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. Several initial commentaries cast Lucas as a win for private property owners. See,
e.g., Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court Supports Rights of Landowners, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1992,
at A3; Comnrentary: No More 'Takings,' Please, ROCKY MouNrAIN NEWS, July 2, 1992, at 70;
Elliott, Property Rights Ruling Recasts Land-Use Law, THE DENVER POST, July 18, 1992.
3. Five of nine justices are Reagan-Bush appointees: O'Connor, Souter, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas. Justice Rehnquist was appointed ChiefJustice during this period. Jus-
tices White (who announced his retirement from the bench as this Article went to press),
Blackmun and Stevens round out the lot. Over 70% of the current active circuit court
judges have been appointed since 1980, when the Republicans took office. An even higher
percentage of the active district court judges, over 757, have taken the bench during this
time. WEST'S POCKET DIARY, FEDERALJUDGES EDITION, 1993 at 5-24, 97-111 (1992).
4. The Clinton/Gore plan adopts five major goals: (1) reduce pollution and solid
waste; (2) preserve America's natural beauty and key resources; (3) use market forces to
encourage environmental protection; (4) exert American leadership for a healthier world;
and (5) improve energy efficiency. Contained within these general goals are specific goals,
such as reform and proper enforcement of the EPA Superfund, support legislation al-
lowing ordinary citizens to sue federal agencies, make the "no net loss" wetlands pledge a
reality, and "crack down" on environmental crime. Clinton/Gore '92 Committee. Clinton/
Gore on Protecting Our Environment (1992).
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II. REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Brief Discussion of the Evolution of Regulatory Takings
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
5
It is settled law that the Fifth Amendment also protects the property of
states and local units of government under this principle. 6 "Regulatory
takings" under the Fifth Amendment evolved from traditional condem-
nation law, under which the government directly appropriates private
property for such public uses as parks, streets and walkways. 7 The con-
cept of physical appropriation now extends beyond actual entry onto
and possession of property to include acts that invade less directly one's
private use and enjoyment of property. 8 As the concept of compensable
physical invasion grew to include invasions other than actual entry onto
property, the notion that regulations could indirectly preclude one's use
and enjoyment of property took root.9 Thus, regulatory takings result
from regulation that interferes with a property owner's economic inter-
ests to such a degree that, even without physical entry, the property is
essentially "appropriated" for governmental use and the owner de-
serves compensation.' 0
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment was intended not to preclude taking of
private property for public purposes, but to secure compensation in such event. First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 242 (1946) ("[W]hen the Federal
Government... takes for a federal public use the independently held and controlled prop-
erty of a state or of a local subdivision, the Federal Government recognizes its obligation
to pay just compensation for it..."); California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 263-64 (9th
Cir. 1968) ("[Tlhe Fifth Amendment protects the property of the State from appropriation
by the United States without 'just compensation.' This is true even when the property has
been dedicated by the State to public use.").
7. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (condemnation of land for redevel-
opment pursuant to District of Columbia Redevelopment Act).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (government planes flying
low over a chicken farm constituted a compensable physical invasion that prevented the
owner from operating a successful chicken farming business); Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-
Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866 (Cal. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986)
(homeowners allowed to sue municipality for taking resulting from noise and vibrations
caused by aircraft).
9. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (statute forbidding min-
ing of subsurface coal constituted taking of coal); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986 (1984) (interest in environmental data recognized as a trade secret under state law and
thus was a property interest for takings purposes). But see Calvert Invest. Inc. v. Louisville
Metro. Sewer Dist., 847 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1988) (no property interest in expectation to
continue delivering sewage treatment services); United States v. Charles George Trucking
Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260 (D. Mass. 1988) (entry onto property for CERCLA clean-up pur-
poses is not a taking); Cecos Int'l Inc. v.Jorling, 706 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. N.Y. 1989), aft'd,
895 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1990) (company's expectation that permit procedures will not change
is not a protected property interest for takings purposes); Environmental Waste Control,
Inc. v. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 763 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga.
1991) (damage to business reputation from preliminary assessment under CERCLA not a
protected property interest); Lachney v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 244 (1983), aff'd, 765 F.2d
158 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (two year delay in granting permit pursuant to Clean Water Act § 404
did not constitute a taking).
10. The analysis to determine whether compensation is deserving, however, is differ-
ent for each type of taking. Physical appropriations have, at least since Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), required no consideration of
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B. Court Proceedings in a Takings Case
Controversies involving potential takings are unique in that prop-
erty owners' various remedies are not necessarily pursued in one case.
For example, permit denial or a zoning action may be challenged under
applicable substantive criteria (i.e., statutory or regulatory law) before
an administrative law judge. This is distinguished from rights the prop-
erty owner may have under the Fifth Amendment. When confronted
with a permit denial, an owner who believes that his property has been
"taken" can pursue his substantive case before an administrative law
judge and can also-pursue compensation for a taking in claims court. "
An owner can pursue equitable relief in claims court, but courts
favor using claims court for money damages only. 12 This rule relates
directly to the maxim that the necessity of compensation does not result
from unlawful government actions, but instead from lawful exercises of
regulatory powers that do not include compensation for losses.' 3
Takings claims for monetary relief proceed under the Tucker Act in
claims court.14 The general policy has been stated by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc. :15
We have held that, in general, "[e]quitable relief is not avail-
able to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public
use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can
be brought against the sovereign subsequent to a taking. Ruck-
elshaus v. Monsanto Company, 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984) [citation
omitted].
The United States Claims Court has jurisdiction "to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Con-
stitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive de-
partment, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding
in tort." 16 However,
whether the government legitimately has regulated. Compensation is instead deserving
upon a determination that a physical appropriation has occurred. Regulatory takings de-
terminations take account not only of whether legitimate governmental action might pre-
clude recovery, but also of the remaining value of property after governmental action.
These are essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, and do not always result in a compensable
taking. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, (1978).
11. With limited exceptions, the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction
for claims against the United States not exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
12. The claims court may grant declaratory judgements and grant equitable relief (in-
cluding injunctions) within its jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) and (3) (1982). How-
ever, the Supreme Court indicated in Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990), that Takings
Clause cases should be pursued in claims court as suits for compensation.
13. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 at n.22
(1987) (illegal actions or public nuisances are not compensable).
14. 28 U.SC. § 1491(a)(1)(1988); Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1 (1990) (takings chal-
lenge to conversion of public lands easement from railroad to public trail without permis-
sion was premature when not brought in claims court first).
15. 474 U.S. 121, 127-28 (1985) (facial challenge to permit requirements of § 404 of
the Clean Water Act as regulatory taking premature.).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a) (1) (1988).
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[Tihe United States Claims Court shall not have jurisdiction of
any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee
has pending in any other court any suit or process against the
United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of
action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect
thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly under
the authority of the United States.'
7
The statute of limitations for actions over which the claims court
has jurisdiction is six years.' 8 With limited exceptions, the federal dis-
trict courts have concurrent jurisdiction for claims against the United
States not exceeding $10,000.19 Claims court judges can sit anywhere
within the United States to take evidence and enter judgment. 20 Parties
can appeal claims court decisions to the Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims court cases.
2 1
III. THE LAW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS PRIOR TO AND AFTER LucAs
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Lucas in late June, 1992.
The decision, one of two takings cases decided by the Court,2 2 marked a
turning point in takings analysis.
A. Prior to Lucas-Balancing of Governmental Interests against Owner's
Interests
The test for determining whether government action amounts to a
regulatory taking has appeared in two related forms since 1980. Each
test basically requires balancing legitimate governmental interests
against a property owner's right to compensation for the resulting re-
duction in the property's value.
2 3
The Agins two-part test was announced in 1980.24 Under the Agins
test, one can recover compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment
where: (1) government action fails to substantially advance a legitimate
governmental interest; or (2) government action effectively deprives the
17. Id. § 1500.
18. Id. § 2501. See also DiPerri v. Federal Aviation Admin., 17 ERC 1792 (D. Mass.
1981) (action for uncompensated taking for noise associated with Logan Airport accrued
at least 15 years earlier and was barred by six-year statute of limitations).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). See also United States v. Mt. Vernon Memorial Estates,
Inc., 17 ERC 2212 (N.D. 11. 1981) (district court did not have jurisdiction to hear eight
million dollar counterclaim by landowners for taking resulting from denial of permit to
construct sanitary landfill).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2505 (1988).
21. Id. § 1295(a)(3).
22. The other case that the court decided was Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct.
1522 (1992), concerning whether a rent control ordinance amounted to a taking.
23. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 60 (1964); Richard
A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For a
recent review of takings analysis as it relates to selected environmental matters prior to
Lucas, see James S. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and other Critters - Is
it Against Nature to Payfor a Taking? 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309 (1992).
24. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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owner's property of all economic value.2 5 In Agins, plaintiff developers
sought compensation for a taking of a five-acre tract because the City of
Tiburon restricted development of that tract to five or fewer single-fam-
ily homes. 26 Plaintiffs had planned to build multi-family dwellings on
the property.2 7 The Supreme Court ruled that the restriction did not
amount to a taking. 28 The Court's discussion focussed on the City's le-
gitimate exercise of a governmental interest and less on determining the
tract's residual value. 29 In fact, the Court went so far as to speculate
that the owner might actually benefit from leaving the tract undevel-
oped, and that such a benefit could offset any losses.30
The Court also used the Agins test to decide Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n. 31 In Nollan, a state agency conditioned a private prop-
erty owner's building permit on securing a right-of-way across the
owner's land.3 2 The easement supposedly improved public access to
the beach.33 The Nollan Court refined the "legitimate state interests"
test, requiring a substantial "nexus" between the exercise of govern-
mental authority and the purpose to be achieved. 34 The Supreme Court
saw through the defendant's veiled purpose of preserving public access
to a beach by requiring plaintiff to grant a right-of-way across its prop-
erty when constructing their home. The Court stated that beach access
might be a laudable purpose, but a single property owner cannot be
required to relinquish a major property interest (i.e., the right to ex-
clude others) to promote that purpose without being compensated for a
taking.3 5 The Court ruled that a taking had occurred because the law
did not effectively advance a legitimate state interest.
36
In other cases, however, the Court has employed a three-prong test
that balances various factors related to the Agins test. 3 7 Three factors
that have particular significance in this regard are: (1) the character of
government action; (2) the economic impact of government action; and
25. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. See also United States v. Riverside-Bayview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985) (although test not applied, Court reiterates applicability of Agins test).
26. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257.
27. Id. at 258.
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id. at 260-61.
30. Id. at 262.
31. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
32. Id. at 827.
33. Id. at 828.
34. Id. at 837.
35. Id. at 841. The Supreme Court has not elaborated an exact standard for deter-
mining what constitutes a "legitimate state interest." Federal courts have seldom found
that a taking occurs solely because a legitimate governmental interest is not substantially
advanced, but rather have found it necessary in every case to include at least a nominal
discussion of economically viable use of the property at issue. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sports-
man's League v. Alexander, 511 F. Supp. 278 (W.D. La. 1981), aff'dinpart rev'dinpart, 715
F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983) (state has legitimate interest in regulating wetlands under § 404
of Clean Water Act).
36. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841.
37. This test existed prior to Agins. The two tests relate in that Agins essentially re-
states the three-prong test as a general, two-part balancing test. Until Lucas, the tests have
survived as independent analyses.
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(3) the extent to which government action interferes with distinct, in-
vestment-backed expectations.3 8 Although the Agins test has survived,
recent courts have used this three-prong test to analyze takings issues.3 9
The Court seemingly employs the three-prong test to focus more di-
rectly on matters from an owner's perspective. Accordingly, a taking
occurs if the injury to the property is sufficiently severe, even though the
government might have a legitimate interest in regulating.
For example, in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States,40 the Fed-
eral Circuit noted that the "holding or plain implication of Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc.4 1 ... is that a regulation can be a taking if its effect
on a landowner's ability to put his property to productive use is suffi-
ciently severe."'4 2 In Florida Rock, the plaintiff was a limestone miner
who was denied a Section 404 permit under the Clean Water Act to
mine ninety-eight acres of a 1,560 acre tract.4 3 In its analysis, the court
recognized that Clean Water Act regulations substantially advance the
public welfare. 44 However, the court downplayed the environmental
degradation or "pollution" that the regulations prevented. In balancing
public against private interests, the court in Florida Rock concluded that
this was a situation where a private interest deserved compensation for
38. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) (citing
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
39. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (statute precluding
recovery of costs spent on defunct nuclear power plant did not interfere with utility's over-
all investment-backed interests); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DiBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470 (1987) (no taking of subsurface coal where state has legitimate purpose for regu-
lating and coal's value not diminished). Other cases not discussed here also use the three-
prong test, including: Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (chemical com-
pany on notice of conditions in which EPA can release information relating to registration
of chemicals under FIFRA and had no reasonable investment-backed expectation that in-
formation would be protected); Price v. City of Junction, 711 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1983)
(ordinance allowing city to order removal ofjunked vehicles from property does not deny
landowner of economically viable uses of land); Atlas Corp v. United States, 895 F.2d 745
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990) (UMCTRA regulations requiring company to
stabilize mill uranium tailings piles did not interfere with investment-backed interests);
Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (governmental designation of river
area for protection under National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act may have deprived land
owners of economically viable use of mining claim); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
310 (1991) (denial of permit to fill New Jersey wetlands did not deprive owners of all
economically viable use of property, owners had unreasonable expectation that property
could be developed profitably; mixture of Agins and three-part test); Dufau v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156 (1990) (mixture of Agins and three-part test; sixteen-month delay in
issuing permit did not constitute a temporary taking because it did not deprive owners of
enough economically viable use of property); Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct.
Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (denial of permits to construct near navigable waters
of the United States did not render property valueless); Deltona Corp v. United States, 657
F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982) (denial of § 404 of Clean Water
Act permit did not render property valueless); Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd.,
485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984) (owners could not reasonably expect to develop property con-
taining wetlands and thus no taking occurred).
40. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987).
41. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). The Riverside case criticized the lower court's narrow con-
struction of § 404 regulations of the Clean Water Act to avoid compensation. Id. at 127.
42. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 900.
43. Id. at 895-96.
44. Id. at 898.
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loss incurred, aside from the threat that regulation prevented. 45
B. Lucas Clarifies the Test for Determining Whether Government Action
Amounts to a Regulatory Taking
The Court's decision in Lucas comes full circle in a sense. It inte-
grates the current emphasis on economic impacts highlighted by the
three-prong test into the Agins test, to provide clarity for future takings
cases. In Lucas, plaintiff Lucas sued because legislation amending the
South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,46 passed subse-
quent to his acquisition of beachfront property, prevented him from de-
veloping two lots situated along the South Carolina coast.4 7 The case
made its way through the South Carolina courts until the state supreme
court ruled that the legislation prevented harmful and noxious public
nuisances and therefore fell within the traditional "nuisance" exception
to a taking.
4 8
Although the facts of the case center around the nuisance excep-
tion, the Supreme Court takes the opportunity to clarify the takings test.
The Court first re-enunciates the Agins two-part standard as its test, this
time placing emphasis on the second prong, denial of all economically
beneficial use.4 9 The Court reasons that the "deprivation of all econom-
ically viable use" test gives merit to the common law "equities" ap-
proach which holds that it is fair to compensate someone who has lost all
property value, regardless of whether the government action is justi-
fied.5 0 To bolster this equitable emphasis, the Court justifies its rule by
using an historical perspective. 5 1 Having taken an historical perspec-
tive, the Court delivers an implicit message: because traditional con-
demnation law centered around an owner's loss of property, the law of
regulatory takings analysis should square with its historical origins.
5 2
The Court thus abandons any sort of balancing test and establishes the
important initial consideration for future courts-reduction in property
value. Whether a regulation advances legitimate governmental interests
is secondary to this analysis.
53
45. Id. at 905-06. See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153
(1990) (property owner compensated for denial of § 404 permit under the Clean Water
Act).
46. S.C. Code Ann. § 48 (Law Co-Op. 1976 & Supp. 1992).
47. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90. Lucas is related directly to two other consolidated
cases decided pursuant to the same statute in South Carolina. Both cases were not takings
where beachfront houses once existed, were destroyed by weather, and could not be re-
built because of statutory prohibitions. See Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992).
48. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886.
49. Id. at 2893-95.
50. Id. at 2894.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2893.
53. Id. The Court's clarification, however, is not entirely pro-property. The Court
emphasized that it will not compensate for less than "total" reductions in value. Id. at
2895.
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C. Lucas did not Decide all Questions Related to Residual Value after
Government Action, but does Offer New Guidance
The trial court in Lucas determined that the South Carolina statute
had reduced Mr. Lucas' property value to nothing. 54 Therefore, the
Court does not address directly the considerations involved in establish-
ing a total deprivation of property value. Some of these considerations
are: (1) What percentage of the property's value must be lost to amount
to a "total deprivation?" (2) What types of remaining uses for the prop-
erty are considered in determining its residual value? (3) How does the
Court consider smaller parcels that are part of larger parcels? Although
these questions are not addressed directly, the Court drops some rather
strong hints for future cases.
1. What Percentage of the Property's Value must be Lost to
Amount to a "Total Deprivation?"
No question now exists that an owner whose property contains no
residual value should be compensated. 55 Can this be expressed in per-
centages? In short, probably. The Court speaks to this issue in footnote
eight of its majority opinion, responding to Justice Stevens' dissent.
56
In his dissent,Justice Stevens argues that the majority's opinion is unfair
in that someone who loses ninety-five percent of his property's value will
not be compensated, while someone who loses just five percent more, or
one hundred percent of his property, will be compensated. 57 But the
majority refuses to apply percentages to the loss in value, 58 instead re-
ferring to other inquiries such as "the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and.., the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations." '5 9 In this way, the Court
shows its preference for a non-numerical analysis that could result in a
taking regardless of the percentage of property deprived of value.
2. What Types of Remaining Uses for the Property are
Considered in Determining its Residual Value?
Most property can be used for some purpose, even though it might
not be developed. For example, a piece of beachfront property might
provide both a scenic spot for tourists and wildlife habitat. These types
of uses, however, provide little or no income to the developer, whose
plans generally include maximizing income by providing exclusive use
54. Id. at 2896.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2895.
57. Id.
58. This approach has been taken by the lower courts. See, e.g., Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile
County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (92% reduction in land value resulting
from denial of landfill permit for company operating 14 years not enough to constitute a
taking).
59. Lucas, 112 S. Ct at 2895 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). Note that these
inquiries are part of the three-prong test, further indication that the Court is trying to
integrate the two tests.
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to the owner. Should this make a difference in takings cases? 60 The
Court's discussion of whether significant residual value remains in non-
income producing property again appears in footnote eight.6 1 The ma-
jority acknowledges to Justice Stevens that it might consider other types
of deprivations as takings, such as interests in excluding strangers from
one's land. The majority, however, dodges Justice Stevens' real criti-
cism, that "developmental" uses should not be the only uses the court
should consider when determining whether property has any remaining
value. If no developmental uses remain, the property still might have
enough value remaining to avoid a taking.
62
The majority indicates that deprivation of all developmental uses
seems to be enough for the Court to require compensation. 6 3 The
Court repeatedly equates deprivation of all property uses with "produc-
tivity" in its traditional sense, and refers indirectly to several environ-
mental uses as "unproductive" and "idle" uses of property.4 Two
references to the Court's discussion of the takings test illustrate the
point:
On the other side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a
compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that
leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or pro-
ductive options for its use--typically, as here, by requiring land to be
left substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of
public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm. [emphasis added].
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our fre-
quently expressed belief that when the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all [emphasis in original] eco-
nomically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that
is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
6 5
[emphasis added].
In addition, the Court compares regulatory takings to statutes that
impose servitudes on private scenic lands. Such statutes "suggest the
practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and appropri-
ation." 6 6 The Court's negative reference to wildlife refuges, scenic
easements and other protective easements for historic architectural,
archeological, or cultural purposes implies that such laws might amount
to compensable takings in the future.
6 7
60. This controversy has been brewing in the lower courts. In Florida Rock, for exam-
ple, the trial court refused to consider the value of the property to the government as a
measure of residual value in a property, and instead referred to the lack of business inter-
est in the property to prove that the property had no residual value after government
action. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161, 171-74 (1990).
61. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2899.
64. Id. at 2894-95.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2895.
67. Id.
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3. How does the Court Consider "Partial" Takings, i.e., Smaller
Parcels that are Part of Larger Parcels?
Although the Lucas case clearly decides that deprivation of all eco-
nomically beneficial use is reason in itself to compensate an owner for a
taking, the case does not address the issue of partial takings, which is
fundamental to determining economic deprivation. 68 "Partial takings"
result when a court considers denial of a permit for development of only
a portion of an owner's larger holdings.
6 9
For example, assume that Development, Inc. owns a 100 acre par-
cel. Owners like Development, Inc. commonly buy large parcels and de-
velop only a section at a time. In this case, Development, Inc. decides to
develop twenty of the 100 acres. The government, however, determines
that it will deny necessary approval to develop the twenty acres because
all of the subparcel contains wetlands. 70 Thus, the twenty acre portion
of Development, Inc.'s 100 acre parcel is rendered idle and Develop-
ment, Inc.'s investment is for naught.
Will the Court require the government to compensate Develop-
ment, Inc. for the lost investment in that twenty acres, or will the Court
look at the entire holdings of Development, Inc. adjacent to and sur-
rounding the twenty acres, and determine that no compensation is nec-
essary, because only twenty percent of the entire parcel is reduced in
value? The question arises because the Court has used both approaches
in nearly identical cases. 7 l Indeed, the Court openly acknowledges that
the issue exists and must be resolved in a future case.
7 2
A close reading of Lucas indicates that partial takings similar to the
above scenario will likely be compensated. Indeed, compensating par-
tial takings follows logically from the Court's justification that regulatory
takings resemble physical invasions, or appropriations. 73 Physical inva-
68. As the Court stated in footnote seven, the new rule emphasizing total deprivations
of property value has more rhetorical than real force until the issue of whether to compen-
sate partial takings is settled. Id. at 2894. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1190-93 (1967).
69. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886. The Court passed on an opportunity after Lucas to decide
the partial takings issue (also referred to as the "parcel as a whole" question) when it
refused to review Tull v. Virginia, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992). See also Wetlands: High Court Foregoes
Opportunity to Define 'Parcel as a Whole'for Compensable Takings, 23 Env't Rep. Current Dev.
1551 (1992).
70. Several cases have addressed takings as a result of denial of a § 404 permit. See
generally Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 (1990); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990); Ciampitti v. United States, 18 Cl.
Ct. 548, 550 (1989).
71. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (law restrict-
ing subsurface extraction of coal held to effect a taking) with Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-502 (1987) (nearly identical law held not to effect
a taking). 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
72. Perhaps as a way to forecast how the Court will resolve the tension between the
two holdings, the Court refers to "the State's law of property - i.e., whether and to what
degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular in-
terest in land with respect to which the takings claim alleges an diminution in (or elimina-
tion of) value." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
73. Id. at 2894.
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sions are compensated even though a potentially small part of one's
property might be taken. 74 Thus, partial takings should be compen-
sated no matter how small.
The view that partial takings should be compensated finds much
support in the Court's discussion. The Court repeatedly compares reg-
ulatory deprivations to physical appropriations that are compensated re-
gardless of the government's interest in regulating.7 5 For example,
eminent domain statutes creating scenic easements are similar to regula-
tory takings. 76 Such statutes often impinge on only a portion of an
owner's property.
More generally, the Court warns against government's ability to
press private property into some form of public purpose under the guise
of mitigating serious harm. 77 The Court views restrictive regulations
almost as a legislative evil, stating that the economically beneficial use
test should not succumb to "our usual assumption that the legislature is
simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life.' ,,78 In ad-
dition, although total deprivations of beneficial use will be relatively
rare, 79 the Court spends much more discussion justifying that total dep-
rivations are compensable when they happen.
In other comments, the Court emphasizes repeatedly that good rea-
sons exist for its frequently expressed belief that owners who sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good must be
compensated.8 0 Finally, probably the most revealing hint is the Court's
criticism of its holding in Penn Central in footnote seven.8 ' In Penn Cen-
tral, the Court refused to compensate a property owner for a regulatory
taking, because regulation deprived him of only a portion of his prop-
erty. The Court reveals in Lucas that the Penn Central holding is now
"extreme and unsupportable."'8 2
D. Lucas Limits the Scope of the Nuisance Exception Depending on State Law
A long line of cases establish that "harmful or noxious uses" of
property can be proscribed without compensation.8 3 This exception is
74. Id. at 2893. The most recent case on point is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (plaintiff suffered a taking through physical invasion of
only 1 1/2 cubic feet of a building for cable TV lines).
75. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95.
76. Id. at 2895.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2894.
79. Id. at 2894.
80. Id. at 2895.
81. "For an extreme -and, we think, unsupportable-view of the relevant calculus,
see Penn Central Transportation Co v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276-77 (1977), aff'd,
438 U.S. 104 (1978), where the state court examined the diminution in a particular par-
cel's value produced by a municipal ordinance in light of the total value of the taking
claimant's other holdings in the vicinity. Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the
composition of the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent
pronouncements by the Court." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2897. Several cases were cited in Lucas for this proposition. Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Hadachek
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commonly called -the "nuisance" exception to a taking, although the Lu-
cas Court is careful to characterize the exception as potentially broader,
falling within the state's general police powers. 84 The nuisance excep-
tion is not subject to takings analysis. Instead, the exception falls
outside the parameters of consideration indicating whether a taking has
occurred.
The Lucas Court rejects the nuisance exception to the extent that
the "legitimate state interest" test restates the same concern. To the
extent that a statute contains no direct, specific and clearly stated link to
the common law of nuisance in that state, it is not a nuisance exception
to a taking. 85 In such case, laws should be analyzed as part of a takings
analysis, and should be considered under the "legitimate state interests"
test. This change is bound to diminish the number of cases that are
subject to the nuisance exception and therefore will increase the chances
that exercise of regulatory powers amounts to a taking.
8 6
In response to Lucas, legislatures would be well-advised to re-ex-
amine state land use restrictions, and amend laws to either strengthen
their connection with common law nuisance principles or otherwise
amend laws to avoid unconstitutional takings if connections with com-
mon law do not exist. Mere recitations of general purposes won't pro-
tect state governments.
8 7
E. Lucas does not Address the Practical Issue of Quantifying Damages
The Court in Lucas did not address how to value the property that
Mr. Lucas lost. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the South Car-
olina court for further proceedings. 8 8 To date, the lower courts have
used several methods to value land. One might extrapolate those ap-
proaches to apply to other property such as water. Practically speaking,
determining the amount of reduction in value is difficult and can easily
dissolve into a "battle of the experts."
1. Options for Valuing Land
A review of three recent claims court cases in which damages were
awarded for reduction of property value upon denial of a Section 404
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring operation of brick mill in residential area);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent
infection of nearby orchards); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effec-
tively preventing continued operation of quarry in residential area).
84. Lucas, at 2897.
85. Id. at 2900-01. The Lucas Court states that all legislation must identify common
law principles and show their relationship to the current restriction, i.e., the Court will not
"fill in the blanks" for state legislatures.
86. There exists little means of predicting the number of cases that will now result in
compensation to owners because of this shift. No doubt the initial barrier of the nuisance
exception will be easier to overcome for a time. In cases where a taking has clearly oc-
curred but for this exception, chances are greater that owners will now be compensated.
87. Ironically, even though the Court criticizes the "artfulness" of legislative drafting,
it has seemingly established a future of artful drafting in state legislatures.
88. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902.
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permit under the Clean Water Act illustrates the difficulty of valuing
property. Simply put, the court must determine the value of the prop-
erty prior to government action and subtract any remaining value after
government action from that amount. Applying this simple concept,
however, leads to various results. In both Florida Rock and Loveladies
Harbor,8 9 the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking
(also the fair market value of the property prior to government action)
was the value of damages. For example, in Florida Rock, the property
was valued at $10,500 per acre prior to government action and ninety-
eight acres were lost ($1,029,000 was awarded in damages). Although
both courts preferred to use a "comparable sales" figure in calculating
the fair market value of property prior to government action, they dis-
agreed on how to calculate that figure. "Comparable sales" are used
often in real estate valuations. One looks for sales of comparable prop-
erty under comparable conditions to determine market value. In Florida
Rock, the trial court ultimately rejected a comparable sales analysis as
not comparable enough, and used a different calculation that was based
on acquisition cost, adjusted for the "changing value of money and real-
ity." In Loveladies Harbor, the court employed another variation on
"comparable sales," projecting the value of the property after develop-
ment, and then subtracting development costs from the final total. Fi-
nally, Formanek90 uses the Loveladies Harbor approach, but adjusts the
dollar values to reflect present values.
2. Options for Valuing Water
Comparable sales analysis is quite useful if one can find comparable
situations to use as a baseline in calculating value. Difficulty arises with
this approach, however, when property is more unique such as water
rights91 and mineral rights. 9 2 If at least three means of calculating com-
parable sales of land exist, imagine the difficulty in determining values
of these more obscure types of property.
If one applies the above approaches to valuing water several possi-
ble valuations can result. Using a water reservoir project as an example,
one might arrive at a "comparable" sales figure by determining the
value of water sold in another similar project. One might also reason-
ably determine the cost of the project after development and adjust that
89. In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), plaintiff was
denied a § 404 permit under the Clean Water Act to develop 11.5 acres of 51 acres re-
maining from a 250 acre tract in New Jersey.
90. Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
91. For a more in-depth discussion of regulatory takings as they apply to water rights,
see David C. Hallford, Environmental Regulations as Water Rights Takings, NAT. RES. & ENVr.
13-15, 54-56 (Summer 1991).
92. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 406 (1991) for a recent discussion differentiating between land and mineral
rights. Other recent mineral rights cases which constitute takings include: NRG Co. v.
United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 51 (1991) (cancellation of mineral prospecting permits on Indian
lands constituted taking); United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (expectation of mining lease approval is a reasonable, investment-backed
expectation).
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cost to today's dollars. The difficulty comes when determining the value
of water after government action. Water rights can be "changed"
through court proceedings and used for other purposes, but such a
change almost always diminishes the amount of the water right.9 3 In
addition, one cannot realistically determine the results of a change case
without actually going through the process. A change case could result
in a total loss of rights, or might diminish the right only marginally.9 4
Predicting a result is impossible.
III. CONCLUSION
During the Reagan-Bush era, the claims court was revived and sub-
sequent claims court decisions of Reagan-Bush appointees have
awarded high dollar amounts in damages for regulatory takings. 9 5 In
addition, the Supreme Court, now weighted heavily with Republican ap-
pointees, has established the claims court as the sole venue for takings
claims seeking compensation. Now that Lucas has been decided, the
claims court has a mandate to continue issuing decisions that take less
account of legitimate state interests in regulating and more account of a
loss in an owner's property value resulting from that regulation. Any
far-reaching environmental regulations enacted under President Clinton
could reach into the federal government's pocket as well. In the final
analysis, following Lucas, more owners will be compensated for regula-
tory takings.
93. See Hallford, supra note 92.
94. In Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1175-76, the court determined that the existence of
a statutory provision, 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5), that enabled the federal government to ex-
change coal that could not be developed for coal that could be developed, did not pre-
clude the court from finding that SMCRA provisions precluding surface mining of alluvial
valley floors constituted a taking.
95. Damages amounting to over a million dollars in each case were awarded in Florida
Rock and Loveladies Harbor. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
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THE EFFECT OF A SUPERFUND SITE DESIGNATION ON
PROPERTY VALUES-SMUGGLER MOUNTAIN,
ASPEN, COLORADO: A CASE STUDY
NANCY A. MANGONE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Complaints from homeowners, small businesses and lenders about
the negative impacts of a Superfund site designation on their property
values are nothing new. For years, particularly after the passage of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,1 citizens and
local and federal lenders have been lobbying the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") to ease the "credit crunch" they
have been experiencing.
2
But just how pervasive is the credit crunch caused by Superfund
designation? While there are no national statistics compiled to answer
this question, examples from the six states comprising EPA's Region
V1113 suggest that the effects of a Superfund designation on property
values are anything but uniform. For example, in the prosperous com-
munities of Central City and Black Hawk in Colorado, taxes have been
raised to reflect the fourfold increase in property values inspired by be-
ing two of the few areas within the state approved for limited stakes
gambling. While local resident Norm Blake fears he cannot sell his
property because it is located within the Superfund site, he is quick to
admit that its value has increased from $5,000 to $5 million with the
introduction of gambling to his community.4 For most developers in
these two mountain communities, addressing Superfund wastes is sim-
ply a "cost of doing business" figured into their casino or parking lot
construction projects. No diminution of property values appears to
have resulted.
The community of Midvale, Utah, however, has been hard hit by its
Superfund designation. This community, located approximately twelve
miles to the east of Salt Lake City, is home to two contiguous Superfund
sites-the Sharon Steel (Tailings) and Midvale Slag Superfund sites.
Property values have been so affected by the sites' designations as "na-
* Senior Attorney, Office of Regional Counsel, United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, Region VIII. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the
author. Nothing contained in this Article, therefore, should be relied upon as a final
Agency decision or statement of position.
1. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-
9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
2. See, e.g., Statement of Glenn L. Unterberger before the Senate Committee on
Small Businesses, August 3, 1989, as reported in 135 Cong. Rec. D. 923.
3. EPA's Region VIII is comprised of the States of Colorado, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, and Utah.
4. See Changes Noted By Residents, Wkly. Reg. Call, Oct. 2, 1992, at 12.
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tional priorities" that the Salt Lake County Assessor stepped in to en-
sure that the owners of the approximately 511 residential properties
located within the sites retained some economic value for their homes.
5
The County, during its yearly tax assessment, significantly reduced the
value of approximately 95% of the homes within the sites. 6 For some of
these homes, the value for the land was fixed at $100 per lot, with the
remaining original value being assigned to the structure located on the
lot.7 For others, the value of land was fixed at $100, with the value of
the house staying the same.8 Only 5% of the properties retainedtheir
original values. While it is too early to tell if this solution will ease the
credit crunch long-term for the Midvale residents, the County's reas-
sessment program may have made it more difficult for some site resi-
dents to refinance their homes and may have decreased the City of
Midvale's revenue base between $35,000 and $50,000.9 This tax base
decrease may have a measurable impact on the City's ability to provide
essential public services.10
To understand the credit crunch and the responses of communities
in its grips, it is important to understand the actual as well as perceived
financial risks the lending community associates with a Superfund
designation. Nowhere in EPA's Region VIII is there a better example of
the credit crunch problem and its effects on a community than the
Smuggler Mountain Superfund Site located in Aspen, Colorado. It is
common knowledge that since the 1940's this once sleepy little mining
town has become the playground of the rich and famous. Property val-
ues have grown at an astronomical rate, with prime "downtown" build-
ing lots now going for $800,000 to $2 million.l" The Aspen boom has
forced many long time Aspen residents to flee, as they are no longer
able to afford the high costs of living and housing in Aspen. One chal-
lenge facing local governments, therefore, has been to secure reason-
ably priced housing for its "working" class. These affordable housing
units, however, are now located in the middle of one of the most contro-
versial Superfund sites in the country. Thus, the Superfund designation
has greatly impacted the economic balance of Aspen and makes an inter-
esting case study to frame the issues and solutions to this set of environ-
mental' 2 and financial problems.
5. Telephone Interview with Skip Criner, Director of Development Services for the
City of Midvale, Utah (Jan. 14, 1993); Telephone Interview with Bruce Nieveen, Environ-






11. Telephone Interview with Caroline Christensen, Agent, The Aspen Brokers, Ltd.
(Dec. 3, 1992).
12. "Environmental" is used generically in this article to denote risks to the health,
welfare and habitats of both human and ecological populations.
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II. SMUGGLER MOUNTAIN SUPERFUND SITE
BACKGROUND
The Smuggler Mountain Superfund Site ("Site") covers approxi-
mately 110 acres of land in the City of Aspen, Pitkin County, Colorado.
Its general boundaries consist of the Roaring Fork River on the west and
south, Hunter Creek on the north and Smuggler Mountain on the east.
Mining activities, including milling and processing operations, were be-
gun in the late 1800's, and it is estimated that heavy metal-laden wastes
were discarded and/or concentrated on the Site from the 1880's to
1960's.
1 3
The first mineral discovery in Aspen was made in 1879 on Aspen
Mountain and the first shipments of silver ores were sent by burro in the
early 1880's to the smelters operating in Leadville.14 The Denver & Rio
Grande Western completed a narrow gauge railroad between Aspen and
Glenwood Springs in 1887, and the Colorado Midland Railroad com-
pleted a direct route to the Leadville smelters through the Carlton Tun-
nel in 1888.15 Small local smelters and various mills operated until
these railroad connections were completed, but the processes employed
by these smelters and mills proved unsuccessful in separating zinc and
lead from the silver contained in the ores.
16
Statistics from the United States Bureau of Mines ("BOM") show
that the ores produced from the Aspen mining district returned roughly
$103 million, $74 million of which was in silver production and $27 mil-
lion in lead.17 The Smuggler Mountain mines produced approximately
one-half of this total value. 18 The Mollie Gibson Mine, located on
Smuggler Mountain, became famous in 1894 as the producer of the
largest silver nugget ever mined, weighing approximately 3,700 pounds.
The principal production from the Smuggler mines occurred between
1885 and 1895.19 The chain of producing mines during this boom pe-
riod was eventually consolidated into two groups of operations: those
held by the Smuggler-Durant Mining Company and those held by the
Della S. Consolidated Mines Company. 2° The Smuggler Leasing Com-
pany operated both the Smuggler and Della S. mines, but a dispute with
the owners of the Della S. Consolidated Mining Company, along with
the collapse of the silver market, resulted in a cessation of operations in
1918.21
13. Volin, M. E. and Dunham, W.C., United States Department of the Interior, Report




16. Id. at 5.
17. Volin, M.E. and Hild,J.H., Investigation of Smuggler Lead-Zinc Mine, Aspen, Pit-
kin County, Colorado. United States Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines Report
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Since 1918, there have been a number of attempts to re-start opera-
tions at the Smuggler mines. The three most noteworthy were: 1) at-
tempts by the BOM in the middle and late 1940's, first in conjunction
with the Pacific Bridge Company of San Francisco, and later the Hum-
phreys Gold Corporation of Denver; 2) attempts by the Anaconda Cop-
per Mining Company, with its affiliate the Aspen Mining Company, in
1948 and 1949; and 3) an attempt by the McCulloch Oil Company of
California to mill the dump materials adjacent to the Smuggler mines in
the mid to late 1960's.2 2 The Herron Brothers, owners of the gravity-
separation mill located on the Site, also intermittently mined and milled
ores during and after World War 11.23
The geologic nature of the Smuggler Mines is characterized as sil-
ver-bearing, lead-zinc deposits formed mainly by the replacement of
limestones and dolomites.2 4 These ores exist in the contact between
two stages of mineralized breccia, 25 known as the Leadville and Weber
formations. Mining was conducted by crosscutting the contact fault of
these formations and by stoping, to expose low-grade ores in the walls
of the stopes.2 6 The high concentrations of lead and cadmium caused
by these mining activities are found in the tailings and soils throughout
the Site. These hazardous substances in turn may pose toxic and carci-
nogenic health risks to the over 1,100 residents living within the Site's
boundaries. In 1981, a graduate student conducting his thesis docu-
mented high levels of lead in flowers and vegetables grown in gardens
on the Site.2 7 Investigations to determine the extent of contamination
on the media affected (air, surface water and groundwater) were begun
by EPA as early as June 1982.28 In 1983, at the request of the Board of
County Commissioners of Pitkin County, EPA became fully involved at
the Site.
2 9
Some of the potentially responsible parties, including the develop-
ers of the condominium complexes and trailer parks, agreed to conduct
a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study ("RI/FS").a0 The parties
22. Id.
23. Harshman, E. H. and Salsbury, M. E., United States Department of the Interior,
Defense Minerals Exploration Administration, DMPA Report 2296, Smuggler Mine, Pitkin
County, Colorado (June 1952), Engineering Report, at 3.
24. Id.
25. "Breccia" is a geologic term meaning a rock consisting of sharp fragments embed-
ded in a fine-grained matrix.
26. A "stope" is a step like underground excavation cut made for the removal of ore,
which is formed as the ore is mined in successive layers.
27. See Boon, D. Y., Lead Contamination in Aspen: A Preliminary Presentation, Fort
Collins, Colorado, Colorado State University Department of Agronomy (June 7, 1982).
28. See Record of Decision, Smuggler Mountain Superfund Site, Pitkin County, Colo-
rado, U.S. EPA Region VIII (September 1986) at 5.
29. See Resolution of the Board of County Commissioners of Pitkin County, Colorado,
Regarding Inclusion of the Smuggler Mountain Area on the Superfund National Priority
[sic] List, No. 84-124 (Dec. 10, 1984).; See also Letter from George Madsen, Chairman,
Board of County Commissioners, Pitkin County, Colorado to John Wardell, Air and Waste
Management Division, U.S. EPA Region VIII (March 14, 1983) (On file with EPA Region
VIII).
30. In an Administrative Order on Consent issued by EPA on July 12, 1985.
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submitted a final report on these investigations in March 1986.31 In an
exercise of its oversight role and as a follow-up to the RI/FS, EPA pre-
pared an Endangerment Assessment in May 1986 and an addendum to
the RI/FS in June 1986.32 The Regional Administrator subsequently
signed an Endangerment Finding, which determined that the levels of
cadmium and lead in the soils at the Site pose "an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to public health and the environment."1
3 3
The Smuggler Mountain Site was originally proposed for inclusion
on the National Priorities List ("NPL") in 1984.3 4 After taking public
comment on this proposed listing, the Site was finally listed on the NPL
on June 10, 1986.3 5 A Record of Decision ("ROD") was issued on Sep-
tember 26th of that same year, also at the conclusion of a public com-
ment period.3 6 The ROD separated the Site into two operable units.
3 7
The remedy selected for Operable Unit 1 called for excavation to a
depth of four feet and disposal of "high-level wastes" soil (i.e., over
5,000 parts per million ("ppm") of lead) in a Pitkin County owned and
operated repository.3 8 This repository would be capped, meeting the
performance standards for in-place closure found in the Resource Con-
servation and Reclamation Act ("RCRA"). 39 Compliance with local
land use restrictions and controls, known as "institutional controls,"
would be required in perpetuity and would be ensured by the County.
40
"Low-level wastes" (i.e., between 1,000 and 5,000 ppm lead) would be
controlled by placing a six to twelve inch cap of clean topsoil over the
wastes and revegetating. 4 1 The County would also be required to con-
duct groundwater monitoring on a quarterly basis.
4 2
Sampling to determine the amount of soil with high-level wastes be-
gan in the Spring of 1988. 4 3 Repository sites were also identified and a
suitable location, the Mollie Gibson Park, was selected because of its
stability and its size.4 4 When continued sampling showed that the
amount of soil needing excavation and disposal was greater than origi-
nally estimated, EPA issued an Explanation of Significant Differences
("ESD"), which amended several elements of the ROD. 4 5 The March 2,
1989, ESD changed the remedy by allowing for shallower excavation (to
31. See Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study for the Smuggler Mountain Super-
fund Site, Aspen, Pitkin County, Colorado, U.S. EPA Region VIII (March 1986).
32. See Endangerment Assessment for the Smuggler Mountain Site, Pitkin County,
Colorado, Draft Final Report, U.S. EPA Region VIII (May 5, 1986).
33. Id.
34. 49 Fed. Reg. 40321 (October 15, 1984).
35. 51 Fed. Reg. 21073 (June 10, 1986).
36. See Record of Decision, supra note 28.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1988). In-place closure standards are found in § 6925.
40. See Record of Decision, supra note 28.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Soil Cleanup of Smuggler Mountain Site, Explanation of Significant Differ-
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two feet) and replacement of high-level wastes soils, but established a
more stringent action level. 46 All soils with lead concentrations above
1,000 ppm were to be addressed.4 7 As a result of the increase in the
volume of soils to be excavated, EPA deemed that additional repository
space was necessary. 4 8 That space was to be located on property owned
by the Smuggler Racquet Club.
4 9
Several elements of the remedy proposed in the ESD were altered
in a second ESD dated May 16, 1990.50 These changes consisted of a
greater reliance on institutional controls and excavation or placement of
only six inches of contaminated soils in the Hunter Creek and Centen-
nial condominium areas. 5 1 However, the remedy remained essentially
the same-where lead concentration of the soil exceeded the action
level, soil would be excavated to a depth of one foot, a geotextile barrier
would be installed, and "clean" soils would be placed over the
geotextile.
5 2
In May of 1991, the Board of County Commissioners adopted the
requisite institutional controls as a prelude to EPA's implementation of
the remedy contained in the 1990 ESD. 53 Three weeks later, however,
in the face of a citizens' referendum to block its implementation, the
County repealed the new land use ordinance.54 In July, 1991, citing the
same citizen opposition, the City Council tabled consideration of an
identical land use and building code ordinance. 5 5 The citizens' coali-
tion-the Smuggler Mountain Citizens' Caucus-and local governmen-
tal officials then lobbied Congressional and Agency officials to either re-
examine the need for the remedy or delete the Site from the NPL.
56
These efforts culminated in a meeting between Aspen representa-
tives, EPA senior level management officials and Colorado's Congres-
sional delegation in Washington, D.C., on February 28, 1992. 5 7 This
meeting resulted in a commitment by EPA to impanel an advisory com-
mittee of technical experts to examine risk assessment information gen-




49. See Soil Cleanup of Smuggler Mountain Site, Aspen, Pitkin County, Colorado,





53. See Michael Bourne, New Smuggler Vote-Approval Needed Again, ASPEN DAILY NEWS,
July 4, 1991, at 1, 16.
54. Id.; See also Scott Condon, EPA Foes Will Declare Independence In Parade, ASPEN TIMES
DAILY, July 4, 1991, at 1.
55. See Letter from Edward M. Caswall, City Attorney, City of Aspen, to Marc R. Al-
ston, Chief, Colorado Section, U.S. EPA Region VIII, Superfund Remedial Branch (Au-
gust 20, 1991); See also Michael Bourne, Council, EPA Debate Big Question; Final Vote Delayed
For Two Weeks, ASPEN DAILY NEWS, June 25, 1991, at 3.
56. See Michael Bourne, U.S. Senators Push for Smuggler Exclusions, Fannie Mae Help,




coalition. 58 The task of the panel was to advise the Agency and the com-
munity on whether a risk is posed by the hazardous substances found at
the Site.59 This Technical Advisory Committee ("TAC"), in a prelimi-
nary report issued October 27, 1992, determined that while no actual,
current risk exists from the hazardous substances found at the. Site, a
small future risk may exist. 60 These findings assumed that the observed
land use and human behavioral patterns would not change signifi-
cantly. 6 1 Going beyond its charge, the TAC suggested measures to ad-
dress or manage the risks presented by these materials. 6 2 A final TAC
report was issued on January 27, 1993,63 and EPA responded by ac-
cepting the TAC's recommendations. 64
In the meantime, on October 16, 1989, the United States filed a cost
recovery suit seeking $1,851,116.58 in past costs pursuant to Section
107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 6 5 The United States' complaint sought to
recover response costs from eleven named defendants. 66 These defend-
ants, in addition to the developers mentioned previously, included a
number of owners and operators of property within the Site, such as the
Hunter Creek Commons Corporation and the Smuggler Racquet Club.
The assertion of cost recovery claims against these two parties, one a
homeowners' association and the other a loose association of tennis-
playing Aspenites, gave the residents of the Site considerable cause for
concern. And although not named in the lawsuit, the citizens living
within the site were technically liable as current owners of a facility ac-
cording to Section 107 of CERCLA.
FINANCIAL IMPACTS
The residents of the Smuggler Mountain Site first began to claim
that they were experiencing difficulty in selling their properties some
time after EPA finally listed the Site on the NPL and selected its remedy
in 1986.67 Since that time, residents have continued to maintain that it
is both difficult to secure financing for selling or improving property
within the Site and that the value of the property has significantly de-
58. Id.
59. Smuggler Mountain Technical Advisory Comm., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
Executive Summary 3 (Oct. 28, 1992).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 3-4.
63. Smuggler Mountain Technical Advisory Comm. Final Report, U.S. Envtl. Protec-
tion Agency (Jan. 27, 1993).
64. See Bryan Abas, EPA Accepts Panel's Smuggler Recommendations, ASPEN DAILY NEWS,
Jan. 6, 1993, at 8.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). Section 107 of CERCLA ad-
dresses potential liability of polluters for cleanup costs. Id. § 9607. In the intervening
three years, the United States' costs, including investigatory, remedial design and litiga-
tion-related costs and interest have escalated to over $7 million.
66. As of the date of writing this article, the United States has reached either settle-
ments with seven of the eleven original parties, and dismissed with prejudice against an-
other defendant.
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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creased. In an attempt to ascertain whether these difficulties indeed ex-
ist and if so, the nature and extent of the financial problems the
residents are facing, this author consulted a number of the local lenders
and examined the correspondence between EPA and the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae").
68
PROPERTY VALUES
It is difficult to ascertain the effect of the Superfund site designa-
tion-both prior to and following NPL listing--on property values of
parcels within the Smuggler Mountain area for a variety of reasons.
Property values are generally attained by examining comparable proper-
ties as "paired sales" and adjusting the value of the property being
purchased or appraised up or down based on a number of variables.
6 9
These variables may include the condition of the home, trailer or condo-
minium unit, any improvements that are unique to the property, and any
land use restrictions that may apply to the property, such as condomin-
ium bylaws or zoning ordinances. 70 The difficulty in valuing the Smug-
gler properties arises from the fact that there are few properties that are
comparable. 7 1 Also, there is no specific formula for increasing or de-
creasing the value of a property based on the Superfund designation;
the value of properties within the Site is determined by local real estate
appraisers on a property-specific basis, using their best professional
judgment.
7 2
Perhaps the most important factor that an appraiser considers in
valuing a Smuggler property is whether the unit is "free market" or
"deed restricted."7 3 Deed restricted units are generally less valuable
because the pool of acceptable buyers is limited by local ordinance. 74 A
considerable number of the properties located within the Site were con-
structed between 1979 and 1985 with the restriction that they be rented
or sold to low, moderate or middle income families. 7 5 According to the
Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority 1992 Affordable Housing Guidelines, the
maximum gross household income for a person wishing to purchase or
rent a restricted unit has been divided into four categories. 76 Depend-
ing on the number of dependents in the household and the category, the
68. The author would like to thank representatives of Thatcher Bank, Colorado Fed-
eral Bank, Aspen Appraisal Group, Reitz Mortgage Association, the Aspen Board of Real-
tors and the Aspen/Pitkin Housing Authority for their invaluable assistance in preparing
this portion of the article.




72. Id. and Telephone Interview with Jodi Cooper, Colorado Federal Savings Bank
(Nov. 24, 1992).
73. Telephone Interview with Kathy Chappell, Senior Vice President, Thatcher Bank
(Nov. 24, 1992).
74. Id.
75. See Christensen, supra note 11.




income of the household can range from $22,000 to $100,000. Cate-
gory 1 sets an income level between $22,000 and $42,000 and is desig-
nated as the "low" income level. Category 2, with income levels from
$35,000 to $55,000, is the "lower moderate" income level. Category 3
(from $50,000 to $70,000) is the "upper moderate" income level and
Category 4 (from $85,000 to $100,000) is the "middle" income level. 77
The Hunter Creek, Centennial and Smuggler Run Mobile Home Park
units can by purchased or rented by persons or households that qualify
at or below Category 4 income levels. 78 These income restrictions were
imposed so that affordable housing could be made available to Aspen's
resident employee population.
There are four areas within the Site that are subject to income level
or "employee-occupied" deed restrictions. The Hunter Creek condo-
minium complex contains 295 units, 77 of which are deed restricted to
moderate and middle income families. 79 The Centennial condominium
complex contains 240 units which are all deed restricted: 148 units may
only be rented to low, moderate or middle income households; 92 units
may be sold to middle income qualifying buyers. 80 Smuggler Run Mo-
bile Home Park has 17 employee occupied restricted units. 8 ' Each of
these restricted units carries with it a ceiling of 6% appreciation of the
purchase price per annum so that the price will remain affordable. The
Smuggler Mobile Home Park consists of 87 units, which, while not "in-
come" restricted, are restricted by "owner occupancy" requirements.
The difference in property value between deed restricted and free mar-
ket units may be as much as $100,000.82
Although there is not a profusion of information about free market
units, there are two comparisons that can be made regarding the prop-
erty value and salability of certain Smuggler properties, particularly
those in the Hunter Creek condominium complex. In 1984, before the
Site was listed on the NPL, income restricted two bedroom, two bath-
room units in Hunter Creek were selling in the middle $50,000s to mid-
dle $60,000s range.8 3 Similarly sized condominium units in the
adjacent Lone Pine complex, which is just outside the Superfund site
boundary, were selling for approximately $10,000 more. 8 4 Today, a two
bedroom, two bathroom unit in Hunter Creek sells for approximately
77. Id.
78. Id. With no dependents, the maximum household income cannot exceed $85,000;
with three or more dependents, the maximum allowable income cannot exceed $100,000.
Id.
79. Memorandum from Terri Newland to Mark Fuller, Development Director, Pitkin




82. Comparable Hunter Creek 840 square foot, 2 bedroom units have sold for
$95,000 with the deed restrictions and $170,000 on the open market. See Aspen Bd. of
Realtors Summary Statistics (1992); Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Auth. Sales Activity
Summary (1992).
83. Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Auth. Sales Activity Summary (1984).
84. d.
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$95,000, while similar Lone Pine units sell for approximately
$100,000.85 Of course, the asking price for these units is controlled,.
since the seller can only receive a profit of 6% per annum. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the compared purchase prices have remained
constant; the deed restricted Hunter Creek units within the Site are
keeping pace with the property values of the deed restricted Lone Pine
units. These statistics demonstrate that the high demand for "low cost"
employee housing within Aspen still drives prices upward, regardless of
its location.
The second comparison that can be drawn is between the sales
figures for properties within the Site pre- and post-listing on the NPL.
According to EPA collected statistics, 153 of the Hunter Creek units
sold afterJune 10, 1986, the date of EPA's final listing of the Site on the
NPL.8 6 These 153 units reflect 51 % of all units within the Hunter Creek
complex.8 7 Likewise, 54% of the Centennial units were sold after NPL
listing.8 8 Ninety-four percent of the Smuggler Mobile Home Park
homes sold after June, 1986, as well as 50% and 57% of the single fam-
ily homes in the Sunny Park North and Hughes/Gibson subdivisions.8 9
Thus, the designation of the Site as a "priority" for EPA appears to have
had little if any effect on the initial sales of these condominium and
trailer park units or the resale of private residences.
There are also very few documented cases where the property val-
ues of land or private, single family homes within the Site have actually
decreased. One such devaluation occurred at the request of the owner
of the Smuggler Mine and Williams Ranch property-the Smuggler-Du-
rant Mining Corporation.90 Before 1986, this approximately fourteen
acre tract was valued at $350,000 for corporate asset and tax assessment
purposes. In 1987, the Corporation petitioned the County to decrease
the property's value to $65,000. The County agreed.9 1 This devalua-
tion has allowed the Corporation to pay less in real property taxes. It
has not, however, prevented the Corporation from soliciting offers from
interested buyers.9 2 Thus, with the exception of the Smuggler-Durant
property (which, it could be argued, is a significantly different situation),
property values within the Site seem to have increased apace with the
"downtown" area of Aspen, despite the Superfund designation.
85. Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Auth. Sales Activity Summaries (1991 & 1992).
86. Letter and enclosures from Sandra K. McDonald, Work Assignment Manager,
TechLaw Inc., to Paula Scl'mittdiel, USEPA Region VIII 3 (Nov. 2, 1990)(on file with
USEPA Region VIII). This letter discusses the number and percentage of landowners that




90. See Letter from Martin H. Kahn, Attorney for the Smuggler-Durant Mining Corp.,
to Pitkin County Assessor (June 23, 1987) (requesting adjusting value of Williams Ranch)
(on file with USEPA Region VIII).
91. See Pitkin County Assessor, Residential Property Appraisal Record, Schedule No.
08-04445, Parcel No. 2737-074-00-008 (1987).
92. See Scott Condon, Housing Longtime Locals, Not Profit, Is Goal, Williams Ranch Group
Says, ASPEN TIMES DAILY, Feb. 3, 1992, at 13.
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After ascertaining whether the property is deed restricted, apprais-
ers may contact EPA to determine whether the property requires
remediation or has "tested out" (i.e., has a soil lead level less than 1,000
ppm). 93 Appraisers do not go so far, however, as to assign a dollar
value to the cost of remediating the property.9 4 Previous EPA mine
waste residential soil cleanups, like the one in East Helena, Montana,
have cost approximately $15,000 to $20,000 per property.95 While the
size of the residential yards in the East Helena cleanup were larger, the
cost is thought to be an applicable estimate since the Smuggler cleanup
requires more remediation by hand rather than by earthmoving equip-
ment. Generally, the appraisers do not devalue the property by this
$15,000 amount, but merely note that the property is within the Site
boundaries and that it may contain contaminated soil. The Superfund
Site designation, even though it is widely known within the Aspen com-
munity, must specifically be disclosed by the appraiser, since local banks
and Fannie Mae require a disclosure of environmental hazards. 96
LENDING PRACTICES
In addition to the appraised value of the property, the other major
factor that influences "salability" is the willingness of lenders to finance
or purchase loans.9 7 Private and public lenders have been unwilling to
initiate or purchase loans on the secondary mortgage market for Smug-
gler properties because of two potential liabilities: (1) the liability the
current residential owner may have to the United States for its response
costs; and (2) the liability the lender may acquire if it forecloses on a
loan and takes title to the property in the future. The banks and public
lenders were also concerned that they may not be able to dispose of the
property and recoup their investment in a future sale.
98
By law, the current owner of a "facility" where hazardous sub-
stances have been disposed of, placed or come to be located 9 9 is liable
to reimburse the United States for the costs incurred in responding to
these hazards to human health or the environment.1 0 0 The United
States can recover costs of any response activity, including costs in-
curred for investigatory, abatement or enforcement purposes.' 0 ' Resi-
dential owners were also concerned that, even though the portions of
the Site owned by them were distinct and insignificant in comparison to
93. See e.g. Letter from BrianJ. Pinkowski, Remedial Project Manager, U.S. EPA to L.J.
Erspamer (April 2, 1992) (regarding property "testing-out" because soil sampling results
were below EPA's 1,000 ppm action level).
94. See Vorbert, supra note 69.
95. Telephone Interview with Jay Spickelmier, Assistant to Vice President for Opera-
tions, ASARCO, Inc. (April 23, 1993).
96. Fannie Mae, Property and Appraisal Analysis 728 (1990).
97. Telephone Interview with Patrick R. Dalrymple, President, Colorado Federal Sav-
ings Bank (Nov. 24, 1992).
98. Id.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B).
100. Section 107(a)(l) of CERCLA holds persons liable that are owners or operators of
a facility. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
101. Id. § 9604.
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the rest of the Site, they would be held jointly and severally liable' 0 2 for
all response costs incurred and to be incurred at the Site. Further, these
owners could not sustain a defense as "innocent" or de minimis landown-
ers, since the owners bought the properties with the knowledge that
they were within the location of historic mining activities.10 3 With close
to $7 million in past costs spent, and the remedial costs projected at $10
to $12 million, the potential Superfund liability would spell bankruptcy
and financial ruin for any homeowner compelled to pay a substantial
portion of these costs. Public lenders like Fannie Mae and private lend-
ers like the local and regional banks shared these concerns: the lenders
were worried that taking title to these residential properties would sub-
ject them to joint and several liability for environmental hazards they
neither created nor exacerbated.
While EPA maintained that it would not look to individual landown-
ers or lenders who took title to Smuggler properties pursuant to foreclo-
sure, lenders demanded more express assurances. 1o4 The banks argued
that without these assurances they could neither risk incurring
Superfund liability nor accept "tainted" property as collateral. Accord-
ing to the former President of the now defunct Aspen Savings Bank, no
amount of points or additional fees could make a bad loan good. 1o5 The
risk associated with these properties could not be measured and most
banks simply would not assume the risk. 106 Moreover, the perception of
the risk by the lending community was compounded by the community's
belief that the liabilities could outweigh the value of the Smuggler
properties.°7 The lendees, according to the bankers, therefore had lit-
tle or no incentive to repay the mortgage loan. 108
These perceptions translated into a suspension of conventional
102. Section 107(a) of CERCLA lists the classes of persons that may be held liable to
the United States for response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. Courts have upheld joint and
several liability under this provision where there are multiple defendants and the harm is
not divisible. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 223 (W.D.
Mo. 1985); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1395-96, 1401 (D.N.H.
1985).
103. In order to sustain such a defense, a landowner must be able to prove he con-
ducted "all appropriate inquiry" into the former ownership and use of the property
purchased. This inquiry must be made consistent with "good commercial practices" of the
real estate industry at the time the property is purchased. For a further discussion of the
requisite showing, see, "Guidance on Landowner Liability under Section 107(a)(1) of CER-
CLA, De Minimis Settlements under Section 122(g)(l)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements
with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property," June 6, 1989.
104. Nationally, lenders were skittish about being held liable for conducting any loan
"work-out" activities on Superfund sites or foreclosing on mortgages and taking title to
Superfund properties because of two district court decisions: United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988)(holding issue of fact existed as to whether lender's
activities constituted control and thus justified imposition of liability) and United States v.
Maryland BanA & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (holding bank which owned
property and had previously been mortgagee liable for cleanup cost).






lending practices lasting some two years.' 0 9 Thatcher Bank, and before
its demise, Aspen Savings, were two of the few, if not the only banks,
that offered to approve mortgages on Smuggler properties between
April, 1990, and August, 1992.110 Conventional mortgage loans, such
as 15, 20, 25 or 30 year fixed interest rate loans, were not available to
purchase Smuggler homes. I I Conventional financing was also unavail-
able for refinancing and home improvement purposes. 1 2 The primary
lending option available to Smuggler residents consisted of portfolio
loans. These portfolio loans were short term in duration and carried
variable interests rates." 3 Standard practice for these portfolio loans
was to tie the interest rate to either the prime rate or the one year inter-
est rate for Treasury Bills, and attach an additional 3%.'14 This rate
was adjusted annually, and the loans were held and serviced "in-house"
by the originating bank." 5 Due to the short term duration and the in-
terest rate, however, most homeowners within the Site found the financ-
ing and repayment terms beyond their means. 1 6 Certainly, this was
true for owners of income restricted units.' 17 Free market units, if they
could be sold at all, generally were purchased for cash, with private fi-
nancing or by other non-conventional means.' 1 8
In addition to the reticence of the local lending community to lend
or underwrite loans for properties on the Smuggler Site, Fannie Mae
suspended its agreement "to purchase 30 year fixed rate mortgages
from authorized lenders who originate mortgages ... on properties de-
veloped by the Aspen/Pitkin [County] Housing Authority"' ' 9 in late
1990.120 Fannie Mae halted its purchase of these loans based on a fail-
ure to comply with the warranty and disclosure requirements of its
Mortgage Selling and Servicing Contract and its Selling Guide. 12 1 Sec-
tion 303 of the Selling Guide requires the lender to disclose information
to an appraiser that an environmental hazard exists "in or on the prop-
erty or in the vicinity of the property."' 122 The appraiser must then
109, See Michael Bourne, Local Bankers Say Smuggler Loans Too Risky, ASPEN DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 13, 1990, at 1.
110. See Terri Barteistein, Some Smuggler Financing Is Available Despite Fears About Lead
Contamination, ASPEN TIMES DAILY, Dec. 23, 1991, at 12.





116. See Barteistein, supra note 110.
117. Id.
118. See Chappell, supra note 73.
119. Letter from Suzanne Parker, Senior Investment Officer, Low- and Moderate-In-
come Housing, Fannie Mae, to James Adamsky, Director, Aspen/Pitkin County Housing
Authority 1 (uly 27, 1990) (on file with the author). This letter documents Fannie Mae's
commitment the mortgages.
120. Letter from Judith Dedmon, Senior Vice President, Fannie Mae Southwestern Re-
gional Office, to Harry Truscott, Acting Executive Director, Aspen/Pitkin County Housing
Authority 2 (Mar. 22, 1991) (on file with the author). Although the rejection of loans be-
gan in November 1990, the agreement was formally suspended in this letter.
121. Id. at 1-2.
122. Fannie Mae, supra note 38, at 728.
19931
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
"note the hazardous condition on the appraisal report and comment on
any influence that the hazard may have on the property's value and mar-
ketability.., and make appropriate adjustments in the overall analysis of
the property's value."' 123 The lenders' inability to quantify the costs and
effect of EPA's remediation activities, including institutional controls, on
property values coupled with EPA's reluctance to provide assurances
that lenders would not be jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs
prompted Fannie Mae to reach this decision.
124
III. EPA RESPONSES TO ALLEVIATE LENDING COMMUNITY WORRIES
On both a local and national scale, EPA endeavored to convince
residents and lenders that it would not seek its response costs from resi-
dents and lenders despite the fact that they are liable under the law.
Preliminary attempts by local EPA officials to explain EPA's enforce-
ment practices,' 2 5 while they appeared to be appreciated by the Aspen
community, did little to allay the residents and lenders' fears that they
would be the subject of a cost recovery action. In response to the con-
tinuing reluctance of local lenders to approve mortgages, EPA, the De-
partment ofJustice, and counsel for the local citizens caucus, developed
the first-ever Citizens Consent Decree.126 This decree, however, did not
meet with widespread acceptance; in fact, less than 50% of the residents
of the Site signed it. 1 2 7 In response to the growing national concern
over residential landowner and lender liability, EPA drafted an enforce-
ment policy followed by a rulemaking. These responses and their rela-
tive success in addressing the residents and lenders' concerns are
discussed below.
CITIZENS CONSENT DECREE
In April, 1991, after eighteen months of internal discussions and
external negotiation, EPA offered the residents of the Smuggler Moun-
tain Site a consent decree to settle any of their potential liabilities. This
consent decree was not only unprecedented but somewhat superfluous
since EPA had publicly stated it would not seek its response costs from
residential homeowners at the Site. The citizens, however, insisted on
the legal protection the consent decree would offer not only from the
United States (in case it changed its mind) but from third parties, who
might seek the response costs they paid pursuant to a settlement or in
the event the United States prevailed on the merits in the cost recovery
lawsuit. Except for one provision, the terms of the citizens consent de-
123. Id.
124. Letter from Judith Dedmon, supra note 48, at 2.
125. Discussions between EPA Region VIII Regional Administrator James J. Scherer
and Hazardous Waste Management Division Director Robert L. Duprey and top Pitkin
County officials and local bankers were held on May 18, 1990.
126. A copy of this proposed consent decree can be obtained from EPA's Smuggler
Mountain Site file, EPA Superfund Records Center, 999 18th Street, Denver, Colorado
80202. This decree was offered to all Site residents on April 10, 1991.
127. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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cree were unremarkable. The decree required that the Smuggler resi-
dents: 1) refrain from exacerbating the contamination that existed on
their property; 128 2) grant the Untied States access for performance of
the remedial action and subsequent periodic reviews; 12 9 and 3) comply
with local land use restrictions (institutional controls). 130 These con-
trols had been developed cooperatively between EPA and the local gov-
ernments and were designed to ensure the continued effectiveness and
protectiveness of the remedy. The decree allowed future additions or
developments of Smuggler properties without Superfund liability pro-
vided the excavation and construction activities complied with institu-
tional controls.' 3 1 Residents were also required to file a Notice of
Record in the chain of title for the property that indicated the property
was situated within the boundaries of the Smuggler Mountain
Superfund Site. '
3 2
Because the consent decree was premised on the residential use of
the property, a unique provision was crafted so that the United States
could revive its claim for response costs should a subsequent purchaser
use the property for commercial purposes.' 3 3 This provision compels
the settling defendant property owner to notify EPA of any intended
real estate transaction and whether the prospective purchaser "intends
to use the property for Residential Use or Commercial Use."' 3 4 If the
intended use is commercial, the property owner must also disclose the
purchase price,' 3 5 to guard against any collusion between the parties or
any "unjust enrichment" of the seller. Unjust enrichment could occur if
the purchaser states that the use of the property will remain residential,
waits for EPA to remediate the property and then develops the property
commercially. EPA having spent monies out of the Superfund and will
then have to incur additional costs to recoup these funds from the new
purchaser/developer. To guard against any potential misrepresenta-
tions, EPA provided that the covenants not to sue the settling defendant
could be voided and the response costs recovered if the property's use
was impermissibly converted. ' 3 6
In consideration for the performance of these obligations by the
settling defendants, the United States covenanted not to sue the current
residential homeowners for present and future liability.' 3 7 Simply put,
the United States would refrain from seeking its response costs for im-
plementing the remedy selected in the original ROD (and ESDs that
modified it) or for any future remedy, should the remedy be changed or
prove to be ineffective. The settling defendants also were given protec-
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 12-13.
132. Id. at 13.
133. Id. at 16.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id. at 18-19.
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tion against claims by third parties in contribution actions, to the extent
provided by Section 113 of CERCLA. 13 8 These covenants not to sue,
however, did not run with the land and future landowners would not be
protected from suit by EPA or any third parties unless they also entered
into the consent decree with the United States.' 39 Without these pro-
tections running to future landowners, the decree received a lukewarm
reception by both the residents and the banking community. As a result,
less than 50% of the Site residents actually executed the agreement. 140
POLICY TOWARD OWNERS OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY AT SUPERFUND
SITES
Concurrent with the finalization of the citizens' Consent Decree,
EPA began working on a national policy to address the potential liabili-
ties of residential landowners at Superfund sites. The lending contro-
versy at Smuggler played a major role in the development of this policy,
as did the financial difficulties of residents near the Tucson Airport
Superfund Site in EPA Region IX. There, the migration of a plume of
contaminants in the groundwater created an environmental hazard that
caused the local bankers to curtail the approval of mortgages. 14 1 Based
on these examples, EPA determined that a policy that provided a uni-
form approach to residential landowners was essential.
142
The Policy Towards Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites 143 is
an exercise of the Agency's enforcement discretion and applies to any
owner of residential property located on a Superfund site, regardless of
whether the owner purchased the property with the knowledge that it
was contaminated. 144 "Residential property" is defined as "single fam-
ily residences of one-to-four dwelling units, including accessory land,
buildings or improvements incidental to such dwellings which are exclu-
sively for residential use."'14 5 The policy also applies to persons with
138. Id. at 21 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613). The effect of this provision has been the sub-
ject of many recent court decisions. See, e.g., Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F. Supp. 1182, 1187-
88 (D. Neb. 1992)(holding plaintiff suing for contribution under CERCLA not allowed to
engage in discovery regarding defendant's de minimis settlement with EPA); Azko Coatings,
Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 803 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (N.D.Ind. 1992)(holding settling potentially
responsible parties not liable to non-settling potentially responsible parties for contribu-
tion under state law); Transtech Indus., Inc. v. A & Z Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1087
(D.N.J. 1992)(explaining that section 113(f(2) protects settling defendants from claims for
contributions by non-settling defendants).
139. Proposed Consent Decree, supra note 126, at 20, 21.
140. Michael Bourne, EPA Consent Decrees: Lack of Signatures And Residents' Snafus Spell
Trouble, High Country Real Estate, Week of June 26 -July 2, 1991, at 12.
141. Letter from Susan T. Smith, Director, Loan Acquisition for the Southwestern Re-
gional Office, Fannie Mae, to William H. Rivoir, III, Superintendent of Banks, Arizona
State Banking Department (April 11, 1991) and Letter from Michael Schwartz, Legislative
Director, Federal Relations, Government and Industry Relations, Freddie Mac, to William
H. Rivoir, III (May 8, 1991).
142. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency,
Policy Toward Owners of Residential Property at Superfund Sites, OSWER Directive
#9834.6 (July 3, 1991).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Id. at 3.
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interests in residential properties, such as lessees and tenants, provided
they comply with the other requirements of the policy.1
46
The residential landowner policy distinguishes the instances when
EPA will seek its response costs from residential homeowners from
those instances when EPA will forego such action. It states that EPA
"would contemplate" an action to recover its response costs or order a
landowner to undertake response actions if the property owner's activi-
ties lead "to a release or threat of release of a hazardous substance"1
4 7
or if the owner "develops or improves the property in a manner incon-
sistent with residential use."1 4 8 EPA may also demand access to the res-
idential property to gather information or investigate site conditions to
assess the need for a response action.14 9 Lastly, residential landowners
may lose the protection of this policy if they fail to comply with institu-
tional controls.'
50
Although this guidance officially stated EPA's position on the exer-
cise of its enforcement authority vis-a-vis residential landowners at
Superfund sites, the policy had no binding effect on third parties. The
policy is neither a rulemaking nor an interpretation of any provision of
the Superfund law.151 As such, the residents' concerns about third party
contribution claims had not been resolved. Banks and public lenders
continued to be reluctant to approve mortgages on Smuggler properties
notwithstanding the policy's application to "persons who acquire resi-
dential property through purchase, foreclosure, gift, inheritance or other
form of acquisition, as long as those persons' activities after acquisition
are consistent with this policy."
' 152
LENDER LIABILITY RULE
The obstacles to initiating and approving Smuggler mortgages were
finally eliminated with the issuance of EPA's Lender Liability Rule on
April 29, 1992.153 This rulemaking interprets the "security interest"
exemption found in CERCLA section 101 (20) (A) 154 to exclude certain
persons from liability as owners or operators under section 107(a) of
CERCLA.15 5 A person who maintains indicia of ownership in a facility
primarily to protect a security interest will not be considered a liable
party, as long as that person does not participate in the management of
the facility. 1
56
The rule also defines key statutory terms. "Indicia of ownership"
146. Id. at 4.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 6.
152. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
153. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Lia-
bility Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1992)).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1990).
155. Id. § 9607(a).
156. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992).
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includes evidence of any security interest, such as holding title to real or
personal property to secure a loan or other obligation.' 5 7 Examples of
such interests include mortgages, deeds of trust, surety bonds, guaran-
tees of obligations and titles held pursuant to foreclosure and their
equivalents.15 8 The phrase "primarily to protect a security interest"
means that the person holds the indicia of ownership primarily to ensure
the payment or performance of an obligation.' 5 9 The security interest
may not be held for investment or speculation purposes. 160
Once it is established that the person holds these ownership inter-
ests to protect a security interest, it must be determined whether the
person has "participated in the management" of a facility from which
there is release or threat of release of a hazardous substance or is cur-
rently doing so. Participation in management of the facility would void
the exemption from the CERCLA section 107(a) liability of owners or
operators.' 6 ' A two prong test exists to determine if a person partici-
pates in the management of a facility: (1) the holder of a security inter-
est exercises control over the borrower's environmental compliance,
such as waste disposal or handling practices; 162 or (2) the holder of a
security interest exercises control over the borrower's enterprise, in-
cluding day-to-day environmental compliance decision making, or all, or
substantially all, of the operational aspects of the enterprise other than
environmental compliance.163 The second prong does not include situ-
ations where the person exercises only administrative or financial con-
trol over the operation of the facility. 164 Thus, the rule establishes a
cause and effect relationship; if the secured creditor's involvement
causes any change in the operations at the subject facility, that activity
will void the exemption to the definition of owner or operator found in
section 101 (20) (A) of CERCLA. 1
65
This general standard has been criticized as being vague and impre-
cise for discriminating between acceptable and prohibited conduct.
166
Nevertheless, a lender can engage in a number of activities in the normal
course of business without incurring Superfund liability. For example,
the security interest holder can undertake "loan workout" activities
"such as restructuring or renegotiating the terms of the obligation, re-
quiring payment of additional interest, extending the payment period,
exercising forbearance, or providing advice or taking other workout ac-
tions' 167 without legal repercussions. The rule further provides for
lenders that foreclose on the contaminated property to recover their se-
157. Id. § 300.1100(a).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 300.1100(b).
160. Id. § 300.1100(b)(2).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
162. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(I)(i).
163. Id. § 300.1 100(c)(1)(ii)(A).
164. Id. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(B).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
166. See generally 57 Fed. Reg. 18,357-58 (1992).
167. Id. at 18,347.
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curity interest.168 Foreclosure can be accomplished without risk of be-
ing considered an owner or operator pursuant to Section 107(a) of
CERCLA, 169 so long as the other requirements of the rule are met. Ac-
tivities incident to the foreclosure are also afforded the rule's protec-
tions, such as winding up operations and liquidating assets.17
0
Besides participating in the management of the facility, the exemp-
tion from CERCLA liability will be voided if the secured creditor fails to
offer the subject property for sale in a "reasonably expeditious man-
ner," 17 1 or if the secured creditor "outbids, rejects or fails to act upon
* . . a written bona fide, firm offer of fair consideration for the prop-
erty.' 1 7 2 The term reasonably expeditious manner is defined as
"whatever commercially reasonable means are available or appropriate,
[to the lender for disposing of the property] taking all facts and circum-
stances into account."173 In the alternative, the rule provides a "bright-
line" test 174 against which lenders can determine if their post-foreclo-
sure conduct would void the exemption. According to this test, within
twelve months the lenders must list the property with a broker, dealer or
agent who deals in selling this type of facility, or the lender must adver-
tise its sale in a trade or other publication or newspaper of general circu-
lation in the geographic area where the facility is located on a monthly
basis.' 7 5 The rule further provides that the lender must act on a bona
fide offer to purchase the property within 90 days of the receipt of the
offer. 17 6 The lender may reject or outbid this offer without recrimina-
tion if it is for less than the full fair market value of the facility, particu-
larly if the lender's fiduciary duty requires it to do so. 177 Nonetheless,
the lender is not protected post-foreclosure if its conduct forms an in-
dependent basis of liability under section 107(a)(3) or 107 (a)(4) of
CERCLA. 1
78
In light of the lending difficulties experienced in Aspen, it is impor-
tant to note that EPA's lender liability rule applies to all governmental
entities-federal, state and local-that acquire property "involuntarily,"
as a result of their statutory or regulatory mandates.179 Governmental
entities include governmental agencies or quasi-governmental corpora-
tions or orgnizations that acquire facilities pursuant to their actions as
conservators, receivers, or loan guarantors, or through seizure, forfei-
ture, abandonment, tax delinquency or escheat.1 80 The rule also ap-
plies to governmental entities that hold indicia of ownership in
168. Id.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
170. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,347.
171. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 100(d)(1).
172. Id. § 300.1 100(d)(2)(ii)(B).
173. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,378.
174. See id.
175. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(2)(i).
176. Id. § 300.1 10(d)(2)(ii)(B).
177. Id. § 300.1100(d)(2)(ii).
178. Id. § 300.1100(d)(3).
179. See id. § 300.1105.
180. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,380-82, 18,385.
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Superfund facilities to maintain their security interests. 181
IV. LENDER RESPONSES
PRE LENDER LIABILITY RULE
Although these Agency pronouncements definitively stated how
EPA intended to exercise its enforcement discretion against lenders (i.e.,
title owners who foreclose on Superfund properties to maintain their
security interest) and residential property owners, it took some time
before federal and local lenders responded favorably to EPA's new rule
and policy directions. In the case of the Smuggler Site, both the interim
rule and the issuance of the residential landowner policy had little or no
effect on easing the credit crunch felt by Aspen residents. The lending
community, including Fannie Mae, did not substantially change its prac-
tice against originating or refinancing loans until approximately four
months after the lender rule became final on April 29, 1992.182 The
responses of these entities in the interim period (between July 1991 and
the finalization of the rule), however, document the anxiety that per-
vaded the lending community and offers some suggestions beyond the
lender liability rule to address these fears.
Fannie Mae's apprehensions, then as now, focused on its inability to
recoup its investment, due both to any potential Superfund liability and
any diminished property value. 183 Fannie Mae accepted EPA's assess-
ment of the risk that lead contaminated soil poses to the public living
within the Site boundaries and stated that it believed that this risk would
be eliminated upon completion of EPA's proposed remediation.
184
Since this risk continued until the Site cleanup was finished, Fannie Mae
was concerned that it could be the subject of actions for rescission of
real estate sales contracts, as well as actions for personal injury (i.e.,
toxic torts) and property damage.'
8 5
Fannie Mae was also concerned that the risk would not be perma-
nently eliminated or removed from the Site. It recognized that EPA's
selected remedy could, even after successful implementation, fail to ad-
dress the environmental hazard. Remedy failure in turn could force
EPA to incur additional cleanup costs, which might be passed on to fu-
ture landowners. 18 6 Although Fannie Mae deferred to EPA's judgment
regarding the best way to cleanup the Site, concern remained that insti-
tutional controls would not insure that the remedy remained effective.
Furthermore, even if they worked, institutional controls would encum-
181. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,369.
182. Letter from James A. Johnson, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Fannie Mae, to The Honorable Timothy Wirth, United States Senator for the State of
Colorado (July 31, 1992) (on file with the author).
183. See Letter from Addison Terry, Jr, Vice President and Counsel for the Southwest
Regional Office, Fannie Mae, to Nancy N. [sic] Mangone, Assistant Regional Counsel for
Region VIII, USEPA (Aug. 1, 1991)(on file with the author).
184. Id. at 2.
185. Id. at 2-3.
186. Id. at 3.
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ber the land in perpetuity. 18 7 The possibility of cost recovery actions
and the encumbrances that would run with the land would make the
purchase of Smuggler property less attractive to prospective purchasers
than properties outside the Site. 188 Lastly, Fannie Mae was also dis-
tressed that EPA might look to it to disgorge any windfall profits created
when the property's value increased after EPA's cleanup activities were
concluded. Fannie Mae argued that it would be difficult to "sort out
which.., factors cause an increase in the value of residential property at
a Superfund site," 189 but insisted that it alone should "take advantage of
any gain that might occur from foreclosure and resale property in [the
Smuggler] site." 19 0 As reflected in the lender liability final rule, EPA
did not agree.' 9 '
Before EPA's lender liability rule became final Fannie Mae pressed
for "written assurances that EPA will not bring an action against Fannie
Mae"' 1 2 for the activities of pre-foreclosure residential owners giving
rise to Superfund liability. It also sought assurances that it would not be
considered liable as an owner post-foreclosure. Specifically, Fannie Mae
requested that EPA provide it a covenant not to sue for any prior resi-
dential owner incurred liabilities, in addition to protection for "Fannie
Mae's exposure to continuing liability due to noncompliance with the
proposed deed restrictions"19 3 (i.e., institutional controls). Since EPA
had no legal basis for entering into a consent decree with a possible
future owner, particularly when such ownership was highly unlikely,
19 4
this covenant not to sue was not provided to Fannie Mae. While the
local banks did not insist on this kind of written assurance, they took
their lead from Fannie Mae and their lending practices did not change.
POST LENDER LIABILITY RULE
With the issuance of EPA's final lender liability rule, 19 5 the logjam
in getting Smuggler mortgages approved finally appeared to be broken.
On July 31, 1992, the Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Of-
ficer James A. Johnson wrote to Senator Tim Wirth to document Fannie
Mae's decision that "[a]lthough we have continuing reservations about
the effectiveness of the EPA [lender liability] rule, in the Smuggler
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4.
190. Id.
191. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,368.
192. Letter from Addison Terry, Jr. to Nancy N. [sic] Mangone, supra note 183, at 5.
193. Id.
194. The possibility that Fannie Mae would acquire these properties post-foreclosure
was made highly unlikely due to the terms of its 1990 agreement with the Aspen/Pitkin
Housing Authority to purchase loans on the income restricted units. This agreement pro-
vided that the City and County had the right of first refusal to purchase any loans in ar-
rears and that Fannie Mae could sell the unit on the open market without income
restriction if the loan was in default. According to Mary Murphy of the Aspen/Pitkin
Housing Authority, this option was never exercised by the City or the County nor were any
Smuggler loans ever in default.
195. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,343.
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Mountain Site case, we have concluded our risk is minimal." 1 9 6 A fol-
low-up letter from Suzanne Parker, 19 7 of Fannie Mae's Southwest Re-
gional Office, indicated how Fannie Mae intended to re-initiate its
lending program. Fannie Mae agreed to buy loans originated for Smug-
gler properties "for a twelve (12) month period beginning July 1, 1992
and ending July 31, 1993, or upon the purchase of loans in the aggre-
gate volume of $10,000,000.00, whichever comes first."198 These loans
could take the form of 15, 20, 25 or 30 year fixed mortgages, but they
would only be purchased for the restricted housing units within the
Smuggler Site. 199
Fannie Mae attached a number of other pre-conditions to purchas-
ing these Smuggler loans. For example, in addition to the owner/occu-
pied restriction, Fannie Mae required the loans to conform to all
requirements of its Selling Guide and prohibited purchase of units with
deed restrictions other than those income restrictions imposed by the
Housing Authority. 20 0 These conditions, therefore, require appraisers
and lenders to disclose the environmental hazards, but prohibit loan
purchases if the institutional controls deed restrictions are enacted.
2 0 '
These conditions create an inherent contradiction: the only way the
remedy is effective and the environmental and economic risks are less-
ened is if the deed restrictions are enacted; the only way the loans can be
purchased is if the environmental deed restrictions are rejected.
The other major pre-condition to purchasing these loans is that a
bank interested in participating in this program provide a cash commit-
ment or amend "its existing fixed rate special pool purchase" to secure
these loans. 20 2 As of the date of this article, only a handful of local
banks had sought to enter into these additional commitments. The lim-
ited number of banks seeking to participate in the Fannie Mae loan pro-
gram, however, may be due more to their general disinterest in securing
mortgages for Smuggler properties rather than any hardship in meeting
these financing standards. Thatcher Bank, for example, has secured a
commitment from Fannie Mae of up to $5 million in Smuggler loans.
20 3
This leaves $5 million collectively for the rest of the local bankers that
may be interested in participating in the low-to moderate-income Fannie
Mae program.
20 4
Regardless of their participation in the Fannie Mae income re-
stricted loan program, a few of the local banks have begun to originate
mortgages on Smuggler properties themselves. These mortgages are
196. See Johnson, supra note 182.
197. Letter from Suzanne Parker, Senior Investment Officer for Low- and Moderate-
Income Housing Programs, Southwest Regional Office, Fannie Mae, to Tom Baker, Direc-
tor, Aspen/Pitkin Housing Authority (Aug. 24, 1992)(on file with the author).
198. Id. at 1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. and Letter from Addison Terry to Nancy N.[sic] Mangone, supra note 183.
202. Id. at 1.




either self-financed or sold to local or regional mortgage brokers. 20 5
These banks, as does Fannie Mae, persist in requiring disclosure of the
EPA-identified environmental hazard in an appraisal report or other
"acknowledgement. ' °2 0 6 But, these banks have changed their lending
practices, at least as applied to the income restricted units.20 7 Gone are
the days when higher interest portfolio loans were the only lending op-
tion for income restricted Smuggler properties. Since August of 1992,
these mortgages have become as competitive as other fixed rate, con-
ventional loans.20 8 Unfortunately, according to representatives of both
the Housing Authority and a number of local mortgage brokers, the fi-
nancing problems on "free market" units still exist.20 9 Local lenders
and regional brokers continue to decline to originate or buy "private"
unit mortgages on the secondary markets.2 10 The reticence of local
banks to originate mortgages on private homes or condominium units
may be due to the exclusion of these residences from Fannie Mae's letter
agreement. Private homes and condominiums at the Site, if they can be
sold at all, continue to be the subject of non-conventional financing, pri-
vate financing or are sold for cash.
2 1
A recent development, however, may change the lending practices
of the local banks toward these "free market" units. A March 23, 1993,
letter from Larry W. Bowen, Vice President for Quality Control/Opera-
tions of Fannie Mae's Southwest Regional Office, clarified that Fannie
Mae's intent was to accept loans on any properties within the Smuggler
Mountain Site. This decision to accept all qualifying Smuggler loans
was reached after EPA's publication of the lender liability rule and as
well as EPA's success in reaching agreement with various parties in the
United States v. Smuggler-Durant Mining Corporation litigation. Mortgages
for both employee restricted and free market can now be sold by local
lenders to Fannie Mae provided the lenders comply with Fannie Mae's
Selling and Servicing Guides, execute a Disclosure statement and meet
other previously-enumerated terms and conditions.
2 12
V. CONCLUSION
Statistics demonstrate the high demand for "low cost" employee
housing within Aspen, regardless of its location within or without the
Smuggler Mountain Site. Nevertheless, the designation of an area as a
"Superfund Site" by listing on the NPL decreases its desirability as a
place to live for both environmental and economic reasons. Residents
205. Id. and see Cooper, supra note 72.
206. See Cooper, supra note 72.
207. See Chappell, supra, note 73.
208. Id.
209. Interview with Mary Murphy, Aspen/Pitkin County Housing Authority, in Aspen,
Colo. (Dec. 1, 1992); Interview with Dorothy Winagle, Smuggler Citizens' Caucus, in
Aspen, Colo. (October 27, 1992).
210. Id.
211. Id.; Chappell, supra note 73.
212. See, Form Letter from Larry W. Bowen, Vice President for Quality Control/Oper-
ations, Southwest Regional Office, Fannie Mae, dated March 23, 1993.
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may not want to risk their personal health and banks may not want to
risk their economic well-being on mortgage loans that may expose them
to Superfund liability if they take title to the collateral securing these
loans. There is no easy solution or quick fix to these environmental and
economic risks. Salt Lake County lowered property values in an attempt
to ease the individual landowners credit crunch, but may have created a
new one for the City of Midvale and indirectly, the constituents it serves.
Leadville and other former mining towns were hoping to infuse capital
and increase property values in their communities by instituting limited
stakes gambling, but it appears gambling will not come to these areas
any time soon.
Instead, Fannie Mae suggested that the best approach for restoring
property value of a community affected by a Superfund designation is to
clean up the contamination and move the site toward deletion from
NPL. Of course, depending on the nature and extent of the cleanup
required for the site, this process could take years or even decades. It is
important to note, however, that in the interim period before the site is
deleted, the administrative process employed by EPA to undertake site
remediation offers some comfort for resident landowners and banks
alike. For example, EPA can certify that the remedial action has been
completed in accordance with the ROD and has become "operational
and functional" in addressing the environmental risk. A determination
that the remedy is complete, at least for an operable unit or some sub-
unit, can also be issued. Thus, EPA can notify each individual land-
owner when his property has been "cleaned" and this notification can be
put in the chain of title. Any lender reviewing an application for the
mortgage of the subject property then would take it with the knowledge
that the property is "clean." This may allow the lender or new owner to
invoke the protections of the "innocent landowner" guidance previously
discussed.
The 1990 National Contingency Plan ("NCP") 2 13 also revised the
regulations dealing with the listing and deleting of sites on the NPL and
created a new "Construction Completion" category for Superfund sites
either awaiting deletion, in the CERCLA section 121(c) "five-year" re-
view phase, or undergoing long-term remedial actions.2 14 A site can be
placed in the "Construction Completion" portion of NPL once EPA de-
termines that the construction of the remedy is complete at the entire
site and that it is achieving the protectiveness or cleanup standards se-
lected in the ROD or RODs for the Site. EPA makes this determination
by issuing a document called a "Close Out Report." However, the
Close Out Report will only be issued following the completion of the
remedy at the final operable unit for the site. Five-year or periodic re-
views will nonetheless be conducted to ensure that the remedy remains
protective and that operation and maintenance activities are effective
even after the Close Out Report is issued. The process of deleting a site
213. 40 C.F.R. § 300, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666 (Mar. 8, 1990).
214. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8699 (1990).
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from the NPL can be initiated after performance of the first periodic
review. The first periodic review may occur within five years of the initi-
ation of the remedial action.
For the Smuggler Site, despite all its years of controversy, the worst
of the credit crunch may be over. However, the public and lending com-
munity perception that the properties are "tainted" because of the envi-
ronmental and economic risk will not be easily erased. For this to
happen the human health and environmental risk has to be eliminated
either as the result of a completed cleanup or with a new assessment that
shows that no risk exists. With EPA's existing legislative mandate and
its conviction that high levels of lead contamination in soils pose a
human health and/or environmental risk, it is foolhardy to expect a "no
risk" risk assessment is in the offing.
It is crucial, therefore, for EPA to continue to support its existing
lender liability rule and the "residential landowner" policy and for EPA
and the community to be diligent in keeping lenders informed of the
economic risk, albeit relatively minor, posed by the Smuggler Site. Fur-
ther, EPA can also endeavor to educate lenders on how to minimize that
risk even further. One way may be to quantify the risk for each property.
Homeowners can include environmental testing data in their mortgage
application packages to show the lender the true extent of contamina-
tion on their property. In most cases, the testing can show the few "hot
spots" that need to be remediated, and may go so far as estimating a
cleanup cost. Discussions with national and local lenders have focused
on a fear of the unknown; providing the lenders with a dollar amount of
the property's potential cleanup cost may do more to allay this amor-
phous fear than any other action.
EPA, however, cannot educate lenders alone. There needs to be
more concerted efforts, like those undertaken at the Smuggler Site, to
make lenders smarter. Local community groups and even Congres-
sional intervention should be pursued so that economic risks associated
with an NPL listing and cleanup action can be completely understood,
and in appropriate cases like Smuggler, eliminated.
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THE WHISTLEBLOWER EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ENFORCEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
After centuries of neglect and disconcern, the nations of the world
have realized that the condition of the environment is of crucial eco-
nomic importance.' As the constraints of resource scarcity tighten
under the pressures of burgeoning worldwide demand, Pareto's ques-
tions of allocative efficiency move to the forefront of public concern.
2
The United States foresaw the hazards of environmental pollution and
Congress established agencies charged with protecting the environ-
ment. 3 Government agencies have controlled and enforced environ-
mental policy through various statutes including the Clean Air Act 4 and
the Clean Water Act. 5 Congress designed these well-intentioned laws to
protect and regulate society and they are often the only safeguard be-
tween the environment and harmful pollutants.6 But environmental
laws are most effective when enforced.7 Enforcement of environmental
measures is costly8 and difficult. 9 The high costs of detection and evi-
1. The main objective of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED) preceding the Rio Summit conference
was to "devise ways to change human economic behavior so that the natural environment
of the planet is conserved." Preparatory Committee Narrows Options for "Agenda 21 "; United
Nations Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, 28 U.N.
MONTHLY CHRON., Dec. 1991, at 65. The committee reported that Group I proposed ac-
tion concerning forest and energy conservation, Group II proposed water utilization, and
Group III reviewed existing environmental laws. Id. Over 160 nations were expected to
attend the Rio Summit as signatories to proposed treaties. The Week Ahead: Rio DeJaneiro;
Helping Out Mother, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 2, 1992, World Report, at 1.
2. The resource efficiency theory developed by Vilfredo Pareto holds that scarce re-
sources should be utilized to the fullest possible capacity in applications which provide the
greatest return to society as a whole. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, Eco-
NOMiCS 487 (Patricia A. Mitchell, et al. eds., 1985).
3. Congress declared national environmental policy to "maintain environmental
quality" through coordination of "Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources". 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). Pursuant to this end, Congress established "a Council on Environ-
mental Quality" with the passage of "The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969."
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 202, 83 Stat. 852, 854-
55 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1988)). President Nixon added to the Council on
Environmental Quality by creating the Environmental Protection Agency. Reorg. Plan No.
3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1343 (1988), and in 84
Stat. 2086 (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
6. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642.
7. Economic analysis shows that effective deterrence of criminal acts and increased
care in avoiding civil wrongs is a function of swift and certain penalties. See generally, RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 517 (3d ed. 1986).
8. "The Federal government now spends more than $4 billion a year on the environ-
ment, a 12-fold increase in 20 years after adjusting for inflation." Allan H. Meltzer, Times
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dence gathering make whistleblowers extremely useful in enforcing pol-
icy.' 0 As a result, legislatures have granted whistleblower protection
from wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine." I
This Note focuses on the economics of the whistleblower exception
to the at-will employment doctrine and its function in environmental
matters. First, this Note discusses the background and development of
the at-will employment doctrine. Second, this Note examines pertinent
wrongful discharge and environmental whistleblower decisions. Finally,
Board of Economists / Allan H. Meltzer: Applying Market Principles to the Cause of Saving the Envi-
ronment, L. A. TIMES July 19, 1992, at D2.
9. Difficulty is often encountered because employees may be reluctant to pursue
wrongful discharge actions. See Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc. 361 U.S. 288, 292-93
(1960) (workers are often dissuaded from seeking redress for wrongful discharge); CHRIS-
TOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR,
213-16 (1975) (for a variety of reasons, employees often do not engage in whistleblowing).
10. "Seventy-five to eighty percent of the information on which the Inspectors Gen-
eral Act comes from so-called whistleblowers." 135 CONG. REC. H752 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1989) (statement of Rep. Horton). In many cases, violations of statutes would never be
detected without whistleblower action. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292 (effective enforcement
of labor standards possible only if employees approached officials in the event of griev-
ances). Whistleblowers are crucial in environmental policy enforcement. United States v.
Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1992). In Goodner, discharges of phe-
nol and methylene chloride were discovered when "a neighbor noticed 'two men dumping
creamy beige, toxic-smelling waste into a ravine' on the Goodner Brothers Farm." Id. As
a result of the whistleblowing neighbor, the EPA and the Arkansas Department of Pollu-
tion Control and Ecology investigated, resulting in a cessation of the pollution on the
Goodner Brothers Farm. Id. Goodner Brothers Aircraft and Albert S. Goodner were con-
victed of criminal violations. Id. In the case of PICA Plating, detection of environmental
violations and the imposition of several million dollars in fines occurred only after a tip to
inspectors by an employee-whistleblower. Manik Roy, Pollution Prevention, Organizational
Culture, and Social Learning, 22 ENVTL. L. 189, 194 (1991); STONE, supra note 9, at 213-14
(discussing how B.F. Goodrich memoranda leaked by insiders prompted FBI investiga-
tions). Contra James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U.
COLO. L. REV. 91, 105 (1989) (arguing that statutory enforcement may be reduced because
.of false claims by whistleblowers which penalize innocent corporate behavior).
11. Federal whistleblower protection is granted to federal employees by the
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 10 1-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1990)). States granting statutory
public policy protection against wrongful discharge of state government employees in-
clude: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-103 (1989); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29
§ 5115 (1991); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4 (Burns 1990); Maryland, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 64A, § 12G (1988 & Supp. 1991); North Dakota, N.D. CE'r. CODE § 34-11.1-04,
-06 (1987); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986 & Supp. 1992); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4 2. 4 0.010y-.900 (West 1991).
Those granting statutory public policy protection against wrongful discharge to pri-
vate sector employees include: California, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989); Connect-
icut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 127, para. 63b1 19c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 19A.19
(West 1989); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-1114 (1988); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1601 (1991); Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659.035 (Butterworth 1989).
States granting protection under specific "whistleblower" acts include: Maine, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (West 1988); Michigan, MICH COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 15.361-.369 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -8
(West 1988); New York, N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740 (McKinney 1988).
For a discussion of various State whistleblower statutes, please refer to: Terry
Morehead Dworkin and Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 Am.
Bus. L.J. 241 (1987).
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this Note exposes the shortcomings of the exception as currently ap-
plied and proposes a modest solution.
II. BACKGROUND
At common law, workers hired for an indefinite period of time are
considered employees at-will. 12 This nineteenth century doctrine al-
lowed absolute termination by either employer or employee for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.' 3 Modernly, there developed sev-
eral exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine 14 including the pub-
lic policy exception. 15 Courts created the public policy exception to
protect the public from employers economically coercing illegal or im-
moral acts from employees. 16 Whistleblowing is one of the public policy
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine.17 Whistleblowers face
enormous difficulties when bringing action. 18 Currently, costly disin-
centives exist which discourage whistleblowers from bringing valid
actions. 9
Public Policy Exception to the At- Will Employment Doctrine
To understand the whistleblower exception it is necessary to discuss
12. "[T]he rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is Primafacie a hiring at
will . . " H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877).
13. Id.; Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Hubbell, supra note
10, at 91; Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 481 (1976).
14. Nina G. Stillman, Workplace Claims: Wrongful Discharge, Public Policy Actions and Other
Common Law Torts, 398 PRAC. L. INST. 55 (1990).
15. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(credited as the first case to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine, Petermann was fired from an at-will position for refusing to commit perjury). Cf
Russell v. Courier Printing & Publishing Co., 95 P. 936, 938 (Colo. 1908) (allowing consid-
erations of public policy to void a contract).
16. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27; see also Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Price of the Public Policy
Modification of the Terminable-at-Will Rule, 34 LAB. L.J. 581, 584 (1983) (the public policy
exception is designed to protect the public, not the employer or the employee).
17. United States exrel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1943) (explaining that
qui tam or informer actions have traditionally allowed recovery); Cummins v. EG & G
Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D. R.I. 1988) (cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge of employee dismissed for "whistleblowing" activity); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in
Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (cause of action pursuant to public policy
exception where employee discharged for reporting criminal violations).
18. Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Whistleblower Protection-The Gap Between the
Law and Reality, 31 How. L.J. 223 (1988) (describes the techniques used to dissuade
whistleblowing); Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. A False Hope for
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991); cf. Roy, supra note 10 (examines group be-
havior and organizational culture and its effect on individual behavior which includes de-
terring whistleblowers).
19. STONE, supra note 9, at 215 ("[T]he drawback, however, is that while the law can
save the employee from being fired, it is a much harder matter to prevent the employer
from making his life uncomfortable."); Devine & Aplin, supra note 18; Fisher, supra note
18, at 356 (The credo of the whistleblower should be "No good deed shall go unpun-
ished."); Cheryl S. Massingale, At-will Employment: Going, Going..., 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 187,
200-01 (1990); Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 25 (1988).
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the at-will employment doctrine. The business climate of the latter half
of the nineteenth century was marked by economic hardship. 20 To pro-
tect against the common phenomenon of business failures, the political
and legal climate favored employer protection. 2 1 The employment at-
will doctrine attempted to promote, foster and protect freedom of enter-
prise and economic expansion.
2 2
The at-will employment doctrine first appeared in Horace Wood's
1877 TREATISE ON THE.LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT. 2 3 According to
Wood's rule, employees in the United States hired for an indefinite pe-
riod of time were considered employees at-will, terminable at any time
for any reason. 24 .Despite its questionable origins,2 5 Wood's rule fit the
laissez faire economic climate of the day and quickly gained widespread
acceptance.2 6 The at-will employment doctrine was reinforced by mutu-
ality of duty and obligation allowing either employer or employee to
terminate at will, 2 7 which undoubtedly enhanced its survival. 28
The at-will employment doctrine left employees at liberty to quit
jobs easily, but without legal recourse for wrongful terminations.2 9 The
doctrine held the potential for abusive economic coercion in violation of
public policy and was eroded by Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters. 30 The Petermann court held that an employer's right to discharge
pursuant to the at-will employment doctrine was checked by considera-
tions of public policy.3 1 In time, other courts upheld a cause of action
20. John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employ-
ment At Will, 468 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 467 (1980).
21. Blackburn, supra note 20, at 467.
22. Id. at 467-69; Hubbell, supra note 10, at 94; J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune,
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974); see also Note, Protect-
ing Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1931, 1933 (1983) [hereinafter Public Policy].
23. WOOD, supra note 12, at 272.
24. Id. This differs from the common law of Britain where workers hired for an indefi-
nite period of time are considered to work from term to term with automatic renewal if the
term is exceeded. Summers, supra note 13, at 483-84.
25. Theodore St. Antoine, You're Fired! 10 HUM. RTs. Winter 1982, at 32-33;
The rule making employment arrangements of indefinite duration contracts at
will, terminable by either party at any time, is not one which has roots deep in the
English common law but one which sprang full-blown in 1877 from the busy and
perhaps careless pen of an American treatise writer.
Id. Hubbell, supra note 10, at 94; Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 341 & n.54 (demon-
strating that the case law H.G. Wood cited in his treatise creating the at-will employment
doctrine did not support his final conclusions); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1933.
26. WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES 253 (1985); Charles A. Brake, Jr., Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will
- Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer? 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 206-08 (1982); see also Public
Policy, supra note 22, at 1933.
27. Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1142 (N.H. 1981) (arguing
that the mutual obligations of contract theory were imposed on at-will employment); Sum-
mers, supra note 13, at 484-85; see also Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 515-20
(1884) (analyzing at-will employee dismissal in contract terms), overruled on other grounds,
179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
28. Blackburn, supra note 20, at 470; Blades, supra note 13, at 1419.
29. St. Antoine, supra note 25, at 35; Blades, supra note 13, at 1405.
30. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959).
31. Id. at 27.
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for wrongful discharge pursuant to the public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine as safeguard for public policy.
32
Modernly, courts strike a balance between the competing interests
of employer discretion, employee security and public policy.3 3 Propo-
nents of the at-will employment doctrine argue that the employer's in-
terest in controlling the working environment must be maintained.
3 4
Proponents for enforcement of the at-will employment doctrine argue
that, except in the most egregious instances, allowing recourse for un-
just dismissal is unwarranted. These proponents contend unjust dismis-
sal protection encourages false claims,3 5 and is an inappropriate means
of enforcing public policy.3 6 Opponents contend that protection of the
employee and society is of paramount importance.3 7 If employees have
no recourse, employers will coerce them into committing illegal acts to
the detriment of society and, potentially, the environment.3 8 Heighten-
ing these concerns is the fact that neither union collective bargaining
agreements nor federal employee protection acts protect the vast major-
ity of employees in the United States.3 9 The public policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine developed through the balancing of
32. Harrison, supra note 16, at 581; Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1931.
33. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981); Clou-
tier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981); Martin Marietta Corp.
v. Lorenz; 823 P.2d 100, 105 (1992) (the majority argues that proper balance between the
interests of the public, employer and employee must be maintained). But see Martin Mari-
etta, 823 P.2d at 119 ((Erickson concurring in part and dissenting in part) arguing that the
purpose of the public policy exception is to benefit the public at large and not the individ-
ual employee).
34. Harrison, supra note 16; Hubbell, supra note 10.
35. Hubbell, supra note 10, 105. Opponents have been open in advocating limitation
of the whistleblower exception to the at-will employment doctrine: "Any general standard
for dealing with the discharged whistleblower, on the other hand, should protect him but
not affirmatively encourage others to whistleblow." Martin H. Malin, Protecting the
Whistleblowerfrom Retaliatory Discharge, 16J. L. REFORM 277, 302 (1983).
36. Malin, supra note 35, at 302 ("Relying on employee vigilantes (whistleblowers) is
not necessarily sound general law enforcement policy."); See Harrison, supra, note 16, at
584-85.
37. Theodore J. St. Antoine speculates that the harms to the individual worker and
society associated with job loss are severe:
Numerous studies document the increases in cardiovascular deaths, suicides,
mental breakdowns, alcoholism, ulcers, diabetes, spouse and child abuse, im-
paired social relationships, and various other diseases and abnormal conditions
that develop even in the wake of impersonal permanent layoffs resulting from
plant closures. It seems reasonable to presume that such effects are at least as
severe when a worker is singled out to be discharged for some alleged deficiency
or misconduct .... [Ilt is this piercing hurt to individuals which justifies the call
for reform of the at-will doctrine.
TheodoreJ. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower,
67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988).
38. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
39. "Excluding [company executives and entertainers who have the power to bargain
for 'just cause' provisions, union employees covered by collective bargaining agreements,
and public employees covered by civil service statutes] the remaining nonunion private
sector exceeds 60% of the American work force and consists of over 65,000,000 employ-
ees. For them there has been no blanket protection from the 'at-will' doctrine." Paul H.
Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiff's Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV.
178, 180 (1988).
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these concerns.
40
Two different approaches to the at-will employee wrongful dis-
charge claim have emerged. 4 1 One approach, based in contract, charges
employers with the duty to discharge in good faith arising out of the
implied contract formed by various aspects of company behavior.4 2 The
other approach, based in tort, allows recovery where a wrongful dis-
charge occurs in retaliation for exercising privileges, rights, or duties, or
for refusing to violate the law.
43
The majority of states now recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge pursuant to the public-policy exception to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine. 44 Although the term "public policy" has historically
been difficult to define, 4 5 many jurisdictions followed and expanded the
rationale of Petermann.4 6 Courts include the following discharges under
the public policy exception: (1) bad faith, 4 7 (2) refusal to participate in
criminal activity, 48 (3) retaliation for whistleblowing or invoking a public
40. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27 (holding that employer's right of discharge may be
checked by "considerations of public policy"); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,
421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Il1. 1981) (arguing for the need to maintain a proper balance be-
tween the employer's interest in earning a profit, the employee's interest in earning a
wage, and society's interest in public policy).
41. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261 (1985); Blades, supra note 13, at 1419-
27.
42. Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 794 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1992); Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.
364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974);
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983); HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261; Ar-
thur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 630, 649-63
(1988); Stillman, supra note 14, at 55.
43. Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D. R.I. 1988);
Petermann, 344 P.2d 25, at 27; Sussman v. University of Colo. Health Sciences Ctr., 706
P.2d 443 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (employee wrongfully discharged for refusing to alter pollution control reports);
Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (nurse discharged by hospital
after testifying truthfully in an action for medical malpractice).
44. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 106 (Colo. 1992); see sources cited
supra note 11.
45. Stillman, supra note 14, at 55; see also Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting WILLIAM
W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 546, at 675 (4th ed. 1856) ("[Public
policy] has never been defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of definition,
in the same manner as fraud.") Story continues, determining that whatever is in contra-
vention of the established interest of the public good is against public policy); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (11. 1981) (defining "public policy" as
"what is right and just and affects the citizens of the State collectively"); Public Policy, supra
note 22, at 1947.
46. 344 P.2d 25 (holding that, pursuant to concerns of public policy, an at-will em-
ployee had a cause of action for wrongful discharge resulting from failing to commit per-
jury); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1932.
47. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 28 (applying Coats v. General Motors Corp., 39 P.2d 838,
841 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934), which acknowledged the well-settled doctrine that the em-
ployer must discharge only in good faith).
48. Id. at 27; Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978) (employee wrongfully discharged for not altering pollution control re-
ports); Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (nurse threatened,
harassed, and ultimately discharged by Duke University hospital administrators after refus-
ing to commit perjury in an action for medical malpractice).
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duty49 or statutory right, 50 and (4) malice.5 1
The conceptual framework for wrongful discharge pursuant to the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine differs im-
mensely across jurisdictions, but generally there must be a wrongful dis-
charge that violates public policy. 5 2 The most common elements giving
rise to a cause of action pursuant to the public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine include: (1) an act or refusal to act, (2) sup-
ported by public policy, (3) bearing a causal relationship, (4) to the dis-
charge.5 3 Discharges for any good reason or even no reason whatsoever
are not actionable; only wrongful discharges are actionable. 54 A wrong-
ful discharge standing alone or even coupled with a private interest does
not state a cause of action; rather, the wrongful discharge must impair
some public policy. 55 The Colorado Supreme Court recently required
that an employee must give the employer notice of the reasons for non-
compliance with the unlawful order in addition to the elements above.
56
To fully understand the public policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine, it is necessary to contemplate its policy goals. As the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is currently
interpreted, a wrongfully discharged employee brings suit against an
employer to enforce public policy. 57 Theoretically, the employee bears
the cost, the employer is deterred from future violations, and society
benefits from the action.58 This system of enforcing public policy has
been criticized for being unnecessarily regressive.59
The most recent statement of the public policy exceptions to the at-
will employment doctrine appeared in Martin Marietta v. Lorenz.60 The
49. Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D. R.I. 1988) (cause of
action found for wrongful discharge of employee dismissed for "whistleblowing" activity);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978) (cause of action
allowed pursuant to public policy exception where employee was discharged for reporting
criminal violations).
50. See e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (to
prevent circumvention of the worker's compensation laws, an injured employee dis-
charged in retaliation for filing for worker's compensation benefits was recognized as hav-
ing a claim); Lathrop v. Entemann's Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1372-73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
(held that to allow retaliatory discharge for filing worker's compensation claims violated
public policy).
51. E.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (malicious discharge
for refusing to go out with the foreman).
52. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261; Blackburn, supra note 20, at 472; see also
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co. 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (holding that an employee has a claim where
discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy).
53. Elletta S. Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule Comes of
Age. A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 490 (1991).
54. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261.
55. Id.; see also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (allowing
action where public concern is involved but denying action where only a private interest is
involved); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1949.
56. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992).
57. Harrison, supra note 16, at 584.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Martin, 823 P.2d at 107.
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Colorado Supreme Court held that a plaintiff employee must establish
that: (1) the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act or
prevented the employee from exercising a public duty, (2) the em-
ployer's directive would violate a specific statute or clearly expressed
public policy, and (3) that termination resulted from the refused per-
formance.6 1 . In addition, the plaintiff employee must give the defend-
ant employer notice that refusal of performance is founded upon a
reasonable belief that the action would violate public policy. 6 2
The whistleblower public policy exception is a socially and econom-
ically valuable doctrine.6 3 Environmental policy is often enforced by the
State through agencies or by individuals in the community with standing
to sue.64 These individuals are limited to action either when the possi-
bility of future environmental damage is discovered or after environ-
mental damage has occurred. 65 The whistleblower exception to the at-
will employment doctrine is an additional means of enforcing environ-
mental policy. 66 Whistleblowers have exposed defense contractor
accounting improprieties, federal prison mismanagement, mismanage-
ment of Native American health care programs, numerous improprieties
in federal agencies, and questioned the United States' system of jus-
tice. 6 7 Whistleblowing employees possess the advantage of prevenient
action. 68 A whistleblower may proceed with a wrongful discharge claim
prospective of environmental damage. 69 A whistleblower's wrongful
discharge action derives from the firing itself.70 Firing may occur before
any environmental damage is suffered, or before the prospect of possi-
61. Id. at 109.
62. Id.
63. For a recent discussion supporting the public policy exceptions to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine and examining modem practical applications, see PAUL C. WElLER, Gov-
ERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT Law (1990); see also 135
CONG. REC. H752 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Horton).
"75 to 80 percent of the information on which the Inspectors General Act [sic]
comes from so-called whistleblowers. They testify time and again and most of the
information that [the inspectors] receive comes from these people .... Last fall
we were informed that $120 Billion has been saved in the last 10 years by the
inspectors general, so we are talking about big money here, and it is very impor-
tant to give these kinds of protections."
Id.
64. United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (envi-
ronmental pollution discovered by whistleblowing neighbors and enforced by state and
federal agencies); see Roy, supra note 10, at 194.
65. See e.g., Goodner, 966 F.2d at 383 (environmental damage suffered before
whistleblowing neighbors discovered the damage and reported).
66. Id. (EPA investigation, which led to conviction, instigated because of whistleblow-
ing neighbor); Hubbell, supra note 10, at 104-08; Cf. Fisher, supra note 18, at 357-58.
67. Fisher, supra note 18, at 357-58.
68. See Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114, 1116-17, (Ohio. 1986)
(employee discharged for reporting legal violations to his employer, but apparently no
specific violations of statutes or environmental damage had occurred at the time of dis-
charge as these facts were not alleged in the complaint).
69. See Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372 (I1. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1122 (1986) (employee discharged for refusing to violate federal regulations by mis-
handling radioactive cobalt 60).
70. The injury occurs from the discharge itself; the interest violated is the employee's
right to avoid wrongful, arbitrary loss of gainful employment. Clyde W. Summers, Labor
Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 15-16 (1988).
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ble environmental damage becomes publicly known. 7 1 Economic analy-
sis shows that environmental policy may be efficiently enforced through
whistleblower actions.
The labor market in the United States is criticized for unnecessarily
repressing worker's interests. 72 The labor market partially causes
worker repression. The United States functions with a "dual labor mar-
ket" 73 which consists of primary market and secondary market employ-
ees. 74 The primary market tends to have higher wages, better working
conditions, increased worker stability, more chance for advancement
and greater due process. 75 Secondary market employees have a far
lower rate of instigating wrongful discharge litigation.7 6 An examina-
tion of the case law shows that the vast majority of whistleblower envi-
ronmental litigation is pursued by primary market employees. 77
Secondary market employees, however, are far more likely to be ex-
posed to and have knowledge about environmental damage. 78 These
persons therefore are most in need of protection yet are most easily dis-
suaded from pursuing action.
79
III. DECISIONS
In practice, the public policy exception to the at-will employment
71. Contra, Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (authorities and neighbors una-
ware of pollution until thousands of gallons of toxic waste had been illegally dumped and
considerable environmental damage occurred).
72. See Charles A. Brake, Jr., Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts For-
gotten the Employer? 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 204 (1982); Summers, supra note 69, at 25; To-
bias, supra note 39, at 190; Note, Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1938.
73. Ryan C. Amacher and Richard J. Sweeney, On the Integration of Labor Markets: A
Definition and Test of the Radical-Segmentation Hypothesis, 2 J. LAB. RES. 25 (1981); Public Pol-
icy, supra note 22, 1938-42; Cf. Jerome E. Carlin & Jan Howard, Legal Representation and
Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1965) (discussing class theories ofjustice).
74. Carlin & Howard, supra, note 72, at 381; Note, Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1938-
39.
75. Note, Public Policy, supra note 22, at 138-39.
76. Tobias, supra note 39, at 190; Note Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1938-42.
77. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (quality control
director discharged for assuring compliance with labeling law); Phung v. Waste Mgmt.,
Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986) (chief chemist discharged for reporting legal and ethi-
cal violations); Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 308 N.W.2d 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(company safety director wrongfully discharged for upholding health and safety regula-
tions); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (employee discharged for refusing to alter pollution control statements); Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Executive Director of
Utilities discharged for refusing to order work which would violate environmental regula-
tions). But cf. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (gas station
attendant brought wrongful dismissal action after discharge for refusing to violate air pol-
lution standards); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (ship's
crewman discharged for refusing to violate posted bilge standards).
78. See 135 CONG. REC. H754 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Porter).
Mid- and low-level civil servants are the core of our Government. They are the
dedicated workers who really know how our system works best, and can see
clearly when abuses and fraud are taking place. They are in the best position to
help Congress and the executive branch ensure the proper functioning of our
Government."
Id.
79. St. Antoine, supra note 37, at 68.
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doctrine is applied inconsistently and on an ad hoc basis. 80 Courts across
the nation apply the whistleblower exception dis-similarly.8 1 An exami-
nation of several whistleblower decisions shows that aside from the com-
mon theme of limiting employee actions for wrongful discharge
somewhat, the only consistency in wrongful discharge actions is their
inconsistency.
A. Whistleblower Cases
Federal employees are granted protection under the Federal
Whistleblower's Act of 1989,82 but this statute does virtually nothing for
state or private employees. As a result, state and private sector employ-
ees proceed at the mercy of the state law in their jurisdictions.
85
Pacheco v. Raytheon 84 aided greatly in establishing this current lack of
consistency and private employee limitation to recovery. 85 In Pacheco, a
discharged defense contractor employee sought recovery in tort as a
federal whistleblower under federal statutes. 86 The district court ar-
gued that in order to determine the sufficiency of the action, the court
must ask: "[i]s the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted?" 8 7 Using this rationale, recovery is denied to any
plaintiff not specifically listed in the class of those protected. Any private
sector or state employee not specifically listed as protected under the
statute is barred from recovery.
The Pacheco court denied tort recovery under the statute arguing
that even though the employee was granted statutory protection, em-
ployees are not afforded a private cause of action under federal
whistleblower statutes. 8 8 As a result of the denial of the private cause of
action, punitive and compensatory damages were not recoverable.
8 9
Disallowing these damages greatly reduces the value of the lawsuit to
the wrongfully discharged employee and greatly reduces the cost of the
lawsuit to the employer.
The Pacheco court also established locus of remedy as an element for
recovery: "is the cause of action one that is commonly left to state law to
remedy?". 90 Under that rationale, Pacheco allows, or requires, state rules
to govern whistleblower actions. 9 l  State rules governing the
whistleblower exception to the at-will employment doctrine are incon-
80. Patricia M. Leonard, Unjust Dismissal of Employees at Will: Are Disclaimers a Final Solu-
tion? 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 543 (1987).
81. Summers, supra note 69, at 21.
82. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as amended 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302
(1992 Supp.)).
83. See Leonard, supra note 79, at 543-44.
84. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co. 777 F.Supp. 1089, 1090 (D.R.I. 1991).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1090.
87. Id. at 1091.
88. Id. at 1093.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1091.
91. Id. at 1093.
[Vol. 70:3
WHISTLEBLOWERS
sistent across the nation.9 2 The Pacheco decision further adds to this in-
consistency by incorporating the esoteric standards of the various states
into federal law.
The courts manipulated the interests protected to deny recovery. 93
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. ,94 the court denied recovery for an at-will
employee under the public policy exception. 9 5 In Foley, an employee
informed his employer that his immediate supervisor at the bank was the
focus of an embezzlement investigation at another bank,9 6 The em-
ployer told the employee not to believe rumors. 9 7 The employer trans-
ferred the employee from California to Massachusetts, with a pay cut,
prior to discharge. 98 The supervisor later pled guilty to felony embez-
zlement in federal court. 99 The employee brought an action for wrong-
ful discharge.' 0 0 The court determined that the employee was not
entitled to recovery as a whistleblower where the interest protected was
private, for the benefit of the employer, and not the public.' 0 ' The
court affirmed the award for contractual damages, but denied recovery
in tort.'
0 2
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, l03 the plaintiff brought suit in
wrongful discharge generally, but under the facts as alleged, could have
sought recovery as a whistleblower.' 0 4 The court established an addi-
tional evidentiary requirement to a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge: that the employee must present evidence showing that the
employer was, or should reasonably have been aware that, employee's
refusal to comply with the directive was based on employee's reasonable
belief that the action was illegal, contrary to a clearly expressed statutory
policy related to the employee's duty as a citizen, or violative of em-
ployee's legal right or privilege as a worker. 10 5 The court recognized
that this new element established an additional burden to the claim, but
argued the decision did not fundamentally change the nature of the ac-
tion or recovery.1
0 6
92. See supra note 11, and accompanying text.
93. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
94. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 375.
97. d.
98. Id. at 375-76.
99. d. at 375, n.1.
100. Id. at 373.
101. Id. at 380.
102. Id. at 401.
103. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
104. In Martin Marietta, Plaintiff was discharged from his supervisory position on the
Space Shuttle project after repeatedly reporting substandard workmanship, overstated
performance claims, misappropriation of materials, and budgeting discrepancies to Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration officials. Id. at 102-04.
105. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109.
106. Id. at 110.
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B. Environmental Whistleblower Cases:
Application of the whistleblower exception is equally as varied
where environmental concerns are forwarded. In Trombetta v. Detroit, To-
ledo & Ironton Railroad Co.,°107 a non-union employee was denied recovery
after discharge for refusal to alter federal pollution control reports as
ordered.10 8 The court recognized the employee's cause of action for
wrongful discharge, 10 9 but denied recovery based on the trial court's
determination that plaintiff presented no issue of material fact. 1 10 The
court upheld the award of costs to the defendant." 'I
Following the at-will employment doctrine, courts deny recovery
where employees first reported violations to their employer. 112 In Phung
v. Waste Management, Inc.," 13 the court denied recovery where the em-
ployee reported illegal business practices to the employer."1 4 The Ohio
Supreme Court refused to back away from the strict compliance with the
at-will employment doctrine 115 except in instances of worker's compen-
sation, or discrimination claims.16
Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize any exception to the at-will
doctrine. Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc. "7 presented a situation where
an employee was discharged for refusing to violate state and federal re-
verse osmosis requirements.' 1 The employee sought compensatory
and punitive damages for wrongful discharge from his at-will employ-
ment position but the court refused to recognize such a claim under any
circumstances. 1 19 Other jurisdictions recognize the claim narrowly. In
Sabine Pilot Service Inc. v. Hauck,120 the court upheld a narrow exception
to the at-will employment doctrine where the employee had refused to
perform an illegal act. 12 1 In Sabine, the employee called the United
States Coast Guard which verified a posted prohibition of pumping bilge
into the harbor. 122 The employee refused to pump bilge and was dis-
charged. 12 3 The employer argued that the discharge was the result of
refusing to obey other directives. 124 The Texas Supreme Court held
,/
107. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 388.
110. Id. at 390.
111. Id.
112. Foley, 765 P.2d 373.
113. Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
114. Id.
115. "An at-will employee who is discharged for reporting to his employer that it is
conducting its business in violation of law does not have a cause of action against the
employer for wrongful discharge." Id. at 1117.
116. Id.
117. Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1330.
120. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
121. Id. at 735.





that, while the narrow exception exists, "it is the plaintiff's burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his discharge was for no
reason other than his refusal to perform an illegal act."' 125 Otherjuris-
dictions place the burden on the employer, as in Phipps v. Clark Oil,126
where the court allowed recovery where the employee refused to violate
the Clean Air Act. '2 7 The court recognized a valid claim where a station
attendant refused to pump leaded gasoline into an tank reserved for un-
leaded gasoline, despite evidence that the employee was discharged for
refusing to serve a handicapped customer.
128
IV. ANALYSIS
The current ad hoc system, which favors unscrupulous private em-
ployers, effectively discourages whistleblowing. Whistleblowers are pre-
vented from acting for economic reasons because the additional costs of
bringing action preclude enforcement. 129 The current system ensures
that fewer employees will seek whistleblower protection under the pub-
lic policy exception before discharge, fewer employees will obtain re-
dress after wrongful discharge, and more violations of environmental
public policy will occur. Economic analysis of the whistleblower excep-
tion supports this contention.
Where the cost to the employee of whistleblowing is high and the
benefit is low, whistleblowing will be discouraged.130 Reflexively, where
the cost to the employer of whistleblower action is low, the benefit of
pollution and wrongful discharge is increased. 13 Examination of the
aforementioned decisions illustrates many of the economic realities of
the at-will employment doctrine.
A. Applications of State Standards
The Pacheco court applied state standards in some circumstances to
federal actions.1 3 2 As the cases taken together show, state standards are
extremely inconsistent. Inconsistency will reduce whistleblower action
because state decisions are varied and would-be whistleblowers will be
discouraged from acting. As an example, Phung 133 and Hartley 134 stand
against recovery and, subsequently, for strict compliance with at-will
employment doctrines, while Phipps 135 allows recovery. Whistleblowers
125. Id. at 735.
126. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 570.
129. Massingale, supra note 19, at 200-01; Summers, supra note 69, at 25; Tobias, supra
note 39, at 190.
130. See Posner, supra note 7, at 521 (discussing the effects of erroneous decisions on
deterrence generally).
131. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 404-05 (1973) (discussing the effects of exogenous error).
132. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 777 F. Supp. 1089 (D. R.I. 1991).
133. Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
134. Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
135. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
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are left with differences in recovery based not on their factual circum-
stance or behavior, but on differences of geographic location. It is a
fanciful stretch of reasoning to assume that environmental legislation
may be enforced to society's benefit through whistleblowing in one ju-
risdiction but not in another. Inconsistency discourages the employee
from pursuing recovery by raising the economic costs of action. It also
shields the employer from action by lowering the economic costs of de-
fense, and ensures that wrongful discharges will go unredressed.
B. Limitations to Employee Protection
Decisions which limit the protection provided to employees by
class, such as Pacheco 13 6 and Foley 137, create uncertainty as to which em-
ployees are protected from wrongful discharge. After the decisions
handed down in Phung and Hartley, the employee remains uncertain
whether their jurisdiction provides any protection for their position.
Uncertainty reduces the value to the employee of bringing a lawsuit, and
raises the potential cost if recovery is not allowed. Disincentives created
by uncertainty of protection insulate employers from discharge actions
and offer protection from damage awards.
C. Monetary Limitations to Recovery
Both the Pacheco 138 and Foley 139 decisions also deny a private cause
of action, allowing damages for breach of contract only. Limitations on
the potential award reduce the overall financial value of the lawsuit to
the employee. Reciprocally, this also reduces the cost of the lawsuit for
the employer. In Trombetta, 140 the court went farther by allowing the
defendant to recover costs. The risk of paying corporate legal fees will
discourage employees from bringing action, as most employees cannot
currently afford their own fees.
14 1
Lowering the award of the suit, as in Foley 142 and Pacheco,143 has the
same effect as exoneration since the firm avoids its liability. Exoneration
decreases the incentive to blow the whistle on wrongful action and
reduces the deterrent effect of the law. 144 Subsequently, enforcement
of public policy declines. Wrongful action increases as enforcement de-
creases because it becomes marginally more efficient to engage in
wrongful behavior.14 5 Corporations evaluate environmental damage as
136. 777 F. Supp. 1089.
137. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
138. 777 F. Supp. 1089.
139. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
140. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978).
141. Summers, supra note 69, at 25.
142. 765 P.2d 373.
143. 777 F. Supp. 1089.
144. "In the civil setting the effects of erroneous imposition of liability and erroneous
exoneration from liability are symmetrical: a reduction in the deterrent effect of the legal
rule in question." POSNER, supra note 7, at 521.
145. See POSNER, supra note 7.
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an externality, but often this evaluation is skewed by only considerations
of cost to the firm. 14 6 Only where the cost of the wrongful behavior is
raised will compliance with environmental statutes occur.
14 7
Because pollution externalities are difficult to quantify, 14 8 the full
societal cost of pollution is not taken into account. 149 Increasing the
award for whistleblowing increases compliance by insuring that suit will
be brought and damages will be high. Where damage awards are high
and certain, firms determine that the overall cost of illegal pollution is
too great to engage in, and compliance becomes the marginally cost ef-
fective solution.
For the secondary market employee bringing action, lowering the
likelihood and amount of award raises difficulty in finding legal coun-
sel. 150 Finding competent counsel has traditionally been difficult for
secondary market employees.' 5 ' Lower awards increase secondary mar-
ket employee difficulty in obtaining competent counsel. 152 Attorneys
representing secondary market employees tend to be the less competent
and least skilled members of the profession.15 3 Limiting awards to con-
tractual damages makes contingent fee arrangements available in tort
unrealistic.' 5 4 Giving the secondary employee inadequate counsel
moves the starting line back. Disallowing contingent fee damages slams
the courthouse door in the secondary market employee's face. 155 Most
insidious is that increasing the difficulty in employee action acts as a
preclusive disincentive which grants the employer a windfall allowing
violations to go unredressed.
D. Increasing the Cost of Pursuing Action
The practical functioning of the whistleblower exception acts as a
disincentive to enforcing policy because few employees obtain a finan-
cial position to fund the costs of the litigation process without employ-
146. PICA Plating, a firm of several hundred employees specializing in custom electro-
plating, is a good example of cost driven non-compliance. At PICA, it became cheaper to
illegally dump raw waste water containing cyanide, acid and heavy metals into area sewer
systems and risk the health and safety of workers than to upgrade the treatment facility to
adequate standards. Roy, supra note 10, at 193-94.
147. In the case of PICA, top corporate managers ignored pollution problems until a
whistleblower report prompted a surprise inspection. Only after the subsequent imposi-
tion of several million dollars of fines did compliance occur. Id.
148. Roy, supra note 10, at 207.
149. "Pica's managers, then compared the social cost of pollution not with the total
cost of pollution, but only with the risk borne by the employees working in unsafe condi-
tions." Id. Apparently, the workers evaluated the risk similarly: "After three or four
months of eighty hour weeks yotj don't [give a dam] about the environment." Id. at 194.
150. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942-43.
151. Id.; Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 381; Tobias, supra note 39, at 190.
152. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942-43; Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 428.
153. "Lawyers representing lower-class persons tend to be the least competent mem-
bers of the bar, and those least likely to employ a high level or wide range of technical
skills." Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 384.
154. Tobias, supra note 39, at 190.
155. Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 428.
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ment, 1 5 6 and often are precluded from recovery. 157  Wrongfully
discharged whistleblowers must fund the litigation process while sup-
porting themselves and their families without the benefit of a
paycheck. 158 Whistleblowers often have difficulty finding new employ-
ment. 159 Financial inability to sustain legal action for recovery is even
more prevalent among secondary market employees. 160
Both Martin Marietta and Sabine fundamentally change the nature of
a wrongful discharge action. Martin Marietta requires that employees
give employers notice that the refused performance is based on the rea-
sonable belief that the performance violates the public policy. Requir-
ing the evidentiary burden of notice in the prima facie case raises the
cost of whistleblowing by increasing the cost of bringing action. Notice
requirements also create "show down" style confrontations between low
level employees and management. Secondary market employees reluc-
tantly engage in these confrontations for a variety of reasons including
poor legal representation.161 Unscrupulous employers benefit from this
economic windfall, 16 2 with employees and society paying the eventual
cost. The notice requirement of Martin Marietta forces the secondary
market employee into a confrontation with the employer. Confronta-
tion deters the instigation of action, not based on legal considerations of
the validity of the claim, but by virtue of the unequal bargaining power
the employer wields. 163 Environmental damages increase as a result.
156. See Summers, supra note 69, at 25 (discussing discharged employees' lack of eco-
nomic bargaining power and inability to successfully obtain legal redress for wrongful
termination).
157. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 777 F. Supp. 1089 (D. R.I. 1991) (whistleblowing de-
fense contractor precluded from private cause of action); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (whistleblowing private sector employee denied recovery for
tortious discharge in contravention of public policy); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476
So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (at-will employee had no cause of action after refus-
ing to violate state and federal water pollution statutes and regulations).
158. Fisher, supra note 18, at 356 (explaining that would-be whistleblowers are de-
terred by the fear of losing gainful employment). Those who choose to blow the whistle
face enormous difficulties and are most often laid-off or fired. Id. at 366; Massingale, supra
note 19, at 200. See 135 CONG. REC. H752 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Sikorski) ("With the enactment of this landmark legislation, [The Whistleblower's Protec-
tion Act of 1989] employees can confidentially carry out their responsibilities without fear
of retribution, of ruined careers, lost jobs, and destroyed families, hopes and dreams.").
159. Leonard, supra note 42, at 678; Massingale, supra note 19, at 187; Tobias, supra
note 39, at 182.
160. Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 381; Hubbell, supra note 10, at 102; Leonard,
supra note 42, at 533 ("One result of this inconsistency is that professional and managerial
employees often prevail in wrongful discharge actions. Low-level, clerical employees sel-
dom prevail."(footnote omitted)); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942-43.
161. POSNER, supra note 7, at 524-25; Carlin and Howard, supra note 72; Public Policy,
supra note 22, at 1042-45.
162. Warren F. Schwartz and Gordon Tullock, The Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL
STUrD. 75 (1975) (Examining cost as a function of sanction, where the sanction is low, the
cost of noncompliance is also low. Under these circumstances the incidence of compliance
will decrease as deterrence is eroded).
163. St. Antoine, supra note 37, at 68; "It is they, [employees] not the employer, who
most need protection." Id.; Leonard, supra note 42, at 678; Summers, supra note 69, at 16;




The burden of proof allocates to either the employer defendant or
the employee plaintiff. By requiring notice evidence in the prima facie
case, the Martin court decided that the plaintiff must bear the burden
and costs of persuasion. Had the Martin court allowed the employer to
offer as an affirmative defense evidence that the employee's belief was
unclear or unreasonable, the burden of persuasion would fall on the em-
ployer. Under this allocation, if the employee bringing action is. unable
to prove the new notice element, a directed verdict is in order. 164
The court argued that this additional requirement would not "alter
in a fundamental way the basic nature" of the action. 16 5 But, this shift in
the burden of persuasion changes the posture of the suit altering the
effect of the public policy exception.
First, by requiring that the employee bear the evidentiary burden,
the court implicitly raised the cost of bringing suit. 16 6 The plaintiff will
be required to assemble more evidence and log more attorney hours all
at an additional expense. Because of the inherently regressive nature of
some forms of at-will employment, 16 7 those discharged from at-will po-
sitions are the least capable of incurring additional legal costs. 168 Fur-
ther, because the awards in these cases are likely to be low and
undertaken on a contingent fee, employees bringing action will have dif-
ficulty finding competent representation. 16 9 The Martin evidentiary re-
quirement makes recovery for these actions more difficult and expensive
for wrongfully discharged employees.
While the employee may have difficulty proving notice in a suit for
wrongful discharge, the employer would have far less difficulty raising
the same issue as an affirmative defense. Corporations possess easy ac-
cess to the court system.' 7 0 Additionally, corporations tend to retain
capable counsel from the best institutions accustomed to wrongful dis-
charge cases. 17 1 Corporations are more likely to be able to afford
lengthy litigation and the elevated discovery expenses.1
7 2
The initial costs of bringing an action are born by the wrongfully
discharged employee who is likely the party least capable of bearing
these costs. Historically, courts reluctantly award punitive damages in
164. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 50; FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
165. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 110 (Colo. 1992).
166. See generally, POSNER, supra note 7.
167. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1937-39 (shows that there exists in the United States
two labor markets, at-will employees tend to be either high level white collar employees or
menial white collar and blue collar employees from lower socioeconomic niches); Carlin
and Howard, supra note 72, 428.
168. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942.
169. Id. at 1942-43 n.84 (quotingJ.CARN,J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE
AND THE POOR 47-48 (1967) (arguing that the tort litigation system discriminates against
the poor); Id. at 1942 n.80 (citing Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contracts,
34 AM. Soc. REV. 309, 310 Table 1 (1969) (arguing that employees from the lower socio-
economic groups tend to be represented by attorneys from smaller firms who tend to be
less competent)); see also Carlin & Howard, supra note 72, at 384-85.
170. Id.
171. See generally Carlin & Howard, supra note 72.
172. Id.
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suits for wrongful discharge pursuant to the public policy exception and
awards remain low. 1 7 3 Any additional costs of commencing action re-
sults in the enforcement of fewer legitimate claims for wrongful dis-
charge. Whistleblowing will decrease commensurately.
With the Martin decision, the court further raised the cost of en-
forcement and added disincentives to bringing legal action by requiring
notice as a prima facie element. This new evidentiary standard functions
as an expensive disincentive, which raises the expense of litigation for
the employee to the benefit of the unscrupulous employer and the detri-
ment of society. As a result of the added costs, fewer wrongfully dis-
charged employees will seek redress and fewer will contend the issue as
a preventive measure before discharge occurs.
E. A Proposed Solution
Perhaps the solution lies in presumptively finding each employment
relationship checked by concerns of public policy unless otherwise ex-
pressly specified in the employment contract. 174 Finding all employ-
ment contracts checked by concerns of public policy would remove the
possibility of discharge occurring for improper reasons. Workers could
then whistleblow where justification exists with adequate job security.
Presumptive public policy concerns would bolster employment security
and would further protect the fragile, unprotected environment.
Critics seem to assume that the protections afforded to the em-
ployer by the at-will employment doctrine and the public policies
forewarded by whistleblower exceptions are mutually exclusive.1 75 Em-
ployees, employers and the public may all obtain protection and benefit
from at-will contract reformulation. With the presumption against at-
will employment from the outset, the court has a stronger basis for pro-
tecting public policy while leaving the parties free to write traditional at-
will employment discharge into the agreement. 17 6 Giving the court a
stronger basis for public protection allows the court to curtail grevious
abuses of the environment. Because the parties are left at liberty to
shape their relationship as they may through the contract formulation
process, they may negotiate job security and termination provisions. In
this process, none give away any fundamental right. All must actively
chart the course of the business relationship, and thereby express the
importance of the right in the contract. Through the negotiation pro-
cess, the true economic value of the right to discharge freely and the
importance of job security come to the forefront of the individual con-
173. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 777 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (D. R.I. 1991).
174. Professor Arthur Leonard argues that eliminating the at-will doctrine at the outset
would increase company profitability, increase performance incentives and reduce litiga-
tion and litigation costs without denying the employer the right to discharge in good faith
for poor performance. Leonard, supra note 42, at 678.
175. Hubbell, supra note 10, at 105.
176. "It is neither unfair nor contrary to contemporary contract theory to eliminate the
employer's power to discharge arbitrarily without eliminating the employee's right to
leave." St. Antoine, supra note 37, at 68.
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tract. Traditional rights are molded to shape the preference of the par-
ties to the contract, neither is denied negotiating, or traditional at-will
employment doctrine provisions.
Presumption against at-will employment requires the parties to the
contract to negotiate any preferences to the contrary at the outset of the
employment relationship. As the doctrine is currently applied, at-will
employment is not bargained for, nor found as a conclusion or last re-
sort for interpretation, it is the last word concerning the employment
relationship. At-will employment in this way gives the employer a wind-
fall, creating expense for both the employee and society that would
otherwise be precontractually negotiated for. Precontractual negotia-
tion has the advantage of lowering overall costs by reducing litigation
and associated expenses. 17 7 By finding at-will employment relation-
ships only where the parties to the employment contract have expressed,
the legal system could avoid the ecomomic inefficiencies which plague
the status quo.
Considering the questionable origins of the at-will employment
doctrine, 178 and the inefficiencies created by strict compliance, the re-
formulated at-will employment concept should be a natural implementa-
tion for the legal system. Given the at-will employment doctrine's deep
entrenchment in current jurisprudence, the reformulated concept may
not gain widespread acceptance expediently.1
79
V. CONCLUSION
Reliance on the at-will employment doctrine continues despite its
dubious origins. The whistleblower exception is mired with uncertainty
and hobbled with expense. The costly disincentives associated with the
whistleblower exception in environmental litigation prevent valid ac-
tions. The limitation of damages grants unscrupulous employers a
windfall. As a result, environmental damage unnecessarily continues.
Perhaps the freedom of contract concerns raised by the proponents of
the at-will employment doctrine can be squared with the goals of the
public policy whistleblower exception. Until then, potential




177. See Leonard, supra note 42, at 677-78.
178. Hubbell, supra note 10, at 94; Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 341; St. Antoine,
supra note 25, at 32-33; Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1933.
179. Reformulating the concept of at-will employment may come with difficulty as crit-
ics ardently support strict compliance with the doctrine. Harrison, supra note 16; Hubbell,
supra note 10; Malin, supra note 35, at 302; Brake, supra note 26, at 207-208.
180. Roy, supra note 10, at 194.
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THE STATES SQUARE OFF IN ARKANSAS V. OKLAHOMA-AND
THE WINNER IS... THE EPA
I. INTRODUCTION
The battle between the states that made its way through the Tenth
Circuit to the United States Supreme Court began innocently enough
when the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, proposed discharging effluent
from its planned sewage plant into a local waterway that just happened
to flow into the waters of the state of Oklahoma, thirty-nine miles down-
stream. The Supreme Court's ruling in Arkansas v. Oklahoma I leaves
both state parties dissatisfied and confused. Arguably, Oklahoma
should be content with the Court's requirement that the Arkansas emis-
sions comply with Oklahoma's state-set, federally-approved water qual-
ity standards. 2 But the Oklahoma appellantss contend any ruling that
upholds Fayetteville's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) 4 permit contravenes Oklahoma's efforts to protect the scenic
Illinois River. 5 Arkansas, the apparent victor with permit in hand, re-
mains displeased and insists the decision could interfere with Arkansas'
free use of its state waterways. 6 Arkansas no longer has the degree of
control over the river necessary to allow development at Arkansas' dis-
cretion. Industrial operations on the river will necessarily be limited by
Oklahoma's water quality concerns. While the victor in this instance,
Arkansas' fear of some future application of Oklahoma's stringent water
quality standards may be warranted. Oklahoma state Senator David Bo-
1. 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) [hereinafter Arkansas].
2. Id. at 1057.
3. The State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma's Scenic Rivers Commission and Pollution
Control Coordinating Board, and Save the Illinois River (STIR).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988) (requires a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem permit for the discharge of any pollutant).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1452(b)(1) (1990). Oklahoma's antidegradation policy is set
forth in Oklahoma Water Quality Standards § 3, appended to State of Oklahoma v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 908 F.2d 595, 635 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1046
(1992). The section provides that "[n]o degradation shall be allowed in high quality wa-
ters which constitute an outstanding resource." Protected waters include designated
"Scenic Rivers". Anticipating improved water quality, the standard mandates "no degra-
dation of such improved waters shall be allowed." See also Joint Brief-in-Chief of Petition-
ers/Appellants, The State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Scenic Rivers Commission and
Pollution Control Coordinating Board and STIR, State of Oklahoma v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9503, No. 89-9507, No. 89-
9516), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit Joint Brief-in-Chief of Peti-
tioner/Appellants].
6. Joint Answer Brief and Brief-in-Chief of the State of Arkansas, The Arkansas
Dept. of Pollution Control Ecology, The City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, and the Beaver
Water District, at 38-42, 45-47, State of Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency,
908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-9503, No. 89-9507, No. 89-9516), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
1046 (1992) [hereinafter Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas]; Randy Lilleston,
Arkansas, Oklahoma Argue in High Court Over River Issue, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, De-
cember 12, 1991, at IB (quoting Arkansas Attorney General, Winston Bryant, "[i]f [apply-
ing Oklahoma's water quality standards extratorritorily] were allowed, 'it would create an
economic morass' ").
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ren recently advanced Oklahoma's assault by initiating legislation to
designate the Illinois a national Scenic River.7 If approved, the Illinois
River would be protected by the statutory prohibition on any depart-
ment or agency of the United States' recommendation or authorization
of water resource projects that would have a "direct and adverse" affect
on the waterway. 8 The battle continues.
To the state parties' dissatisfaction, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) emerged triumphant, its interpretation of both the facts
and the law of the case firmly intact. While this case allowed the Court
to answer what water quality standards apply to pollution flowing inter-
state, more was at stake. Deciding the case required the Court to ad-
dress the implicit questions about the judiciary's role in administrative
review and agency deference. Although volumes of data supported each
state's argument, the Supreme Court cast its vote in favor of neither,
choosing instead to reaffirm the potent doctrine of agency discretion. 9
The familiar ring of the Arkansas v. Oklahoma decision is not coinciden-
tal-it is the progeny ofJustice Stevens, author of Chevron v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council,' 0 a decision now synonymous with the notion of
agency deference. " I
This Comment analyzes Arkansas v. Oklahoma in four different parts.
Part II provides the background necessary to evaluate the decision, in-
cluding its common law roots, statutory enactments, questions about
federalism and the policy of agency discretion. Part III considers the
issues decided, and the underlying Supreme Court rationale. Part IV
evaluates the economic effects provoked by the holding, and questions
the policy underpinning the decision. The Comment focuses on the ef-
fect Arkansas v. Oklahoma will have on future conflicts similar in nature,
concluding that the ruling creates a hierarchy of disincentives in the as-
sault on environmental problems. Arkansas v. Oklahoma discourages state
attempts to attack pollution at the grass roots level, discourages critical
judicial review of agency policy and most tragically provides no incentive
to the polluter to reduce degradation.
Arkansas v. Oklahoma perpetuates the existing command and control
7. Boren Pushes Illinois River Protection Bill, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 2, 1992, at 15. If
designated a national scenic river the Illinois River would be protected under the Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988), which is dedicated to the preservation
and improvement of affected waters.
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1278 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
9. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060-61. "If the Court of Appeals had been properly re-
spectful of the Agency's permissible reading of the Act and the Oklahoma standards, the
court would not have adjudged the Agency's decision arbitrary and capricious." Id.
10. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11. E.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283, 296 (1986) (Chevron not only reaffirmed the deference principle but buttressed it in
several ways: "[i]n Chevron, then, deference meant that a reviewing court not only must
consider the agency's interpretation, but must give controlling weight to that interpreta-
tion"); Thomas W. Merrill,Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992)




regulation system, 12 a system which often fails to allocate pollution
costs' 3 to the responsible polluting parties. The command and control
system allows top-down EPA regulation through application of a pleth-
ora of individual restrictions, often promulgated with little or no eco-
nomic consideration. Considerable commentary has been devoted to
pointing out economic inefficiencies continued under the command and
control system.' 4 This Comment also gives attention to the alternatives
available to revamp the system, which would result in economically
sound regulation and reduce costly litigation.'
5
II. BACKGROUND
Arkansas v. Oklahoma is best understood when viewed in light of the
Court's historic handling of interstate pollution disputes, both before
and after enactment of a national water pollution policy. Prior to the
adoption of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
12. See Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era in Environmental Law, 41 S.C. L. REV.
733, 736 (1990). Babich defines the command and control system as detailed regulations
used to prescribe actions of the regulated community to dictate behavior. "Command-
and-control regulation presupposes the government's ability to: (1) identify environmental
problems and set rational priorities; (2) develop regulations that provided technologically
workable and politically viable solutions; and (3) enforce those regulations effectively. Un-
fortunately, in the area of environmental protection none of these presuppositions has
proven true." Id.
13. Unallocated pollution costs will sometimes be referred to as externalities. See
FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAw & POLICY 29 (1990).
"[M]any environmental resources are still unpriced and remain outside the market....
[V]aluable environmental assets ... are 'used up', but their use is not accurately reflected
in the price system. Economists describe the[se] harms as . . . 'externalities', because the
burden of the resources consumed falls on society at large, not just on the user who actu-
ally consumes them." Id. (quoting FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IM-
PROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 3-4 (1977)).
14. See generally Babich, supra note 12, at 749-62. Babich criticizes the current lack of
responsibility in cleaning up the environment and advocates use of liability-based statutes
to supplement regulatory programs, involving the private sector in improvement efforts.
Babich also lauds success of liability-based programs such as CERCLA under which impo-
sition of strict, joint and several liability induces businesses to invest in pollution reduc-
tion. Id. See also Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1984-85) (pointing out the deficiencies in the
best available technology (BAT) approach to regulation and proposing a market based
permit system as an alternative).
15. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 14, at 1341. Ackerman and Stewart advocate a
marketable permit system. Given that an acceptable level of pollution exists, the least
costly allocation of pollution control, saving billions of dollars annually, would be to allow
polluters to buy and sell each other's permits creating powerful financial incentives for
those who can clean up most cheaply. Id. See also Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins,
Incentive-based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1991) (good discussion of commonly advocated incentive-based pollution reduction
plans, including: pollution charges based on direct taxation on emissions; marketable per-
mits which allow the allotting of acceptable pollution in the form of permits to take advan-
tage of each firm's differential cost of pollution control; deposit-refund systems which
implement surcharges on recyclable items to discourage illegal dumping; removal of mar-
ket barriers to allow free trade, facilitating least cost abatement; and elimination of govern-
ment subsidies that allow excessive resource waste); T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS
TRADING, AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY (1985) (cites EPA's successful re-
form allowing for limited free trade of emission credits to more efficiently reduce
pollution).
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1972,16 federal courts 17 relied on a developing body of federal common
law to address conflicts connected with the interstate flow of pollution. ' 8
As industrial development advanced and water pollution became a na-
tional concern, the federal common law was supplanted by legislation
designed to protect national interest in navigable waterways.1 9
A. Common Law Actions
Disputes over superior rights to interstate waterways are not new to
our legal system. 20 As our nation became more industrialized, litigation
evolved from debate over riparian and appropriation rights to disputes
concerning water quality.
2 1
A trilogy of decisions handed down in the dispute between the City
of Milwaukee and the State of Illinois over sewage discharge into Lake
Michigan historically tracks the Courts' handling of interstate water pol-
lution actions. In Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I),22 the State of Illinois
tried to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to decide a
common law nuisance action brought to enjoin Milwaukee from dump-
ing sewage into Lake Michigan. Concluding the nuisance action fell
within the purview of specially created federal common law, the Court
explained the need for a body of federal common law in very limited
circumstances where no forum existed to settle the disputes outside of
the federal courts.23 Bias toward protecting state interests, whether that
of the emitter or receiver state, undermined the effectiveness of actions
brought in state court. In Milwaukee I the Court explained the inherent
difficulty in deciding the proper forum for interstate pollution disputes,
outlining the unique development of the federal common law governing
interstate pollution, and the resulting struggle to create appropriate
legal remedies. 2 4 However, the Supreme Court refused to assert juris-
diction over the dispute, remanding the case to the district court for
16. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, 72 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1368 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1988)).
17. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (federal courts have jurisdiction "In all Cases ... in
which a State shall be Party"); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)&(b)(3) (1988).
18. See 1 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (MB), § 3.03(l)(a) (1992);
see also Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) [hereinafter Milwaukee I] (historic
development of federal common law regarding water pollution).
19. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1053; City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 325-26
(1981) [hereinafter Milwaukee II]; see also Maria V. Maurasse, Comment, Oklahoma v. EPA:
Does the Clean Water Act Provide an Effective Remedy to Downstream States or Is There
Still Room Left for Federal Common Law?, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1137 (1991) (argues
federal common law is still viable in interstate pollution disputes).
20. See generally 1 GRAD, supra note 18, at §§ 3.01[l][a]-[d] (explains historic develop-
ment of water rights law since the early nineteenth century).
21. Id. at 3.02[b].
22. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
23. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court relied heavily on Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236
(10th Cir. 1971), for the controlling principal that, "the ecological rights of a State in the
improper impairment of them from sources outside the State's own territory, now would
and should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis and standard in federal common
law." Milwaukee 1, 406 U.S. at 100 (quoting Pankey, 441 F.2d at 240).





Shortly after Milwaulkee I was decided Congress adopted the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) amendments of 1972.26
While aware of that pending pollution control legislation,2 7 the Court
concluded the remedies to be provided by Congress "are not necessarily
the only remedies available," 28 suggesting a concurrent role for legisla-
tive and judicial relief. After remand, the Milwaukee I action traveled
from the district court through the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
making its way to the Supreme Court in 1981 when the Court decided
Milwaukee v. Illinois [Milwaukee II].29 Influenced by the enactment of the
1972 FWPCA amendments, also known as the Clean Water Act
(CWA), s ° the Court held "establishment of a comprehensive regulatory
program supervised by an expert administrative agency" displaced the
role of federal common law in the nuisance action. s ' Consequently, the
adversely affected parties' options were limited to appeal under the stat-
utory scheme.
Despite the verdict, consensus on the handling of interstate water
disputes remained elusive.3 2 Justice Blackmun, writing on behalf of the
three party dissent in Milwaukee II, was not convinced that the FWPCA
solved the interstate pollution problem.3 3 Blackmun argued that federal
common law could complement the statutory scheme and should not be
automatically displaced.
3 4
After remand, Illinois, with limited legal alternatives, filed a state
common law nuisance action in federal district court in the state of Illi-
nois. When the dispute reached the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
(Milwaukee III),35 the court ruled that Milwaukee I and Milwaukee II deci-
sions precluded a state common law nuisance action, unless specifically
25. Id. at 108.
26. Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 72 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1368 (1972) (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)); see also Milwaukee I, 451 U.S. 304, 310 (1981) (FWPCA
was adopted five months after the Milwaukee I decision).
27. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107 ("It may happen that new federal laws and new fed-
eral regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance.").
28. Id. at 103.
29. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
30. Id. at 317-18 (the Court explicitly points to the legislative history of the amend-
ments showing Congressional intent, emphasizing that "[n]o Congressman's remarks on
the legislation were complete without ... reference to the 'comprehensive' nature of the
Amendments.").
31. Id. at 317.
32. See, e.g., id. at 332-54 (Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
33. Id. at 333 (Blackmun, Marshall & Stevens,JJ., dissenting) ("Because I believe that
Congress intended no such extinction [of federal common law remedies], and surely did
not contemplate the result reached by the Court today, I respectfully dissent.").
34. Id. at 334 (An" 'automatic displacement' [of federal common law] is inadequate in
two respects. It fails to reflect the unique role federal common law plays between one
State and the citizens or government of another... [and] it ignores this Court's frequent
recognition that federal common law may complement congressional action."); see also
Maurrasse, supra note 19, at 1179-87.
35. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1196 (1985) [hereinafter Milwaukee III].
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provided for by the FWPCA.3 6 The Milwaukee controversy ended with-
out consideration of the merits following years of litigation and two
Supreme Court decisions.
The controversy over the availability of state common law nuisance
actions under the CWA, which the amended FWPCA, was addressed by
the Supreme Court in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette.3 7 A group of
Vermont property owners filed a common law nuisance action in Ver-
mont District Court, seeking damages and injunctive relief from Interna-
tional Paper Company's (IPC) practice of dumping paper by-products
into Lake Champlain.3 8 Dumping occurred in New York, but the pollu-
tion migrated to the Vermont lake. In 1987, the Court concluded the
CWA did not preclude state common law actions, provided that the ac-
tion is brought under the laws of the emitter state.3 9 The decision did
little to relieve the downstream states' dilemma, as a source's emissions
presumably comply with the emitter state's regulations. The Court went
on in Ouellette to describe the role of the downstream state as
subordinate, a rationale heavily relied upon by Arkansas in Arkansas v.
Oklahoma .40
The Ouellette Court's unanimous ruling that state common law ac-
tions were available did not mean the Court agreed on which state's law
to apply. 4 1 A sharp split of opinion appeared inJustice Brennan's par-
tial dissent which argued parties should be allowed to bring a state nui-
sance action in either the emitter or downstream state, using existing
conflict of law rules to determine which state's law should apply.
4 2
These decisions expose the Court's difficulty in fashioning equita-
ble relief in interstate pollution disputes and in determining the proper
forum for such disputes. The lack of unanimity about the effect of the
CWA on interstate pollution conflicts indicates why no clearly distilled
precedent existed prior to Arkansas v. Oklahoma.
36. Id. at 411. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the action concluding the
FWCPA does not contemplate application of the law of the state receiving the waste, in
this case, Illinois. Id. at 414.
37. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
38. Id. at 484.
39. Id. at 498-99. The Court explained the two sections of the CWA comprising the
savings clause" which preserve the right of an individual to bring an action thereunder,
33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e) & 1370 (1988), "pre-empts state law to the extent that the state law
is applied to an out-of-state point source." Ouellette, 497 U.S. at 500.
40. Id. at 494-99; see also Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas, supra note 6,
at 35, 40-43, 45, 46.
41. Ouellette, 497 U.S. at 504-07. Ouellette was a 5-3 opinion with Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part: "I find that the Act's plain lan-
guage clearly indicates that Congress wanted to leave intact the traditional right of the
affected State to apply its own tort law when its residents are injured by an out-of-state
polluter." Id. See also Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 197 (1985) (preemption of state common law remedies is
inconsistent with congressional intent). Contra, Chicago Park Dist. v. Sanitary Dist. of
Hammond, 530 F.Supp. 291 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1981) (state law claims against out-of-state
dischargers are pre-empted).
42. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 501-02 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,JJ., concurring in part




B. The Clean Water Act
A two-year study conducted by the United States Senate Committee
on Public Works, concluded in 1972, revealed dismal progress in the
nation's efforts to abate water pollution.43 Following the study, Con-
gress adopted the FWPCA amendments of 1972 with "the objective...
to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters". 44 Resolve to abate pollution was apparent in
both the Committee report and resulting legislation 45 which states, "the
Committee believes it is important to clarify this point: No one has the
right to pollute."'4 6 Congress amended the Act in 1977 and retitled it
the Clean Water Act (CWA).4 7 The touchstone of the 1972 amend-
ments is the creation of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permitting scheme.
4 8
The NPDES permitting program makes the discharge of effluent
into navigable waterways illegal in the absence of an approved permit. 49
Power to issue NPDES permits either rests with states that have enacted
a federally approved permitting program, or with the EPA, in the ab-
sence of an EPA-approved state program. 50 Success in eliminating pol-
lution is then measured by the ambient water quality in areas affected by
the permitted discharge. 5 1 The CWA provides for concurrent federal
and state authority over waterways, expressly preserving states' rights to
"adopt or enforce" standards or limitations on pollution discharge. 52
Adoption of water quality standards remains in the hands of individual
state governments, acknowledging state sovereignty and each state's in-
timate knowledge of its own natural resources. 5 3 The CWA respects
state soveriegnty by allowing each state to adopt water quality standards
more stringent than the minimums required by the EPA.5 4 The EPA
Administrator retains authority to block state issued permits that fail to
consider the effect permitted discharge may have on a downstream
state.
55
43. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1972), repnnted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3668, 3674.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
45. Id.
46. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3709.
47. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. 11 1990).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
49. Id. § 3709; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
51. Id. § 1313 (1988); see also S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675.
52. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675 ("Talents and capacities of those States
whose own programs are superior are to be called upon to administer the permit system
within their boundaries."); see also District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 860
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (where state permits are concerned, the managers will "look for and ex-
pect State and local interest, initiative, and personnel to provide a much more effective
program than that which would result from control in regional offices of the [EPA].").
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988).
54. Id. ("such state ... may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other
limitation ...which is less stringent" than the federally approved standards); see also
United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977) (state limitations
supercede less stringent federal limitations adopted pursuant to FWCPA).
55. Id. § 1342(b)(3) & (d)(2).
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States affected by a proposed NPDES permit are admonished to
voice their objections prior to permit issuance. 56 Statutorily required
hearings provide the forum for dissent. 57 After a permit hearing,
"[s]uch agency, based upon the recommendation of such State, the Ad-
ministrator, and upon any additional evidence ... shall condition such
license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to insure compli-
ance with applicable water quality requirements."1
5 8
After hearings in Arkansas regarding the Fayetteville plant applica-
tion, the EPA concluded that an integrated reading of several CWA pro-
visions prescribed that effluent discharged under an NPDES permit
must conform with the downstream state's water quality standards. 59
Both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Ciruit adopted this
interpretation. 60
C. Federalism and federal-state tension under the CWA
The CWA mandates a partnership between the federal and state
government. 6 ' Compelling language indicates the importance of the
states' role:
It is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation and enhancement) of land
and water resources and to consult with the Administrator in
the exercise of his authority under this chapter.6
2
Since the CWA operates without reference to state boundaries, a
pollution problem affecting two states invokes notions of federalism and
state sovereignty. The CWA does not clearly resolve the tension be-
tween federal legislation as the "supreme Law of the Land" 63 and state
autonomy to protect its waterways for the health and safety of its
constituants. 64
Vesting the states with a major role in deciding water resource allo-
56. Id. § 1341(a)(2).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. §§ 1341, 1342, 1362; see also Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 908 F.2d 595, 609-15 (10th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Oklahoma] (Tenth Circuit held
the EPA reading of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314, 1341, 1342, 1365 & 1370 to require compli-
ance with affected downstream states' federally approved water quality standards was
reasonable).
60. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056; Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 604.
61. SEN. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675 ("The [19721 legislation will restore
Federal-State balance to the permit system.").
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1988).
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. Detailed consideration of constitutional law issues implicit in the Arkansas ruling
are beyond the scope of this comment. Brief consideration of congressional delegation is
addressed in text accompanying notes 61-74, supra. For a more detailed discussion see
Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 335-43 (1987), calling
for reconstitutive strategies of regulation to counteract addiction "to federal rules and




cation is a natural offshoot of the nation's historic water law develop-
ment.6 5 State control of water allocation and use was a basic tenant of
frontier expansionism. 6 6 When the CWA was enacted to coordinate pol-
lution abatement efforts, however, Congress encroached on the long-
standing policy of state self-determination in water allocation and
protection. Intervention into this province by the federal government
should arguably occur only because there exists an overrriding federal
concern to protect navigable waterways.67
The federal government's intrusion into this realm evokes little up-
roar when disputes are strictly intrastate. 68 The CWA merely ensures
that each state observe minimally acceptable federal pollution stan-
dards.6 9 When the dispute crosses state lines, however, the federal gov-
ernment's role becomes more pronounced. The inherent federal-state
conflicts are exacerbated when the relative interests of two or more
states must be considered in the decision making process.
70
An unusual application of federalism arises when state statutes are
promulgated pursuant to an overarching federal regulation. 7' State-en-
acted, federally-approved water quality standards take on a federal es-
sence, 72 as each state's standards are not preempted, but rather adopted
by the federal government. 73 The question then remains whether adop-
tion by the EPA evokes simultaneous disregard for the underlying state
concern prompting implementation of the original standards. The Ar-
kansas v. Oklahoma decision suggests such a position. 74 The response
this position elicits from each state is evident. Part IV of this Comment
65. See D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water Laws and Federal Water Uses; The
History of Conflict, the Prospects for Accomodation, 21 ENv-rL. L. 1 (1991); GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr.
& Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality Law, 60 U. CoLo. L. REV. 841,
857 (1989) ([I]n the mid-nineteenth century as the West was being settled ... the United
States Congress, through a series of statutes, severed the waters of the United States from
the public lands" and deferred to the states' for allocation of water and the creation and
administration of water rights.)
66. See Bell & Johnson, supra note 65.
67. See Hobbs & Raley, supra note 65, at 845-55 (1977 Clean Water Act is an exercise
in fundamental federalism); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism and
Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 607 (1985)
(Congressional power limiting state authority often taken at expense of the state).
68. Mississippi Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir.
1980). In Mississippi Comm 'n on Natural Resources, one of the few cases on disputed intrastate
standards, the State of Mississippi lost its challenge against the EPA mandate that Missis-
sippi comply with stricter federal water quality standards. Id.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992); Pierce, supra note 67, at 646-61 (model
for deciding federalism disputes).
71. See, e.g., Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059.
72. Id. ("at least insofar as they affect the issuance of a permit in another state, the
Oklahoma standards have a federal character").
73. See generally id.; see also S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3672. "The States have
first responsibility for enforcement of their standards. When approved by the [EPA], how-
ever, the standards for interstate navigable waters become Federal-State standards." Id.
.74. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059 ("[Tjhe Oklahoma standards have a federal character,
the EPA's reasonable, consistently held interpretation of those standards is entitled to sub-
stantial deference.").
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addresses the effect this evident tension may have on future state pollu-
tion abatement efforts.
D. Agency Deference
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 5 governs the review of
agency rulings on appeal. Absent procedural defect, or clear frustration
of legislative intent, courts are called on to uphold agency decisions not
arbitrary or capricious or otherwise in violation of the law.
76
Despite criticism by commentators, 7 7 the scope of agency deference
has expanded through a series of decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court,7 8 most notably, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.79 Justice Stevens, for the majority,8 0 explained in Chevron the
limited judicial role in review of agency action.8 1 The Court enunciated
a two-step analysis to review agency decisions. Initially, the Court
looked at whether "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. ' 8 2 If congressional intent is clear, a court merely compares the
agency ruling against the clear intent of the statute, giving "effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."18 3 Even if congressional
intent is difficult to discern, agencies have the latitude to fill legislative
gaps.8 4 Secondly, if the statute is succeptable to different interpreta-
tions because the statute itself is "silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue",8 5 a court must respect and abide by the agency's rea-
sonable interpretion. 8 6 Deference to the agency interpretation ensures
a court will not substitute its judgment for that of an agency empowered
75. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
76. Id. § 706(2)(a). Under § 706(2) of the APA, agency decisions can be set aside on
limited grounds if the decision is (a) arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of discretion, (b)
contrary to constitutional right, power or privilege, (c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority or limitations, (d) without observance of procedure required by law, (e) unsup-
ported by substantial evidence, or (f) unwarranted by the facts. Id.
77. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Challenging Regulatory Interpretations, 23 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 109 (1991) (explaining different strategies in attacking agency decisions, with admitted
limited success); Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74
MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) (explaining agencies' threshold defense of unreviewability);
Rodney A. Smolla, The Erosion of the Principle that the Government Must Follow Self-Imposed
Rules, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 472 (1984) (attacking permissiveness in agency deviation from
self-imposed rules).
78. E.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978); Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
79. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
80. Rehnquist, O'Connor and Marshall, JJ., took no part in the decision.
81. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("[T]he Administrator's interpretation ... is entitled to
deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting
policies.").
82. Id. at 842.
83. Id. at 843.
84. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). Although Morton is long cited for its
"gap-filling" proposition, the Morton Court rejected the BIA interpretation of the gap to
be filled.
85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
86. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defence Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125
(1985); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-46.
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with administering national policy. 8 7 Underlying this premise is the no-
tion the agency is democratically accountable for its decisions, while
courts possess no constituency.
88
From this vantgage, it is no surprise Justice Stevens took the oppor-
tunity in Arkansas v. Oklahoma to reinforce the Chevron doctrine of agency
deference. 89 In Arkansas v. Oklahoma, Justice Stevens quickly pointed out
that the Tenth Circuit broke with precedent, severing the judicial limb
on which the Tenth Circuit was seated.
90
III. ARKANSAS V. OKLAHOMA
A. Facts
InJuly, 1985, the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas, proposed discharg-
ing effluent from a planned sewage treatment plant into Mud Creek, a
tributary of the Illinois River. 9 1 The Illinois flows, in turn, into the state
of Oklahoma approximately thirty-nine miles downstream from the Fay-
etteville plant.9 2 Prior to commencing operations, Fayetteville applied
for an NPDES permit in accordance with the rules and regulations set
forth in the CWA for EPA-administered permits.9 3 Approval of the per-
mit would have allowed approximately one-half of the plant's total 12.2
million gallons of estimated discharge to flow into Oklahoma on a daily
basis.
9 4
On August 8, 1985, the EPA conducted the first of several permit
hearings. 9 5 Oklahoma objected to the permit, concerned about the ef-
fect the effluent may have on the Illinois River. 96 Already designated a
state scenic river, the Illinois River was afforded extensive protection
under Oklahoma's state Scenic Rivers Act.9 7 Over Oklahoma's protests,
the permit was signed and issued by the EPA on November 5, 1985,
drawing the battle lines that would capture national attention.98
87. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11; see also EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n,
449 U.S. 64 (1980); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
88. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (whereas judges are not part of either elected political
branch, administrative agencies are democratically accountable because they operate
under the direction of the executive branch); see Starr, supra note 11, at 301-04 (insight into
the policies underlying Chevron).
89. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060. ("[Tjhe court failed to give due regard to the EPA's
interpretation of its own regulations.").
90. Id. at 1058 ("[Tlhe Court of Appeals exceeded the legitimate scope of judicial
review of an agency adjudication.").
91. See id., 112 S. Ct. at 1051.
92. See id.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
94. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051.
95. See Tenth Circuit Joint Brief-in-Chief of Petitioner/Appellants, supra note 5, at 1.
96. Id. at 30-44. Oklahoma argued, inter alia: (1) the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
misinterpreted its beneficial use limitation, id. at 30 "Proposition VI"; (2) the permit was
issued in violation of its antidegradation policy, id. at 34 "Proposition VII"; (3) the ALJ
misapplied its nutrient standard requirements, id. at 39 "Proposition VIII"; and (4) the
ALJ failed to consider additional evidence of the design inadequacy of the Fayetteville
plant, id. at 42 "Proposition IX".
97. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
98. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990). See also Tim Smart, The Next War
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B. Procedural History
Objections to the EPA's handling of this dispute are evident in the
volumes of appeals attacking the decision on both procedural and sub-
stantive grounds.9 9 After initial permit approval by the EPA, Oklahoma
petitioned the agency for an evidentiary hearing, contending that the
permit was granted without consideration of several important issues. 10 0
The EPA Regional Administrator allowed partial review, limited to
whether Fayetteville's discharge would violate Oklahoma's water quality
standards and whether Fayetteville had the ability to adequately treat the
sewage before it reached the Arkansas-Oklahoma state line.' 0 '
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on August 18, 1987, nearly
two years after the initial permit hearing. 10 2 Affirming the permit, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decided discharge from the Arkansas
plant would not have an "undue impact" on the Illinois River.
10 3
Oklahoma appealed. On review, the EPA's Chief Judicial Officer (CJO)
found the "undue impact" standard inadequate. The CJO first ruled
that the CWA "requires the NPDES to impose any effluent limitations
necessary to comply with applicable state water quality standards."'
10 4
The permit was then remanded to decide whether the discharge would
have a "detectable impact" on the river. 10 5 After completing detailed
findings of the facts, the ALJ upheld issuance of the permit, concluding
application of the revised standard showed no detectable violation of
Oklahoma's water quality. 10 6 The Chief Judicial Officer sustained the
issuance of the permit. 10 7 Oklahoma's next appeal, consolidated with
appeals from the Arkansas parties, brought the matter before the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 10 8
On July 10, 1990, almost five years after the initial permit applica-
tion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the ALJ's decision that Oklahoma's
Between the States Could Be Over Clean Water, Bus. WK., Dec. 1.6, 1991; at 32; Chris Casteel,
High Court to Study River Fight, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 8, 1991, p. 1 at col. 1, p. 2A at col.
3.
99. See generally Tenth Circuit joint Brief-in-Chief of Petitioner/Appellants, supra note
5, at 1-12 (complete historic detail and dates for all appeals and administrative rulings).
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. at 3. The Administrator denied review of whether (1) the EPA erred in failing
to require an Environment Impact Statement prior to issuance of the permit; (2) the EPA
violated the CWA by denying Oklahoma adequate time to determine whether Fayetteville's
proposed discharge was in violation of Oklahoma's water quality statutes; (3) the permit
should be modified to prohibit the split-flow component which allows discharge into Mud
Creek; and (4) the permit safe-guards were sufficient to protect the Illinois River. Id.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051. The ALJ originally decided that more than a mere de
minimus impact on the State of Oklahoma's water is needed before revoking the permit.
104. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1051-52; see also Tenth Circuit Joint Brief-in-Chief of Peti-
tioner/Appellants, supra note 5, at 10.
105. Id. at 1052. The CJO instructed the ALJ that "the permit shoud be upheld if the
record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the authorized discharges would
not cause an actual detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards." Id. (empha-
sis in original).
106. Id.
107. Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas, supra note 6, at 11.
108. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1991).
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water quality standards were applicable.' 0 9 Judge Brorby, writing for
the court, found the EPA's decision to grant the permit "arbitrary and
capricious"" 10 due to the EPA's failure to consider "an important aspect
of the problem [or] offer an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency."'I The Tenth Circuit be-
lieved the effect of additional discharge into the already degraded river
warrented the court's reversal of the decision to issue the permit. "12 Vi-
olation of the CWA, the court argued, is inescapable when additional
effluent is allowed to enter an already degraded body of water.' 1 3 In
view of the Supreme Court's previously articulated policy of agency def-
erence, the Tenth Circuit ruling received much attention." 14 Both par-
ties appealed the circuit court's decision and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of the "importance and novelty of the Court of Ap-
peals' decision."' 15
C. Issues
To reach a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court applied the
CWA to three issues: 1) whether the EPA is obligated to apply down-
stream states' water quality standards on upstream emitters as a condi-
tion of issuing a NPDES permit; 2) notwithstanding a statutory
obligation to apply downstream water quality standards, whether the
EPA has authority to mandate source state compliance with downstream
water quality statutes; and, 3) whether the Tenth Circuit correctly inter-
pretated the CWA to preclude further discharge into an already de-
graded body of water. 11 6 Resolution of the first two issues addressed
the scope of the EPA's discretionary powers. To resolve the third issue
the Court evaluated the Tenth Circuit's judicial authority to overrule the
EPA by denying the permit.
D. Holding
Summarily dismissing the first question of whether the EPA is obli-
gated to apply downstream state water quality standards on an upstream
109. Id. at 615.
110. Id. at 616. "[Wie conclude EPA's decision to issue the Fayetteville permit was
arbitrary and capricious. The agency's decision is also flawed by misinterpretation and
misapplication of two important Oklahoma water quality regulations and by arbitrary dis-
regard for certain expert testimony." Id.
111. Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 43
(1983).)
112. Id. at 634. The Tenth Circuit held, "[plarticularly in light of the existing pollution
of the Illinois scenic river, the agency's decision is inconsistent with the language of the
Clean Water Act, as interpreted in light of the legislative history, and frustrates the policy
that Congress sought to implement." Id.
113. Id.
114. See generally Steven J. Bushong, Note, Upstream Pollution and Downstream Problems:
Oklahoma v. EPA Makes a Splash in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 233
(1992); John Treangen, Note, Cleaning up the Clean Water Act: Oklahoma v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 36 S.D. L. REV. 739 (1991).
115. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1052.
116. Id. at 1056.
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emitter, the Court upheld the EPA's reasonable and permissible statu-
tory interpretation of the CWA to apply Oklahoma's water quality stan-
dards."17 At the same time, the Court concluded the state parties'
reliance on precedent established in Ouellette and similar cases to deter-
mine the respective state roles in establishing water quality standards
misplaced. The Court distinguished state-administered, federally-ap-
proved permits from Fayetteville's permit granted in accordance with
the EPA procedures, refusing to rely on previous decisions clarifying
obligations under state initiated programs. 1 8 The Court declined the
opportunity to clarify future obligations under the statute, allowing the
EPA full discretion in statutory interpretation." 19
Analysis of the second issue-the EPA's authority to interpret and
apply the Oklahoma standards absent any statutory guidance-merited
more detailed discussion. Reiterating the CWA's broad purpose, the
Court focused on a statutory clause which vests with the EPA Adminis-
trator power to make "such other requirements as he deems proper." 120
Finding nothing in the history of the CWA to limit the Administrator's
authority, the Court concluded that the decision to require the Arkansas
plant's emmission to comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards
within the Administrator's domain.121
Arkansas's argument that the Court had previously defined the
downstream state's role as subordinate was dismissed by a narrow read-
ing of Ouellette. 122 The Court explained that Ouellette concerned permit-
ting procedures only, and did not "in any way constrain the EPA's
authority to require a point source to comply with downstream water
quality standards."'
23
The third issue-the Tenth Circuit's denial of the permit on the ba-
sis that the discharge would further damage an already "degraded"
river-was also decided with an eye toward broad agency authority. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the
EPA decision to issue the permit was arbitrary and capricious.
124
Resolving the first two issues in favor of EPA discretion required
only a short step to reversal of the Tenth Circuit's contradictory reading
of the CWA. 12 5 To support this position, the Court adopted the EPA's
argument that refusal of a permit because the discharge has some "theo-
retical impact" on a downstream state's water quality places effective
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The Court held, "[i]t seems unwise to evaluate those arguments in a case such
as this one, which only involves a federal permit." Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1057. The Court held, "we find nothing in that [Act's] history to indicate
that Congress intended to preclude the EPA from establishing a general requirement that
such permits be conditioned to ensure compliance with downstream water quality stan-
dards." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1057 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 1061.
125. Id. at 1059.
570 [Vol. 70:3
ARKANSAS v. OKLAHOMA
veto power of upstream development in the hands of the downstream
state. 126 The Court disregarded the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a
downstream state's influence over upstream discharge is necessarily lim-
ited by the finite ability to measure actual effects. 12 7
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Issues
1. EPA Obligations Under the CWA.
The distinction between an agency's authority to interpret a statute
and its obligation to apply the interpretation is subtle. The Court
granted the EPA authority to impose certain water quality standards,
free from any obligation to act in a consistant manner in the future. Dis-
tinguishing the required standards from the authority to apply the stan-
dards masks the ultimate result. Allowing the EPA latitude to decide its
own obligations has no real effect since making the requirement tracta-
ble at the EPA's volition creates no standard. This tautological ap-
proach provides no guidance or clarification for future disputes
concerning the interstate flow of pollution. Although the applicable
standard is determined by the downstream state, the EPA's authority to
decide compliance overrides downstream state influence.
If predictable application of the two-pronged Chevron test is of ma-
jor importance to the Court, then allowing the EPA to decide its own
obligations is understandable. 128 Arkansas v. Oklahoma maintains defer-
ence as the default standard. When ease of judicial review is our only
concern, the issue of the EPA's future obligations is of small conse-
quence. The problem remains, however, because the parties went to
court to define those future rights and obligations.
Without an effective check on deference, agencies lack accountabil-
ity. Even though an agency's consistent interpretation of its own rules
lends credibility to withstand future attacks on the agency's exercise of
discretion,' 29 agencies are not bound by past regulatory interpreta-
tion.' 3 0 Because the Arkansas decision imposes no obligation on the
EPA to apply any state water quality standards in the future, the prob-
lem remains unresolved after six years of litigation and the paradoxical
expenditure of millions of dollars, ostensibly to save resources.
The Court's refusal to consider past obligations under state-imple-
mented permitting schemes is inconsistent with the Court's later conclu-
126. Id.
127. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 606-07.
128. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); see supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
129. Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S.
27, 37 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (consistent
and contemporaneous construction of a statute increases the amount of deference given to
agency interpretation).
130. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 ("initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in
stone"); see also Ruth Colker, Administrative Prosecutorial Indiscretion, 63 TUL. L. REv. 877
(1989).
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sion that state-enacted water quality standards become federal in
nature,13 ' and thus, subject to full EPA discretion. The confusion could
have been avoided if the Courts' analyis of permit obligations mirrored
its consideration of the nature of state water quality standards. The
state permitting programs previously evaluated by the Court in cases
cited as precedent by both parties should have been considered federal
in nature and also subject to similar federal interpretation.
2. EPA Authority under the CWA.
When considering the second issue-EPA authority to interpret
state standards-the Court disregarded its previous discussion in Arkan-
sas v. Oklahoma of the federal-state relationship under the CWA.13 2 The
CWA encourages each state to set its own water quality standards, even
allowing more stringent state standards than those required by the
EPA. 133 In Arkansas, the Court ignored federal-state partnership by
overriding Oklahoma's previous interpretation of its state-set, federally-
approved water quality standards. Favoring the EPA's interpretation of
the Oklahoma statutes over the express intent of the enacting state legis-
lators makes states appear more pawns than policy-makers.
Interestingly, the EPA Administrator's authority to make these deci-
sions is not based on clear legislative intent, but rather on the CWA's
failure to expressly limit the Administrator's authority. 134 Apparently,
silence in congressional enactment vests unlimited authority in the Ad-
ministrator without accountability: such broad arbitrary power dilutes
any force ofjudicial review under the APA's "arbitrary and capricious"
standard. While this conclusion is admittedly overreaching, if the EPA is
charged with filling legislative gaps with any reasonable interpretation, it
is difficult to imagine circumstances under which additional efforts
would be taken to challenge EPA decisions.
3. Tenth Circuit's Denial of the EPA Permit.
By overturning the Tenth Circuit's permit denial, the Court nar-
rowed the already limited scope of agency review. 13 5 Considering only
a portion of the Tenth Circuit's analysis-namely the circuit court's con-
cern over the already degraded quality of the river-the Supreme Court
ignored the balance of the evidence relied upon by the circuit court.1
3 6
Troubled by the circuit court's disregard for the "substantial evidence"
131. See Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1059 ("state water quality standards-promulgated by
the States with substantial guidance from the EPA [citation omitted] approved by the
Agency-are part of the federal law of water pollution control").
132. See id. at 1054.
133. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
134. See Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1056. For example, the Court held, "[elven if the Clean
Water Act itself does not require the Fayetteville discharge to comply with Oklahoma's
water quality standards, the statute clearly does not limit the EPA's authority to mandate
such compliance." Id.
135. See id. at 1060.
136. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 616-18. The court carefully reviewed the purposes behind
Oklahoma's Beneficial Use Limitation/Antidegradation policies and determined that al-
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standard, the Court pointed out that the circuit opinion mentions, on
several occasions, that sufficient evidence was before the EPA to draw
the circuit's conclusions.' 3 7 This rationale confuses the availability of
evidence with its nature. An abundance of evidence does not necessarily
mean all evidence supports the agency position. Again ignoring the cir-
cuit court,' 3 8 the Supreme Court overlooked the contradiction between
the underlying evidence and the EPA findings.
Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court recognized judicial
review under the APA includes striking down agency acts that entirely
fail to consider an important aspect of a problem.' 3 9 Oklahoma's water
quality statutes, now part of federal law, should have received consistant
interpretation based on the enacting legislature's intent and the pur-
poses of the CWA. Considering the remedial nature of the CWA, 140 dis-
missal of the Tenth Circuit's well reasoned approach to this analysis did
not merit the complete foreclosure it received.
B. Economic Effects of the Decision
The Court's willingness to perpetuate an already economically inef-
ficient system of agency-administered public policy is not the appropri-
ate solution to our administrative or environmental woes. Justice
Stevens' extension of agency deference, initially advocated in Chevron,
produced no significant procedural change in current methods of judi-
cial review. The unfortunate effect results from application of the pro-
cedure. Granting the EPA discretionary authority to interpret and apply
Oklahoma's water quality standards creates a series of disincentives that
block the road to environmental improvement. First, the role of each
state in implementing environmental policy is severely undermined.
Second, expansion of EPA discretion does not create administrative in-
centives to reform programs many deem outdated and ineffective.'
4 '
Third, the purpose and effect ofjudicial review as a check on administra-
tive agency performance and procedure is rendered impotent. Fourth,
and perhaps most importantly, pollution emitters are not encouraged to
expand their efforts to abate pollution. These deleterious results, as dis-
lowing additional pollutants into the river would directly contravene the underlying poli-
cies. Id.
137. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060. "[A]t least four times, the court concluded that 'there
was substantial evidence before the ALJ to support' particular findings which the court
thought appropriate, but which were contrary to those initially made by the ALJ." Id.
138. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 619-31. "[The] EPA undermined our usual deference to its
special expertise by the failure of its presiding officer to consider an important scientific
principal, the oxygen-reducing effects of algae respiration and decay, and by his incom-
plete understanding of phosphorus assimilation . . . [and] lack of thoroughness." Id. at
630.
139. Arkansas, 112 S. Ct. at 1060; Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 599.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988) ("the objective of this Chapter is to restore integrity of the
Nation's waters" (emphasis added)); see also S. REP. No. 414,supra note 43, at 3710 ("[T]he
Administrator is under specific obligation to require that [high quality] level of effluent
control .. .without regard to the limits of practicability.").
141. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text and infra notes 148 & 150 and accom-
panying text.
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cussed below, are closely tied to perpetuating the system currently in
place and are especially disturbing considering Congress' emphatic call
to reduce pollution when the CWA was enacted.142
1. State Effects.
Allowing the EPA latitude to interpret and apply state law over the
dissent of the affected state-even though the state law was promulgated
pursuant to a federal program--challenges the longstanding policy vest-
ing states with control over state resources.14 3 Arkansas' argument that
application of the Oklahoma standards violates its right to use its water-
ways is unpersuasive, 14 4 running contrary to the belief that a party's
freedom to utilize resources remains unencumbered until the use harms
another party. Congressional understanding that downstream states'
concerns provide limits on upstream activities is reflected in the NPDES
permitting scheme that requires extensive downstream state input.'
4 5
State control over water resources, including state water quality
standards, more accurately reflects the desires of those with a vested
interest in the state's water quality maintenance.1 46 All of the options
allowed to states under the CWA, from establishing strict water quality
standards to enacting a seperate permitting procedure, require expendi-
ture of state funds. The EPA's disregard, with court approval, of state
water quality standards results in an uncertainty of whether the effort to
establish state standards as required by the CWA14 7 is efficient or cost-
effective.
2. Agency Effects.
The Court's unconditional affirmation of the EPA's interpretation
of the CWA provides no incentive for the EPA to conduct critical, point-
specific analyses of water quality questions, especially those unique to a
geographic area. If EPA standards will be upheld on a limited eviden-
tiary basis, no need to expend time and energy in more intensive study
exists. This is perplexing because the Court, by ignoring state statutory
interpretation, effectively renders state studies of this nature moot.
Without accountability, agencies may be less motivated to consider all
viable alternatives in developing abatement programs, including those
proposed by individual states. Criticism of this aspect of EPA centraliza-
tion has already been leveled.14 8 The lack of motivation may occur at
precisely the same time that increasing industrial complexity requires a
heightened need for specialized study.
142. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3675.
143. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
144. Tenth Circuit Answer of Respondent Arkansas, supra note 6, at 43.
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988).
146. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988).
148. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 14, at 1333. "The present regulatory system
wastes tens of billions of dollars every year, misdirects resources, stifles innovation, and




The ruling in Arkansas sounds a clear warning to discourage consid-
ered judicial review of agency decisions. It constricts courts' efforts to
ensure the foremost concern of the EPA is public policy implementa-
tion. 14 9 After the Supreme Court's correction of the Tenth Circuit,
courts may be even more reluctant to consider agency decisions. This
exacerbates what has already been labeled by some as the "rubber-
stamp" effect of agency decision making.150 Lack of judicial review al-
lows agencies to operate without accountability. Without accountability
there is no assurance that programs implemented by the agency prop-
erly reflect the public needs prompting the underlying legislation. Pub-
lic awareness of the implications of judicial inability to confront agency
decisions, and the futility of agency challenges, may result in legitimate
industrial or environmental concerns going unaddressed.
An unintended effect of Arkansas may be to promote the use of non-
judicial alternatives to resolve interstate pollution conflicts.' 5 ' The
state parties involved in Arkansas have begun a dialog regarding inter-
state resource planning.' 5 2 If litigation does not achieve the intended
result of establishing absolute rights to the river, alternatives must be
considered. Resource savings may result from earlier resolution without
litigation.
4. Industry Effects.
Perhaps the most serious implication of Arkansas v. Oklahoma is its
failure to provide incentives for polluters to stop polluting. Affirming
149. Arkansas, 112 S.Ct. at 1061. "It is not our role, or that of the Court of Appeals, to
decide which policy choice is the better one for it is clear that Congress has entrusted such
decisions to the Environmental Protection Agency." Id.
150. Smolla, supra note 75, at 475 (provides a due process attack on permissive agency
deviation from self-imposed procedural rules); Jonathon R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local
Regulations and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federal-
ism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990) (calling for closer judicial review); see also Abner J. Mivka,
How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1986). In an April
17, 1986, address at American University Law Review banquet, the Honorable AbnerJ.
Mikva of the federal District Court of the District of Columbia decried the effect of Chevron
of limiting judicial statutory interpretation: "[c]ases like Chevron, however, deny parties,
and more generally, the system of democratic government, access to judges' rich experi-
ence in answering these [statutory interpretation) questions." Id. at 8.
151. Although litigation has long been the chosen method to establish rights and
boundaries to waters, many argue the courts are not best suited to resolve environmental
conflicts. While decisions about the ownership of specific rights to water can easily be
structured into a one-time settlement, problems resulting from the continuous flow of
interstate waters frequently require ongoing attention. The courts' ability to address only
specifically disputed facts results in many of the complexities of the problem to go un-
resolved. See LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION (1984); Frank P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law, 14 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 157 (1989) (discusses environmental disputes amenable to alternative forms of
resolution); Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Rolefor the Courts?,
10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985).
152. Paul English, Arkansas, Oklahoma Target Water Quality, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June 3,
1992, at 7 (A joint task force created by both state's governors, implemented to "work
toward an effective means of controlling the natural and man-made pollution that is
threatening the streams and lakes of this region.").
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
the EPA's position merely continues our current system of command
and control pollution abatement.' 5 3 The mentality that spurred the
EPA to "push, prod, and cajole"' 15 4 industry into reducing pollution
must evolve to meet the needs of the twentieth century. Industrial com-
plexity continues to increase and the ability of a centralized agency to
efficiently administer and economically monitor a growing scheme of
top-down regulations is no longer viable. This does not mean a whole-
sale abandonment of regulations is in order. However, it is time for the
EPA to shift its role from a pure regulator to a market facilitator.'
5 5
Some may argue that the Court's consideration of the degraded
condition of the Illinois River prior to denying the Fayetteville permit
places a disproportionate share of the clean-up costs on new industries.
While true in theory, this proposition begs the question of where to
draw the "bright-line" prohibiting new polluters from entering the mar-
ket. The possibility of discrimination against new polluters is no excuse
to allow additional pollution and disregard the remedial goals of the
CWA.
The Tenth Circuit addressed this notion in Oklahoma v. Arkansas by
pointing out the Illinois River has already been degraded by upstream
polluters. 156 The court considered the poor condition of the river as
evidence that the practice of allowing new contamination, similar to that
of the Fayetteville plant, must stop. Current degradation implies indus-
trial users have previously polluted the river without bearing the appro-
priate cost. The degradation continues today. Unfortunately, the circuit
court was not in the position to take the analysis one step further and
query the allocation of pollution costs between existing and future pol-
luters. Economic considerations suggest that only those polluters utiliz-
ing least cost methods to clean up should be encouraged to operate on
the river. Merely requiring compliance with existing command and con-
trol regulations does not compel the overhaul of outmoded pollution
control systems. While forcing use of newer, more efficient methods of
153. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
154. Daniel A. Mazmanian & David L. Morell, EPA: Coping With the New Political Economic
Order, 21 ENVrL. L. 1477, 1478.
155. Id. Masmanian & Morrell outline ten strategies for the EPA's advancement into
the coming decades: (1) EPA must break out of its monomedia myopia, adopting instead a
true cross-media focus; (2) environmental management must shift from centralized regula-
tory control to reliance on market-based solutions; (3) EPA, whenever feasible, must rely
on goal-based performance standards as opposed to rules and regulations demanding spe-
cific actions; (4) environmental management issues must be understood as collective
goods problems requiring collective solutions both geographically and over time; (5) de-
centralized arenas of action (states, localities, individual firms) are preferable; (6) environ-
mental decisions must be sensitive to business and economic requirements (cost, ease of
compliance) that define their actual implementation; (7) environmental decisions must be
sensitive to social, ethic and minority concerns; (8) emphasis must be placed on source
reduction, pollution prevention, recycling and material efficiency; (9) credible and endur-
ing citizen involvement is required in both policy formulation and implementation; (10)
command-and-control management strategies are often incompatible with several of the
above principles, and should be adopted only as a last resort. Id.
156. Oklahoma, 908 F.2d at 620-28.
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control may be costly for existing polluters, this allocation is long
overdue.
A look at the underlying condition of the river points to feasible
solutions long advocated by commentators, 15 7 and now supported by
administrative officials. 158 The time has come to implement liability-
based programs that provide market incentives to clean up the environ-
ment. A system that allocates the cost of pollution to the polluting par-
ties goes far in eliminating many of the disincentives created by the
command and control structure. 15 9 Several alternatives have been sug-
gested in commentary, some already implemented with success.1 60
Economic and technical assessment of methods to control pollution
to meet reduction goals should be placed not on the agency but on the
responsible polluters. Several means of reapportioning this responsibil-
ity exist and have been implemented on a limited scale to meet specific
needs.' 6 1 Regulating pollution through market-based controls, either
by transferable permits, or taxation according to emission levels pro-
vides cost reduction incentives to polluters. 16 2 A permit system ac-
knowledges the inevitability of externalities at an acceptable,
governmentally approved level. Once an acceptable level of pollution is
established the polluting industries can allocate between themselves,
within a defined economic or geographical area, the cost of pollution
control. The ability to develop least polluting alternatives is rewarded
by a direct offset in the cost of business. Clean-up costs are placed in
the more competent hands of businesses which possess incentives to in-
novate pollution reduction technologies that increase bottom-line effi-
157. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
158. Richard B. Stewart, long a proponent of market based incentives, served at the
post of Assistant Attorney General, Department ofJustice, Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division; See supra note 14 and accompanying text. His comments before the Ad-
ministrative Conference in 1990 on the need for reform and alternatives to the existing
system are summarized in the Yale Journal on Regulation article. See Marshall J. Breger,
et al, Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, Address during the Congres-
sional debate over the Clean Air Act Amendments (April 23, 1990), in 8 YALEJ. ON REG.
463 (1991). The overall goal is to achieve the most clean-up for limited dollars, "[g]iven
that the amount that society is actually willing to spend for environmental protection is
limited, that [use of incentives] means we can get more environmental protection for the
same amount of money by using economic incentives." Id. at 469.
159. 1 am not suggesting a moratorium on new upstream activities. Reforms would
invite the influx of the most economically and environmentally sound industries at the
expense of those no longer able to contribute to the goal of keeping the waters clean. For
an additional discussion of the positive effects of reallocating externality costs to those in
the best position to prevent harm, see Babich, supra note 12, at 755-58.; See also supra notes
14-15.
160. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 14, at 470 (citing success of lead phase-down
in gasoline effected through trading lead reduction credits); TIETENBERG, supra note 15, at
93-122; Hahn & Stavins, supra note 15, at 8 (citing an emissions trading program for saving
between $5-$12 billion over program life; a lead trading program; proposed use of trade-
able permits for water pollution control at Lake Dillon, Colorado with potential savings of
over $1 million annually; and voluntary water exchange programs as alternatives to litiga-
tion between western states for water allocation).
161. See supra notes 14, 15, 155, 157 and accompanying text.
162. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A
New Era From an Old Idea? 18 ECOLOGY L.O. 1 (1991).
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ciency. Similar incentives exist under a pollution tax system where
improved pollution control is rewarded by a direct tax reduction. These
systems not only free up agency resources, the permit fees or taxes as-
sessed as penalties provide a direct financial benefit to the agency. Lia-
bility based programs such as the Comprehensive Environmental
Responsibility Liability Compensation Act (CERCLA) 16 3 also impose
the cost of pollution reduction directly on the responsible polluters. Im-
position of strict retroactive liability forces polluters to internalize exter-
nality costs.164 Leaving industry with no choice but to reduce pollution
provides incentive to develop least-cost methods for pollution control.
This need can be filled internally by the polluting industry, or polluters
can locate third parties with clean-up expertise to complete the work on
a least cost basis. This internal/external competition will promote effi-
cient methods of compliance.
C. Economic Balancing
The CWA edict against pollution is minimized by the Arkansas v.
Oklahoma decision. Explicit in the EPA's duty to issue permits is a bal-
ancing of economic interests.1 65 A cost-benefit analysis necessarily
means the decision focus shifts from pollution abatement to cost alloca-
tion. The most difficult portion of the costs to allocate are the externali-
ties resulting from plant operation. In the Illinois River situation, those
bearing the costs of pollution receive none of the benefits; the down-
stream Oklahoma parties receive no benefit from the Fayetteville waste
treatment plant. This problem also supports reform of the existing sys-
tem. Decisions need to be made regarding the best home for unavoida-
ble externalities.'
66
Questioning this balancing points to the riddle underlying why the
Supreme Court allows the EPA such great latitude in applying policy.
On its deepest level, accountability becomes the overriding question.
Congressional delegation of the decision-making responsibility appears
indicative of its underlying fear that it will be held accountable for un-
popular policy implementation. 167 Chevron provided insight into this ra-
tionale as the Court speculated that Congress "consciously desired the
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp.I 1989).
164. Babich, supra note 12, at 750. The liability based statutes of the 1980's reflect a
policy choice by Congress that those in some way responsible for the release of toxic
chemical, rather than the public at large must bear the costs of environmental pollution.
Id.
165. S. REP. No. 414, supra note 43, at 3713. "[C]onsideration must be given, on a case-
by-case basis, to a balancing of economic and social costs against social and economic
benefits sought to be obtained." Id.
166. For an example of the enormity of externality costs see GRAD, supra note 18, at
§ 3.01[3] (American Public Works Association estimates it will cost between $15 to $48
billion to remedy overflows from storm and waste combined sewers).
167. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICEs 26 (1978)
("Evasion, disguise, temporizing, deception are all ways by which artfully chosen alloca-
tion methods can avoid the appearance of failing to reconcile values in conflict."); Macey,
supra note 150, at 285 (One strategy for maximizing political support under conditions of
uncertainty is to delegate the matter to an administrative agency.)
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Administrator to strike the balance at this [agency] level, thinking that
those with greater expertise and charged with responsibility for adminis-
tering the provision would be in a better position to do so.' 168 While
sounding reasonable, this allows legislators to point fingers to programs
clearly in the public interest, and at the same time wash their hands of
responsibility for poor administration.
V. CONCLUSION
The legitimate attempt by the Tenth Circuit to equitably administer the
CWA by viewing the legislation as a whole has been overruled. Another
vote for the status quo of EPA deference results in the EPA emerging as
the preferred creator, interpreter and enforcer of national policy. Con-
scious implementation of cost-effective programs, subject to reasonable
judicial checks, 169 would be a positive step in alleviating the pollution
problem. Until that happens, the states, affected businesses and individ-
uals are left swimming upstream against a growing tide of EPA
discretion.
Cynthia L. McNeill
168. Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
169. See Deanell Reece Tacha,Judges on Judging: Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Rela-
tionship, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 279 (1991) ("The complexities of the law-making and law-inter-
preting tasks in the third century of this republic cry out for systematic dialogue between
those who make and those who interpret legislation."); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L.
Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 1045 (199 1)(citing the need for better communication between judges and legisla-
tors); Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56
GEO. WASH. REV. 703 (1988) (advocating a structural review of statutes as a means to
better understand legislative intent).
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